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Upon the first citing of any work, the
reference in given in full. After that, only
author and page number are given. Latinate forms
are avoided, the plural of 'court-martial' is
'court-martials', and Harmondsworth is in London.
When quoting from a letter or book, the
original spelling and punctuation is reproduced
without comment. That is, there is no (sic). When
quoting from a court martial transcript of spoken
testimony, I have modernized punctuation and
spelling.
Withing quotations, anything in brackets
(like this) is a reproduction of the brackets in
the original. Anything underlined in brackets
(like this) is an interpolation by me. Anything
underlined outside brakcets, like this, is a
reproduction of the under-lining in a handwritten
text, or of italics in a book. In no case have I
emphasized anything within a quotation.
All references to 'Adm'. are to the Admiralty
records at the Public Record Office, Kew, London.
Summary
This thesis is a study of disputes and
conflicts between officers and men in the Royal
Navy between 1793 and 1814. The first part is a
general introduction to shipboard life and work,
discipline, resistance and protest, and to the
sailors' culture and politics. The second part is
a detailed study of the mutinies on the Culloden
in 1794 and the Defiance in 1795, paying
particular attention to the organization of the
sailors, the strategy of the officers and the
function and working of court martials. The third
part is a more general history of the sailors'
protests and mutinies between 1796 and 1814. These
mutinies and protests are situated with regard to
the changing balance of forces between officers
and men in the Navy as a whole during these years.
The thesis is largely based on the verbatim
transcipts of court martials in the Royal Navy
that are now part of the Admiratly Records at the
Public Record Office. It is intended as a
contribution to the social history of the Royal
Navy and the labour history of the period.
PART ONE:
Introduction
2Chapter One: Two Mutinies
On the late afternoon of February 20, 1797,
the frigate HMS Hermione ran into a sudden
Caribbean squall off the coast of Puerto Rico.
Captain Pigot ordered his men aloft to reef the
topsails. The men leapt up the rigging. The
mizzenmast rose from the quarterdeck where Pigot
stood, so the men in the mizzentop were directly
under his eye. Pigot felt they were working too
slowly, and he shouted at them that he would flog
the last man down. (1)
The mizzentopmen believed him. Many captains
did the same, especially when the admiral was
watching. The men felt it was unfair, for the
first two men up the yard were inevitably the men
out on the ends of the yard, and therefore also
the last two men down. But many captains felt it
encouraged the others.
The Hermione was an unhappy ship. Her
(1) Thi8 account of the mutiny on the Hermione is
based on Dudley Pope, The Black Ship, London,
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1963. My.emphasis and
some of the interpretation differs from Pope's,
however.
3previous captain, Wilkinson, had seemed addicted
to the lash, and two men had died after repeated
beatings. (1) When Hugh Pigot replaced him in
1796, the men held their breath. Pigot turned out
to be no better: a shouter, a bully and a flogger.
The Hermiones (the crews were called after
their 8hips) were certainly frightened. They raced
back along the yards as the wind made the ship yaw
back and forth. Three men fell simultaneously from
the mizzen yard. William Johnson was a 15 year old
orphan from England. Peter Basoomb was a 16 year
old black man from Barbados. The identity of the
third is not recorded. All three died as they hit
the deck.
The men in the maintop were still gathering
in the larger mainsail. They looked wordlessly
down upon the deck. Nobody seems to have moved.
Captain Pigot shouted an order: 'Throw the lubbers
overboard.'
The maintopmen were the most experienced and
respected sailors among the crew. They began to
murmer among themselves. Down on deck Pigot could
not hear what they were saying, but he could
(1) For a very hostile portrait of Wilkinson by a
seaman who served under him on another ship, see
The Adventures of John Wetherell, edited by C.S.
Forester, London, Michael Joseph, 1954, pages
27-106.
4guess. He ordered the boatswain's mates into the
rigging to 'start' the maintopmen. The boatswains'
mates went up the rigging and out along the yards,
beating the maintopmen about the head and
shoulders with 8tout ropes. The maintopmen had to
hang on with their hands and could not defend
themselves.
The men on deck threw the bodies overboard.
Sailors were not religious men. In the heat of
battle they would throw the dead over the side.
But at any other time it was an invariable and
customary mark of respect to say a few words and a
prayer over the body before consigning it to the
deep.
When the maintopmen came down to the deck
Pigot ordered their names taken so that they could
be flogged the next day for insubordination. That
night several of the crew met and decided to take
the ship, but when morning came they had done
nothing. It is possible they were frightened.
At noon the maintopmen were flogged. David
Casey, a midshipman on the Hermione, was later to
record that 'A very severe punishment of several
men, I believe twelve or fourteen, took place in
the usual way at the public place of punishment.'
The Hermiones came for Pigot just after
eleven that night. Among the first men into the
5captain's cabin were a Dane, an Irishman, an
American and a Cornishman. They carried tomahawks
and cutlasses. Above them on the quarterdeck
Lieutenant Foreshaw heard the killing below. He
told William Turner, master's mate, to go below
and see what was happening.
'If you want to know you can go down
yourself,' said Turner.
Forshaw decided it would be politic to change
course and look for help from their sister ship
the Diligence, somewhere to the windward in the
dark night. Thomas Osborn was the man at the
wheel. Foreshaw ordered him to put up the helm.
Osborne replied, 'I'll see you damned first.'
Lieutenant Foreshaw hit Osborne. Out of the
dark, several Hermiones emerged and began chopping
and slicing at Lieutenant Foreshaw. He backed
slowly towards the rail, streaming blood. Finally
he could go no further, and fell over the side. He
landed in the mizzen chains (planks sticking out
from the side of the ship.) Half an hour later he
crawled back onto the deck, weak from loss of
blood. The mutineera at first stepped back, as if
from a ghost. When he spoke they realized their
mistake. They pitched him back over the side, and
he passed out of history.
Captain Pigot went out his cabin window.
6James Allen found Lieutenant Douglas hiding under
a cot. Allen was 14 years old and worked as
Douglas' personal servant. As the men went for the
lieutenant, Allen pushed forward with a tomahawk,
crying 'Let me have a chop at him: he shan't make
me jump about in the gunroom any more.' Nidshipman
John Smith was 13 years old and widely disliked.
The Hermiones pushed him out a porthole.
The people now controlled the ship, and their
leaders met in the captain's cabin. Lawrence
Cronin stood up to speak to the men. 'I have been
a Republican since the beginning of the war,' he
began, and went on to give a revolutionary speech,
wildly cheered. At the end Cronin said they should
kill the remaining officers. The cry was 'Pass
them up'. The surgeon, the purser, the first
lieutenant, the captain's clerk and the marine
lieutenant were thrown overboard.
But the master, the carpenter, the gunner and
Nidshipman Casey were left alive. These men were
liked. Casey had been flogged himself on Pigot's
orders only a short time before. The master's boy
servant was going through the ship in tears
pleading with his shipmates for the master's life.
The moderates among the leaders insisted upon a
vote, and a forest of hands went up for mercy.
The mutineers took the ship to an enemy port
7on the Spanish Main (now Venezuela) • There the
four surviving officers gave themselves up as
prisoners of war. So did one loyalist among the
ship's company. All the other men declared for the
mutiny. Many changed their names and looked for
passage to the United States. The only woman on
board was the widow of the murdered boatswain. She
went with the mutineere.
For the next twenty years the Admiralty
pursued the mutineers with a fierce vengeance.
Many of the men continued to 'use the sea', for it
was their only trade. 33 Hermiones were eventually
caught, and 24 of them were hanged. The four
officers who had survived testified again at these
trials, sending to the gallows many of the men who
had voted to save their lives. Lawrence Cronin,
the revolutionary and republican, settled in
Venezuela. Almost 120 other mutineers got clean
away. (1)
The Winchelseas
The mutiny on the Hermione fits a steroetype,
for there was a sadistic captain, a bloody rising,
1t. i nffl çkT t h
numbers, for the mutineers quite sensibly
destroyed the relevant muster books.
8and the men ran for the Spanish Main with the
Admiralty in cruel pursuit. In fact, it was most
exceptional. It was the only mutiny in 22 years of
war where the men killed the captain. Far more
typical was the mutiny on the Winchelsea at
Spithead in 1793. It began with a letter from the
ship's company to the admiral:
Winchelsea, Sper. 16th, 1793
Your Honour,
We now lay under the disagreeable
opportunity of Informing Your Honour that our
usage is not altogether as good as we
formerly were used to in others of his
Najesty 's ships besides it has been heard
openly for Captain Fisher that he will use us
in a More Crewl Manner than ever he did which
gives us a very dismal prospect of the Voyage
which we are going to proceed we are all with
one accord willing to serve our King and
Country upon any Demand Whatsoever but we are
fully determined never to go to Sea under
Capt. Fisher's command. French Prison will be
more agreeable to us or Death alone than to
mmnc4 1y hi.m W hope ycur HQnu wUl
& gv u	 pdy R1if,
As our situation at the Present time is
9Shocking to Repeat we all Remain With our
Duty to our King.
Yours &c
Winchelseas. (1)
The letter was addressed to Sir Peter Parker, the
Commander in Chief at Spithead. The men were
clearly attempting to be polite, but they were
also clearly threatening to desert to the enemy
without a fight.
The next morning they staged a demonstration.
(2) The ship was riding at anchor, and the
(1) This letter is enclosed in a letter from
Admiral Parker to the Admiralty, 1? September
1793, in Adm. 1:1005, Letter 480. Throughout this
thesis I have left all contemporary letters in the
original spelling and pronunciation, as the style
and grammar and spelling tell us a great deal
about the man who wrote the letter. But in quoting
from the verbatim records of the court martials I
have generally modernized the spelling,
punctuation and capitalization of the clerk, as
all these serve to obscure the similarity of the
spoken language then and. now. I have, however,
preserved any underlinings by the clerk in the
belief that these reflect an emphasis in the
spoken speech. This account of the Winchelsea
muinty is largely based on the trial of William
Price and others in Adm. 1:5330.
(2) The ship's log in Adm. 52:2539.
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boatswain piped all hands on deck to get out the
ship's boats, but 44 of them remained below. They
used their hammocks and sea chests to barricade
themselves in the forward gun bay.
Captain Richard Fisher went below with one
officer. The men stood with their backs to Fisher,
and in the darkness he was unable to indentify any
individual. He threatened violence, and fired his
pistol into the hammocks to underline his point.
The people were unarmed, though the officer
thought he saw a marlinspike gleam in the
darkness. The Winchelseas refused to sail and
demanded that Captain Fisher allow them to speak
to the admiral. They said they could no longer
tolerate the way in which they were used. They
wanted a new ship and new officers, or individual
transfers to other ships. Out of the dark an
unidentifiable voice said 'One and all flOWt. The
people gave three cheers.
Fisher continued to threaten them, and they
finally agreed that if the officers went up on
deck they would follow. After ten minutes, and
probably a lot of argument, the men went up on
deck and reported for muster. It was the first
'mutiny' of the war.
What is really interesting is what happened
afterwards. Two seamen and a master's mate were
11
court martjalled for mutiny. The evidence was
thin. Generally only a few seamen ever testified
against their mates in mutiny trials. On the
Winohelsea nobody did. Every witness from below
decks told the same story: he personally had been
forced to stay below, and he had recognized none
of his shipmates among the 43 men with him. The
master's mate was acquitted. The two seamen were
convicted only of 'being concerned in the said
mutiny, that being present thereat, they did not
use their utmost endeavour to suppress the same'
Accordingly on 7 October William Price and William
Duggan were flogged round the fleet at Spithead.
Price took 131 lashes and Duggan 141 before the
surgeon certified that they could take no more.
(1) It was not a mild punsihment, but it was not
the noose.
The flogging did not solve Admiral Parker's
problem. In their letter the Winche].seas had said
that they were 'fully determined' and effectively
threatened to surrender to the French. There was
no way of knowing if they would carry out this
threat. Four days after the mutiny Captain Fisher
(1) As was customary, Captain Fisher asked the
Adm.lty lzc prc1cn them aftei' that, since they
h4 1tn pUnithiii riLugh, Fisha t Parker and
Parker to Admiralty, 18 October 1793 in Adm.
1:1005, Letter 514.
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wrote to the admiral. He said that he had found 73
petty officers and able seamen, as well as two
ordinary seamen, who wanted a transfer. Fisher
wanted them all exchanged into another ship. (1)
We can assume that he was unsure of his ability to
control his crew.
Nine days after the floggings the Winchelsea
discharged Risher, eight petty officers and eight
seamen into another ship. Their places were taken
by ten seamen, eight petty officers and a new
captain. (2)
The Winohelseas had won. Parker had removed
Captain Fisher and sixteen of his 'folowers'.
Duggan and Price had been brutally beaten, but
mutiny had worked.
And of course it had worked on the Hermione
as well. Captain Pigot had met a rough justice and
over four-fifths of the ship's company had
escaped. But the Winohelsea was far more typical.
It was not an armed revolt. Like most mutinies of
the period, it was really a strike and a
demonstration. This thesis will be devoted to the
analysis of such 'mutiniest.
(1) Enclosure from Fisher to Parker in Parker to
Admiralty, 21 September 1793 in Adm. 1:1005,
Letter 485.
(2) Ship's log in Adm. 52:2539.
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Chapter Two: Introduction
This thesis is about the class struggle
between officers and men in the Royal Navy between
1793 and 1814. It covers the collective protests
of the lower deck: the dignified letters of
protest, sullen murmering crowds, noisy
demonstrations, strikes and mutinies. It also
covers the responses of the officers: concessions,
enquiries, compromise, beatings, armed
intimidation, court martial and flogging. The
intention is to contribute both to the social
history of the Navy and labour history of the
period.
The basic sources are the Admiralty court
martial records for these years, now held at the
Public Record Office. Students of eighteenth
century labour history usually must rely on spies'
reports and brief summaries of trials. The
Admiralty, however, insisted on a verbatim record
of all the questions and testimony in every court
martial. This makes the trials a rich source for
t.h nv	 htc'n, n4 i uni.qi	 .u'c Vc th
V th	 pr4
!4en stood trial for many offenses, and the
14
transcript of the average court martial runs for
perhaps twenty pages. Nany mutiny trials lasted
much longer, and often the transcript is more than
a hundred pages. A detailed astudy of the
transcript can be supplemented by the use of other
documents in the Admiralty records: particularly
the ship's muster books, letters between officers,
and the ships' logs. (There is a detailed
discussion of these and other sources in Appendix
Two.) This wealth of records means that we can
establish quite a lot more about most mutinies
than we can about workplace strikes on shore.
This thesis is a study of collective action.
So I have read through the volumes of court
martial records looking for those that involved
some element of collective protest or organization
by the lower deck. All of the cases I have found
for the years 1793-1796 and 1799-1814 are listed
in Appendix One. All of them are mentioned at
least in passing in the body of the thesis.
Finding those trials involving collective
action or organization was by no means a simple
project. There are, for instance, many trials for
'mutiny', 'mutinous behaviour', 'mutinous
language' and 'riotous behaviour'. Quite a lot of
these are court martials by captains of their
inferior offioers for quarrelling with them. But
15
the majority of these trials on inspection turn
out to be prosecutions of lone seamen who became
drunk and angry and abused and sometimes struck
their officers. I have not included them in my
sample. I have included all those trials where two
or more men protested, and all those where the
lone individual received some support from his
shipmates. I have of course included all those
trials that reveal a strike or demonstration.
Many of these were not explicitly mutiny
trials. Where there is doubt it is often necessary
to read the transcript thoroughly to find out if
there was a demonstration or cheering. These may
turn up in the trial of an officer for
insubordination or of a seaman for desertion or
seditious langauge.
I have also included all prosecutions of
seamen for writing letters of complaint. These
were usually trials of the individuals who wrote
the letter, but the organization of a letter was a
collective activity. Also, when a ship was lost
there was always a court martial of the captain,
officers and men to establish responsibility for
the loss. These court martials occasionally reveal
that the ship was seized by the lower deck and
delivered to the enemy. Where mutineere were not
subsequently Qaptured, these trials provide
16
the only record. They usually include graphic
descriptions of mutiny.
In addition, I have included trials of
individuals for expressing explicitly
revolutionary sentiments. I have also included all
the trials where officers were prosecuted for
cruelty as a result of the organized petition or
protest of their men.
I have rather arbitrarily decided to exclude
certain sorts of ship from my remit. I have left
out almost all mutinies on press tenders and among
prize crews on the grounds that these were very
small vessels and the men on them were only
together for a short period of time. My central
focus has been on the dynamics of a shipts
company. I have also left out all mutinies on East
Indiamen, privateers and whalers, all of which are
to be found in the records. And I have left out
the collective actions of marines in barracks on
shore, but included those on shipboard.
More importantly, I have not dealt in detail
with the great wave of mutinies in 1797-98,
although Chapter Twelve is devoted to the subject,
There are two reasons for this. The first is that
these years have been well served by historians
17
already. (1) The second reason is that a thesis
can only be so long. The mutinies before and after
(1) William Johnson Neale, An Account of the
Mutiny at Spithead and the Nore, London, Thomas
Tegg, 1842, is largely worthless. G. E. ?Ianwaring
and Bonamy Dobree, The Floating Republic, London,
Geoffrey Bles, 1935, though the best known of the
modern works, is also the weakest. Their middle
class arrogance leads them to treat the sailors as
stupid: animal metaphors for the lower deck
abound. Their political Fabianism leads them to
view the mutineers as essentially moderate men led
by middle class failures, and to underestimate or
ignore both the sailors' strong tradition of
protests and the influence of working class
revolutionaries on the mutineers. But Conrad
Gill's older work, The Naval Mutinies of 1797,
Manchester, University of Manchester Press, 1913,
provides a balanced and scholarly account. James
Dugan's The Great Mutiny, a more colourful and
narrative work, provides a useful complement to
Gill and ig particularly good on the mutinies of
1798. And there is a brilliant chapter (pages
79-109) in Roger Wells' Insurrection: the British
Experience, 1795-1803, Gloucester, Alan Sutton,
1983. Among other things Wells brings out the
importance of revolutionaries in the fleet in
1797, and of the Irish dimension. Both Wells and
Clive Emaley, in his British Society and the
French Wars, 1793-1815, London, Macmillan, 1979,
have tried in different ways to integrate an
account of the naval mutinies into a more general
social history of the period.
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1797-98 have barely been studied, (1) and I have
concentrated my attention on them.
How representative are the collective actions
selected for study here? The first answer to this
question is that they include the great majority
of the collective actions which ended in a court
martial. Because of the difficulties in telling
what precipitated every court martial, it must be
assumed that a few cases of collective action have
been missed out: probably two or three, possibly
five, perhaps even ten. It is unhieXy that these
(1) There are a few exceptions. Christopher
Lloyds article'The Mutiny of the Nereide',
Mariners Mirror, volume 54, 1968, is thin and
superficial, most uncharacteristic of a very
perceptive historian. But Dudley Pope has
published good two monographs on particular
mutinies. The Black Ship is a study of the unusual
mutiny on the Hermione in 1797, and forms the
basis for my account in the last chapter. The
Devil Himself: the Mutiny of 1800, London, Secker
and Warburg, 1987, is much thinner, because the
documentary record on the mutiny on the Diana is
not really detailed enough to sustain a book. And
that is more or less that, although there is of
course an enormous literature on the Bounty: a
most untypical mutiny which falls just outside our
period. The best account is Roger Hough, Captain
Bligh and Mr. Christian: the Men and the Mutiny,
London, Hutchinson, 1972. Gavin Kennedy, Bligh,
London, Duckworth, 1978, is also good.
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include any of the really big mutinies.
But there is a much larger question. To what
extent do these recorded mutinies and
demonstrations reflect the actual incidence of
mutiny and demonstration? And were these in some
sense rare and unusual conflicts, which can
therefore tell us little about 'normal' class
relations on ship? Before tackling these
questions, it is best to deal in some detail with
some of the problems in interpreting the court
martial records.
Problems
The major problem is that the court inartials
provide a record of defeated protest. The mutiny
of the Windsor Castle in 1795, for instance, was
more important than the mutiny on the Culloden the
next month. (1) But the people of the Windsor
Castle won their demand that nobody be victimized
afterwards So this thesis devotes more space to
the Culloden.
Moreover, at the court martial the prosecutor
(1) For these two mutinies see below, chapter
Eight.
20
was by custom the captain of the unruly ship. The
defendants were his seamen. The witnesses were
mostly his officers and petty officers. In many
cases the court records show the prosecutor was
trying to establish that the men gave no warning
of their feelings and made no prior protests. had
they first protested through normal channels and
gained no redress, this might mitigate the
offense. But it would also reflect badly on the
captain, who had been neither firm enough to
suppress protest nor fair enough to defuse it. The
court, of course, was composed of the prosecutor's
fellow captains and perhaps a vice-admiral. The
prosecutor did not want his incompetence exposed
in that arena.
So both seamen and officers were discouraged
from mentioning earlier protests. On the Terrible
in 1796, for instance, her particularly unplea8ant
captain had faced several deputations complaining
about bad bread before the men inutinied over the
issue. During the trial (1) the captain was at
some pains to establish that the men had not
protested, and that when they had done so they had
been given satisfaction.
(1) In Adm. 1:5333.
21
Defendants also usually had more sense than
to anger the court by trying to justify their
actions. All this means that one sometimes has to
read thirty or forty pages of a court martial
before discovering the cause of a mutiny.
Sometimes one never finds out.
But of course the court was composed of human
beings. They were curious, and they could not
actually judge the case without knowing the
background. Of course they usually knew already,
for they were part of the same fleet. But often
the record contains enlightening questions from
the court, presumably put by a captain who cannot
figure out what is going on, or wants to confirm a
rumour he has heard.
It is possible to combine such accidental
illuminations with other evidence to glean some
idea of organization below decks. But the bias in
the records means that we can see only the tip of
the iceberg. The protests we know most about were
more violent and less successful than the average
run of protests.
And of course the lower deck witnesses were
usually trying hard to conceal what happened below
decks. Most seamen on most ships êtayed resolutely
22
silent to protect their shipmates. A few petty
officers testified. Their evidence often served to
hang a man, but they were usually not verbose
witnesses.
Officers were much the best prosecution
witnesses. They shared the values and loyalties of
the court, so they were more likely to be
believed. They were more at ease, and therefore
more fluent and more lucia. Their accounts are
more detailed and more truthful, except where they
were clearly covering for superior officers. But
besides their obvious biases, they had no concrete
idea of how the men organized. This was because
organization was the thing the people were
concealing. So the officers' testimony usually
concentrates on overt acts: one seaman was
standing sentry with a pike or another battered
down the ward room door.
In any case, the court wanted all witnesses
to concentrate on overt acts. The court was trying
to be fair, and to be seen to be fair. They
therefore did not go into the question of whether
the captain or the people were in the right. After
all, the people were so often in the right.
Instead, the court concerned itself with the
simple matter of whether such and such an
individual prisoner had committed specific overt
23
acts.
At the same time, however, they did want to
get the rignleaders. This was partly a systematic
hostility to lower deck organization. But it also
happened because three hundred people might have
demonstrated or struck, and the Navy did not want
to and did not dare to try three hundred men. So
they had to select exemplary victims on some
basis. This tended to mean that the defendants
were some combination of ringleaders and angry
individuals who had been insulting or violent
towards officers. But one always has to remember
that the 'ringleaders' were not necessarily the
actual leaders. They were the people the officers
thought were the leaders. In many cases the people
were trying very hard to conceal the identity of
their leaders. When they actually took command of
a ship, it became very clear who their leaders
were. At the Nore in 1797 they elected ship's
committees. But when a whole ship's company groans
in protest while watching punishment and one man
is singled out, it is likely that the captain is
only guessing. In cases where most of the petty
officers are brought to trial and none of the
seamen, it is likely that the captain is trying a
scatter shot attack on the men he regards as the
probable leaders.
24
How Many Mutinies?
Having looked at some of the problems with
the court martial records, let us return to the
original question. How representative are the
cases revealed in the court martials?
The answer varies with the type of collective
organization. At one extreme we have records of
every occasion where the people succeeded in
seizing the ship and taking it to the enemy. At
the other extreme, in the overwhelming majority of
cases where the people wrote a letter of
complaint, the letter writer was not prosecuted.
The few trials of letter writers are exceptional,
but interesting for what they reveal of how
letters were written.
In between things are more complicated. One
has to rely on guesses, albeit guesses educated by
years of nosing around the records. I feel
reasonably confident we have records of the
majority of major strikes where the people seized
and held part of the ship for a time. (The
exception to this is 1797 and 1798, when many
mutineers won amnesty.) I am equally sure that
only a minority of demonstrations and protests
resulted in prosecutions. Some captains will have
relied on a few floggings, some will have ignored
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the protests, and some will have redressed their
grievances. It is very difficult to tell how
common such strikes and demonstrations were. They
were shameful for the officers involved, and no
responsible person afloat or ashore wanted to
publicize them. They rarely surface in memoirs, or
even letters. My guess would be that strikes or
demonstrations that avoided prosecution were
probably some five to twenty times as common as
those recorded here. It is possible, though
unlikely, that they were only three times as
common. It is also possible that they were more
than twenty times as common.
But this is, perforce, guesswork. Nor does it
answer the other question. All of the cases I have
been able to find of persecuted collective action
are listed in Appendix One. They include only
twenty cases of riot, strike, demonstration or
attempt to replace the captain, and four cases of
successful attempts to seize the ship and desert
to the enemy. Of course there were many more
mutinies in the tow years 1797 and 1798, which I
have not included in the appendix. But for the
tnormal yearst, even if unprosecuted
demonstrations were ten or twenty times more
common, we are dealing with exceptional cases.
Most of the time on most ships men were not
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protesting or making mutiny. Are these mutinies
not abnormal behaviour, symptoms of an unusual
pathology of shipboard relations?
This question cannot really be answered
properly until the evidence has been presented in
the body of the thesis, so it will be tackled
again in the conclusion. But for the moment a
preliminary point needs making. These collective
actions were unusual events which set limits to
and conditioned the usual.
The point is familiar from the approach to
discipline in most naval history. The exemplary
punishment is understood as setting the limits to
permissible behaviour. Flogging round the fleet
was not the common lot. Hangings were even rarer.
But the lash and the noose were essential to
discipline. They conditioned what unruly sailors
would normally consider doing. In the same way,
protests, demonstrations and strikes were not
everyday events. But every day everybody on
shipboard knew that they were a possibility for
the ship t s company if they were so minded. The
possibility of action set the limits of every day
life. The point is also familiar from industrial
relations. In almost all industries strikes are
rare events, but the possibility of strike action
constrains management to deal with unions.
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Thompson and Class
Let us turn now from the sources to the
argument of the thesis. This thesis is a study of
class conflict between officers and men. In
understanding this conflict, one useful place to
begin is the analysis of eighteenth century
society developed by E. P. Thompson in a series of
articles. (1) Thompson argues that in the
eighteenth century the 'gentry' was hegemonic over
the 'crowd'. The crowd were the lower orders, what
Thompson at times calls plebians. The hegemony of
the gentry meant that while the crowd could, and
did, protest, there could be no affirmative
rebellion. This was because until the French
(1) 'Patrician Society, Plebian Culture', Journal
of Social History, volume 7, 1974, pages 382-405;
'The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the
Eighteenth Century', Past & Present, number 50,
1971, pages 76-136; 'Eighteenth Century English
Society: class struggle without class?', Social
History, volume 3, 1978, pages 133-65. The first
cited is the most important. For a good
description of the eighteenth century working
class see John Rule, The Experience of Labour in
Eighteenth Century Industry, London, Croom Helm,
1981, and C. R. Dobson, Masters and Journeymen,
Croom Helm, London, 1980.
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Revoluttion there was no vision of an alternative
society.
The rhetoric of the gentry was traditional
and paternaijet. But they were in fact a
capitalist class, one that instinctively reduced
everything to cash. The measure of a man was not
his lands or his honour, but 'How much a year?' In
enclosures, in hiring practices, in labour
discipline and in the trade in food, they
constantly tended to reduce the element of the
traditional for the sake of the monetary. So when
the crown protested they protested in terms of
tradition, because the economic attack of the
gentry on the people took the form of an attack on
tradition. The people recalled the gentry to their
rhetoric.
Because capitalism is a dynamic system, the
attacks of the gentry on tradition were constant.
As the century wore on they created more and more
islands outside the web of paternalism: holes in
the system where the habits of deference no longer
applied. The most important of these holes was
London.
While the gentry's rule was hegemonic, this
did not mean that the crowd endorsed any of their
particular actions. Moreover, the gentry did not
wish to strengthen a state and a king they had
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defeated in 1688, so they had only limited force
to call upon. There was no standing army and no
police. This led to considerable reliance on what
Thompson calls 'theatre': the gentry used the
power of ritual to turn metaphors into
accomplished fact.
This particular insight has been developed by
Douglas Hay in an article on 'Property, Authority
and the Criminal Law'. (1) Hay argues that the
rule of law was the central ideological prop of
class rule in this period. This may be overstating
the case. But his analysis of the social
implications of the legal system is brilliant. He
emphasizes the effect of 'm&jeety, justice and
mercy' . Majesty is ritual plus terror. Justice
presented the law as a system above the workings
of petty interest. And the prerogative of mercy,
exercised upon the intervention of locally
powerful gentlemen, reinforced the relations of
clientage and deference between plebians and
gentlemen.
Much of this applies to the Royal Navy in our
period. We find the same importance of the law,
(1) In Douglas Hay and others, Albion'e Fatal
Tree: Crime and Society in the Eighteenth Century,
London, Allen Lane, 1975.
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with its terror and ritual, its scrupulous justice
and regular mercy. At sea too the gentlemen
confront the crowd, and the sailors have a moral
economy of their own. And for reasons we shall
see, the man of war is certainly one of the
largest holes in te fabric of hegemony.
But there is a prblem with Thompson's
concept of class. Thompson writes of class partly
in terms of economic position and partly in terms
of consciousness. For him, one cannot speak of a
working class until it becomes conscious o
itself. Before The Making of the English Working
Class one finds 'Class Struggle without Class'. I
do not find this useful, and prefer the classic
Marxist approach to class.
This approach sees class in terms of
relations between groups in the process of
production. A serf is one who owes labour, a lord
the one he owes labour to. A worker is one who
sells labour power, the capitalist is one who buys
labour power. The sellers of labour power may or
may not have a common understanding of their
identity. As long as they must work for wages,
they are an economically constituted class.
Class struggle happens when one economically
constituted class comes into conflict with
another. Most commonly, this occurs at the point
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of production and is often only partially
understood as class conflict. It may also,
however, occur as more general political conflict
and even a contest for state power. At this level
it may be understood by those involved in class
terms, or religious terms, or other terms, or in
terms of a mixture.
In no class conflict does one united class
face another. Captains of industry do not 'scab'
workers do. In every revolution children of the
ruling class are to be found working on opposition
newspapers. For a conflict to be class conflict it
only requires that in general the majority
involved line up along class lines. A class
conflict is one in which the sides are patterned
by the different roles of the participants in the
mode of production.
This does not mean that the question of class
consciousness is boring or unimportant. It is the
very stuff of practical politics. The distinction
between a 'class in itself' and a 'class for
itself' is a traditional Marxist one. It simply
means that one can have 'class struggle without
consciousness', or'class struggle with confused
consciousness', but not 'class struggle without
class.
In these terms, the mutinies and
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demonstrations in the Royal Navy were class
conflict. The officers were usually gentry. In any
case they were the ship board representatives of a
capitalist state. The 'people' were almost all men
who had to sell their labour to live. Struggle
between these two groups was class struggle.
Rediker and Class
After Thompson, the other useful starting
point is Marcus Rediker's wonderful book, Between
the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Merchant Seamen,
Pirates and the Anglo-American Maritime World,
1700-1750. (1) Rediker's argument is complex, but
again, one must summarize.
Rediker is concerned with British and
American sailors, at that time subjects of one
state. He startS, like Thompson, with the
expansion of capitalism as a system. As capitalism
expanded as a world system, it required more and
more sailors. Because Britain was a great imperial
and capitalist power, many of these ships and
sailors were British. At the same time, various
processes of 'primitive accumulation' were
creating a supply of men without property or land
rights, men who had to live by their labour.
(1) Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987.
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These sailors were workers. In many ways
their working experience prefigured that of
industrial workers of later centuries. They were
alienated labour, men whose employers thought of
them in terms of the labour they did rather than
the person they were, who called them 'hands'.
Crucially, they were wage workers who had to sell
their labour power to live. They were also casual
labour. Their employers, the owners, were more or
less pure capitalists. In previous centuries men
had worked for shares of the profit of the voyage.
Where they could, sailors preserved the share
system: in fishing vessels, smugglers, privateers
and pirate ships. But in merchantmen (note the
name) the relations between master and men were
capitalist relations.
The master represented the owner. Sometimes
he was the ownet. Often he had a share in the
vessel or the voyage. As a wage employer, his
profits in the end came from the difference
between his takings and his wage bill. This
created a relentless pressure to drive down wage
rates, or manning levels, or both. And that meant
driving the seamen, or cheating them on their
wages or provisions or both.
This pressure, this opposition, this class
conflict between master and worker was new. And
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there was a new difficulty in controlling this new
labour. On shore, particularly in the countryside,
there had been a habit of deference. The lower
orders had to live with their betters. On sea they
signed on for short voyages and often jumped ship
if they were displeased. There was no elaborate
web of relations between masters and men. The
master needed to drive the men harder but found it
harder to do so. Seamen were an 'unruly' lot.
This unruliness came partly from the job. It
was hard and dangerous work, and it made men
rough. But it came also from their new found
freedom from the constraints of land. And it came
from the culture they built in opposition to the
world of the masters. This seaman t s culture was
godless, determinedly secular and egalitarian.
They lived for the moment, they did not save. They
valued skill and generosity and solidarity. They
drank too much and died young. And they were
workers of the world in several senses. They
travelled the world. They lived in ports and
looked outwards to other ports rather than inland
towards their own country. They came from all
corners of the world. And they were workers of the
world in the sense that they prefigured the later
work experiences of industrial workers.
So a driving capitalist regime confronted an
35
unruly and egalitarian workforce. This, Rediker
argues, goes far to explain the ubiquity of
violence by masters to men he describes. The
master would summon the authorities in port. At
sea he relied in the end on his fist and anything
he could grab to hit a man with. If the men were
not afraid of him, he could not drive them. And if
he could not drive them, he could not compete with
those who could.
The sailors responded to this driving with
weapons of their own. The first resort was
desertion. In theory this was illegal: a man
signed a contract for a voyage and could not leave
until it was complete. In practice the masters
kept trying to use the authorities to reclaim
absent sailors, but often failed. At sea, or where
desertion was impossible, demonstration and
protest were possible. Working more slowly or
refusing to work were common, but constrained by
the fact that on a ship if the essential work was
left undone, everybody would die. In extremity men
could and did mutiny and take the ship. Sometimes
this led to piracy, the expropriation of the means
of production.
This habit of conflict between masters and
men led, over time, to a more political cast of
mind among sailors. The egalitarian values and
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hatred of the masters developed at work were the
grounding for the presence of the sailors in the
New York and London crowds of the l77Os. And as
sailors developed a tradition of withdrawing their
labour, the word for taking down a sail (strike)
became the general word for withdrawal of labour
by other groups of workers.
Of course, Rediker is writing about merchant
seaman, not naval sailors, forty years and more
before our period. Thompson is writing about the
traditions of working class protest on land. But
armed with their insights, we can now turn to
sketch out the analysis that underlies this
thesis.
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The Argument
The argument of this thesis is as follows.
We begin with the nature of the production
process. The naval man of war was a unique
machine. The ship was the most complex machine of
its day. A merchant ship carried a crew of tens: a
man of war of the same size carried a crew of
hundreds to work the guns. This made the man of
war closer in many ways to a modern factory than
to an eighteenth century estate. Several hundred
workers were gathered together under the control
of one man.
From 1793 onwards the war required hundreds
of ships. That meant over a hundred thousand men
were needed. The war also expanded merchant trade.
Navy and merchant marine competed for an inelastic
pool of skilled men, and wages in the merchant
service shot up. The only way the Navy could get
men for what they paid was to impress them and
hold them by force against desertion.
This produced a resentful force of wage
labourers working against their will. Once on
board they were driven to work by constant low
level violence. This was not because their
officers were brutal. It was because of the
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problem of control the officers faced in policing
a large angry workforce who had to be forced to
work.
But the low level violence ('starting') was
not enough. It did not always work, men skulked,
and they could defy the drivers. So to keep order
and control there was a whole panoply of
'punishment': flogging, court martial, flogging
round the fleet, This was highly ritualized
brutality: a theatre of terror.
Sailors, however, had ways of fighting back.
These were partly grounded in a forecastle culture
with considerable tradition. This culture revolved
around women, drink, song and solidarity. Sailors
also had a tradition of resistance, from 'round
robins' to strikes, and a strong sense of moral
economy. In addition to the tradition there was
something new; the impact of the French
Revolution. This gave many of them a feeling of
their rights as men, and just as important it
massively broadened the horizons of possible
resistance.
So punishment was not a complete answer to
the problem of control. The 'people' could, and
did, resist in traditional ways. They wrote
letters of complaint, they demonstrated, murmered
and worked to rule. Above all, they deserted.
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This takes the argument to the end of Part
Two. In Part Three we shift from general
background to a detailed analysis of two mutinies
in 1794 and 1795. Here we can see a shift from
traditional forms of resistance to something more
ambitious: the armed strike. There were certainly
precedents for 'mutiny' in the Navy. There had
been protests and strikes over pay in port. At
times men had seized the ship by force and taken
it to the enemy or deserted. Now they were taking
part or all of the ship and holding it by force
while they effectively negotiated with their
commanders over specific issues of shipboard life.
They were contesting for control.
The intention in this part is to show the
details of this contest. The court martial records
of big mutinies provide the only real window into
the nuts and bolts of class struggle on a local
level in this period. We can watch both officers
and people manouvering, struggling to find the
tactics which will help them claw back or take
control. The aim is to analyse a mutiny rather as
a modern sociologist might analyse a strike.
These mutinies were both defeated. This
provides the opportunity for a detailed look at
the workings of the law. Some of Thompson and
Hay's ideas are used to explain what happened in
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court martiale, how they could be at one and the
same time extremely fair and instruments of class
rule.
In Part Four the method shifts again: we move
from the trees to the woods. This analyses the
trends in mutiny, resistance and justice from 1796
to 1814. The exaat trends will be outlined at the
beginning of Part Four, so they will be fresh in
the reader's mind at that point. The approach will
be historial: the questions will be what changed,
and why? Attention will be paid to wider social
forces. But too often the new social history from
below ignores the importance of specific events.
Much hinges on economic social processes. But, to
use a naval metaphor, much also hinges on whether
important battles are won or lost. One of the
things I will try to show in Part Four is the
influence of the outcome of mutinies on the
strategy and tactics of both sides in subsequent
mutinies. In a sense, as&with Part Three the goal
is to rescue the phrase 'class struggle' from a
slogan and show it as the name for a process among
men and women.
Part Five is the conclusion. This sums up the
argument, deals with some possible objections, and
shows how the thesis relates to the work of a few
other scholars in naval and labour history.
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Naval Social History
The above is an outline of the plan of the
thesis. It is a statement of the argument. The
proof of the argument is in the body of the
thesis. But before moving on to that, how does
this approach relate to the current state of
schoalrship in naval history, and in particular,
the study of discipline and mutiny?
The first good social history of the Navy was
John Masefield's Sea Life in Nelson's Time, based
larely on sailors' memoirs. (1) But the modern
social history of the Navy in our period begins
with Michael Lewis, A Social History of the Navy,
1793-1815, published in 1960. (2) This book broke
new territory for naval historians, but it dealt
mainly with the officers and was largely
statistical. There is little useful on discipline.
Christopher Lloyd, The British Seaman, 1200-1600,
A Social History, was much better. (3) But Lloyd
is weak on discipline and there is almost nothing
on mutinies. Dudley Pope is much better. His
- ------------------------------------------------
(1) London, 1906.
(2) London, Allen and Unwin.
(3) London, Paladin, 1970.
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Life in Nelson's Navy (I) must now be taken as the
standard work on the subject. It is good on the
culture of the lower deck, but still relatively
weak on discipline and mutinies.
There are also, of course, Pope's two good
monographs on particular mutinies cited above. And
there is the work of Gill, Bonamy and Dobree,
Dugan, Wells and Emsley on the mutinies of 1797
and 1798. (2)
Until recently, that was more or less that.
Then in 1986 N.A.M. Rodger published a major work
of scholarship, The Wooden World: An Anatomy of
the Georgian Navy. (1) This dealt with the social
history of the Navy during the period of the Seven
Years War, and to a lesser extent up to 1783.
Rodger's project was to rehabilitate the Georgian
Navy. He felt that Masefield's 1906 book had set
the tone for later accounts of a navy where life
below decks was nasty, brutish and short.
Masefield, of course, was dealing with the
same period as this thesis. Rodger does not take
on the argument directly, because he is dealing
(1) London, Allen and Unwin, 1981..
(2) See the notes on pages 17 and 18 above.
(3) London, Collins, 1986.
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with an earlier period. He produces a panoramic
social history. In the course of it he mounts a
partial defense of almost every institution that
has traditionally been attacked in accounts of the
eighteenth century Navy: the press, the purser,
the operation of influence, and the lash. It is a
partial defense: Rodger is rio Neanderthal, and
there are things he is not prepared to justify.
Our concern here is with mutiny and
discipline. Rodger's description could be roughly
summarized as follows. (1) The middle of the
eighteenth century was a time of unusual social
stability. The officers and gentry felt that their
authority was unshakable. They did not think of
the world in class terms, and they did not
conceive of any possible challenge to their class
power. This meant, paradoxically, that they were
prepared to tolerate a degree of rowdiness and
insubordination on board ship which would have
been unthinkable in later times. Rodger folows
Thompson in this, and in emphasizing that
officers, like the gentry ashore, had few ways of
controlling the crowd by force. So they
negotiated. Slackers were punished,, but not
(1) See pages 205-244 and 344-46.
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flogged unduly hard except by a few unusually
sadistic captains. These few were tried by their
peers and removed from command. In general,
officers and men worked out ways of living with
each other which were part of a shared set of
values. Desertion was forbidden, and in theory the
punishments were draconian. In fact men usually
got away with a short flogging. Court martial
justice was rough and ready, but fair. Theft, a
crime against the lower deck, was treated more
fiercely than mutiny or desertion.
On mutinies Rodger writes:
This is a matter in which most writers today
may be said to belong to the Cecil B. de
Mills school of history, whose notion of
mutiny is of the violent seizure of a ship
from her officers, on the high seas. Mutinies
of this sort did occassionally occur in
merhcantment and privateers, but were
virtually unkown in the Navy. The kind of
mutiny which did happen, and happened quite
frequently, conformed to certain unwritten
rules, which if they had been codified, would
have looked something like this:
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1. No mutiny shall take place at sea, or in
the presence of the enemy.
2. No personal violence may be employed
(although a degree of tumult and shouting is
permissible).
3. Mutinies shall be held in pursuit only of
objectives sanctioned by the traditions of
the Service.
The only cases in which these rules were
broken were mutinies openly led or covertly
incited by officers; genuine lower-deck
mutiny invariably conformed to them, and so
long as it did, authority regarded it with a
weary tolerance, as one of the many
disagreeable but unavoidable vexations of
naval life. It called, not for punishment,
but for immediate action to remedy the
grievances complained of. (1)
The great majority of these mutinies were
over pay. This was not, significantly over pay
rates, but rather strikes because money which both
officers and men agreed was due to the men had not
in fact been paid. But in addition t the ejection of
(1) Page 238.
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intolerable officers was a proper and traditional
object of mutiny'. (1) When men demonstrated
against bad officers or refused to work while in
port, they generally received redress.
There were two mutinies in this period which
did not fall within these unwritten rules, on the
Swallow and the Chesterfield.
These two mutinies were exceptions which
prove the rules by which other mutineers
conducted themselves. These rules were very
similar to other sets of unwritten rules by
which the Navy conducted its affairs - the
rules for impressment, for example, or for
desertion. When other methods failed, mutiny
provided a a formal system of public protest
to bring grievances to the notice of
authority. It was a sort of safety-valve,
harmless, indeed useful, so long as it was
not abused. It was part of a system of social
relations which provided an effective working
compromise between the demands of necessity
and humanity, a means of reconciling the
Navy's need of obedience and efficiency with
the individual's grievances. It was a means
(1) Page 239.
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of safeguarding the essential stability of
shipboard society, not of destroying it. (1)
The above is Rodger's picture of naval discipline.
As will become obvious, it differs in important
repsects from the picture of naval discipline
presented in the body of this thesis. Of course,
Rodger is dealing with a different period. Society
changed, and the Navy changed with it. Rodger has
some interesting views of the nature of these
changes:
It is clear that the Service which suffered
the mutinies of 1797 must have been very
different from that of forty years before...
(But) perhaps it did not change as much as
might appear. Except in being collective
movements in which ships co-operated, these
mutinies followed more or less the 'unwritten
rules' which had long governed such affairs.
Like popular riots throughout the century,
they were essentially conservative, aimed to
restore the just system which had formerly
obtained, to rescue the Navy from the
deformations recently introduced into it. To
men, both on the lower deck and the quarter
(1) Pages 243-4.
48
deck, who had seen the excesses of the French
Revolution, the mutinies of 1797 seemed very
dangerous. Certainly they displayed evidence
of class and political sentiments which would
have been unthinkable a generation earlier,
but it is not clear with hindsight that they
were really as novel or as revolutionary as
they then seemed. In forty years material
conditions in the Navy had worsened.
Inflation had ground away at the value of the
naval wage, and the coppering of ships had
removed the chance of frequent leave. The
Service had expanded not only absolutely but
relative to the population as whole, to
recruit many men (and officers) unacquainted
with the traditional accomodations of
seafaring. When all these things have been
considered, however, we should still beware
of exaggerating the changes of forty years.
(1)
Rodger, then, feels that some things changed
and some things remained the same. At several
points in the body of this thesis I will return to
Rodger's analysis of naval discipline. The matter
(1) Page 346.
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is complex. For the moment I will summarize it in
the following way. Rodger is right that there was
a traditional mode of protest, in many ways
analagous to the tradition of collective
bargaining by riot on shore. However, by the 1790s
these traditional protests were not an aecpeted
safety valve. On one level, neither officers nor
men knew what would happen next in any
confrontation. On another level, after the French
Revolution neither side knew what the ultimate
consequences of any mutiny would be. The
traditions of protest described by Rodger are
real. But mutiny in the Navy in 1797 or 1808 was
very different from mutiny in 1745 or even 1783.
In the last chapter I will 8ummarize my
differences with Rodger and return to historical
questions. What changed? Why?
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PART TWO:
Officers and Men
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Chapter Three: Work and Control
Samuel Leech was the son of servants on an
English country estate. As a boy he constantly
badgered his mother to let him run away to sea
Finally she relented. He joined the Navy carrying
two going-away presents: a Bible and a pack c
cards. During the War of 1812 he deserted to the
Americans. He eventually opened a shop in New
England, married a Connecticut Yankee and gave up
drink. He wrote his memoirs in 1842. When he
described the organization of a ship his mind
turned not to the country estates of his boyhod
but to the new factores that were springing up
around him:
This community (the ship's) is governed by
laws peculiar to itself: it is arranged and
divided in a manner suitable to its
circumstances. Hence', when its members first
come together, each one is assigned to his
respective station and duty.. .. Each task has
its man, and each man his place. A ship
contains a set of human machinery, in which
every man is a wheel, a band, or a crank, all
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moving with wonderful regularity and
precision to the will of its machinist, the
all-powerful captain. (1)
In the eighteenth century this set of 'human
machinery' was unique. On a man-of-war 600 men
worked and ate together under one command. These
ships were among the largest workplaces in the
world and in many ways were closer to a modern
factory than to the country house of Leech's
boyhood.
The reason was the guns. The great ships were
floating batteries and were described by the
number of guns they carried. The usual battleship
was a '74': it carried 74 guns. In turn, guns were
called after the weight of shot they carried. So
a'74' carried mainly '32 pounders' and '24
pounders'. (2)
On the great ships all available space was
given over to housing this weaponry. For instance,
the Victory at Trafalgar carried 104 guns, 90 of
these on the three gun decks. Each gun deck was
186 feet long and 51 feet wide. In other words,
(1) Samuel Leech, Thirty Years From Home, or a
Voice from the Main Deck, London, John Neale,
1844, pages 14-15.
(2) Actually, a '74' usually carried more than 74
guns, but for various reasons some of them were
not counted. I am simplifying here.
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the total area of all three decks was about half
the size of a football field. The ships fought in
a. 'line-of-battle', the nose of one ship up
against the tail of another. The line moved at the
speed of the slowest ship.
Speed in itself was unimportant for the 748.
Two factors were crucial in the great sea fights.
One was the speed at which the guns could be
reloaded and fired again. This was the product of
endless drill. The second factor was seamanship.
Each fleet tried to tack to gain the weather
advantage. Every admiral hoped for some captain on
the other side to make a mistake and open a hole
in the enemy line. Guns were carried in rows on
either side of the ship. Half of them were fired
in any one 'broadside'. A ship was terribly
vulnerable if an attacker broke the line and
passed under the stern or across the bow. Then the
attacker could deliver a full broadside. Each gun
was fired at pointblank range as the gun passed
the midline of the victim ship. At the 'Glorious
First of June t , for instance, the Queen Charlotte
broke the French line and passed behind the
Jacobin, forcing the crippled ship to retire from
the fight. (1)
(1) A.T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon
the French Revolution and Empire, 1793-1812,
London, Sampson and Low, 1892, volume 1, page 139.
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The combination of men, guns and sails was
crucial to the frigates in a different way.
Frigates carried smaller and fewer guns than a 74.
So a single broadside from a 74 could blow them
out of the water. By tradition the frigates in
each fleet sat and watched the larger ships fight
it out. But frigates were fast, and they carried
messages quickly from fleet to fleet. The British
always had a few patrolling outsid the French
ports, ready to race home with a warning if the
French fleet came out. Though smaller than a 74,
the frigate was a terror to merchant shipping, and
chased down merchantmen and privateers alike.
There were many smaller ships in the Navy:
bomb ships, sloops, brigs and tenders. The
frigates and line-of-battle ships were
square-rigged. The smaller ships were rigged at
least partly fore-and-aft, and could sail fast
close to the wind.
The Press
Twenty men could take a merchant ship across
the Atlantic. A warship of the same, size carried
3OO. Again, the guns made the difference: ten to
fourteen men to each pair of guns. Each gun also
needed a woman or a boy to do duty as a 'powder
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monkey' . (1)
The demand for men was immense. Any
'landsman' could learn to work a gun or pull on a
rope, and the boatswain's mates would beat him
until he did. But it took balance and experience
for a 'topman' to take in the sails while hanging
in the swinging rigging far above the deck. The
quartermaster's mates had to take the wheel. The
sailmaker's crew and the carpenter's crew were
skilled men. Each gun needed a 'captain' who knew
the job. Some of the 'waisters' could stand around
the ship's waist pullingon ropes, but some of
them had to know which ropes were which. Captain
I'larryat estimated that over a third of the crew
had to be men
'bred to the sea' . (2) It was these men the press
was designed to recruit, and in fact press gangs
were only allowed to impress seamen.
In wartime both the Navy and the merchant
marine grew by leaps and bounds. Good seamen were
(1) Dudley Pope, Life in Nelson's Navy, 1793-1815,
London, George Allen and Unwin, 1981, page 206;
Michael A. Lewis, A Social History of the Navy,
1793-1815, London, George Allen andUnwin, 1960,
pages 227-8.
(2) Captain Marryat,Suggestions for the Abolition
of Impressment in the Naval Service, London, J.M.
Richardson, 1822, pages 25-34.
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therefore in short supply and wages shot up. A
sailor could make three or four times as much in a
merchant ship as in the Navy. And he was probably
more sure of receiving his wages on time.
But perhaps it would not have made a
difference if the Navy had paid higher rates.
Sailors hated the brutality and boredom of the
man-of-war. No experienced seaman seems to have
joined willingly in wartime. John Bechervaise, for
instance, was a Guernseyman from a seafaring
family and a seafaring island. He first went to
sea in 1803. Seventeen years later, in the srping
of 1820, Bechervaise found himself in London. He
could not find a berth in a ship and had a wife
and children to feed:
I looked round the docks. Nothing was
stirring.. In my rambles I saw men who had
been to my knowledge masters and chief mate
of vessels, who would now gladly have gone
before the mast: to paint the distress that
pervaded every part f the merchant service
is beyond my power. The immense number of men
discharged from ships of war who had
foolishly spent their money and now got into
deep distress strolling about the streets,
some begging, others worse, was truly painful
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to those who possessed any feeling... Of all
the places then dreaded by seamen in the
merchant service, a ship of war is the worst.
I fully had my share of the prejudice, but
there was no alternative. . .Painful indeed was
the parting from my home. May the 6th, 1820,
early in the morning, I passed by the R---.
then fitting out, and for the first time in
my life saw the momentous fabric that was to
be my residence for several years, with a
shudder of grief I cannot describe. (1)
Bechervaise was a volunteer and no
malcontent. Having joined as a petty officer, he
was soon promoted to quartermaster. He loved the
sight of a trim deck with brasswork gleaming. If
he says dread of the Navy was common, we should
believe him. And his 'prejudice' is echoed by
every other seaman who left his memoirs.
James .Durand, for instance, was an American
impressed into the Royal Navy. When the War of
1812 began he tried and failed to join the
American prisoners of war who were taken out of
the Navy and sent to Dartmoor prison. 'In fine,
(1) John Bechervaise, Thirty-Six Years of a
Sea-Faring Life, Portsea, 1839, pages 107-8.
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all tho8e who went to prison were best off. They
were not flogged as often. (1) Samuel Leech, the
boy with Bible and the pack of cards, records that
'The crew, too, by some means had an impression
that my mother had brought me on baord to get rid
of me, and therefore bestowed their bitteres
curses on her in the most profuse manner
imaginable.' (2)
It is impossible to tell what proportion of a
a ship's company were pressed men. The ship's
books show about half, but this is clearly an
understatement. Many pressed men took the 'bounty'
when they joined, and so went into the ship's
books as 'volunteers' . Some experienced seamen do
appear to have joined because they needed the
bounty quickly. Some were sent as 'volunteer8' by
the magistrates. (3) And in theory it was illegal
to press foreigners. So all impressed foreigners
were signed into the books as 'volunteers'.
(1) James Durand, An Able Seaman of 1812, eidted
by George S. Brooks, New Haven, Vale Universtiy
Press, 1926, page 67.
(2) Leech, page 14.
(3) For some examples, see Clive Emsley, 'The
Recruitment of Petty Offenders during the French
Wars, 1793-1815', Mariners Mirror, 1980, volume
66, pages 199-208.
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The matter is well summed up by John Nicol,
who had volunteered as a boy: 'I was surprised to
see so few, who, like myself, had chosen it for
the love of that kind of life. t (1)
Even enthusiasts often regretted their
decision. Jack Nastyface volunteered and was taken
by tender to the Nore:
Upon getting on board this vessel, we were
ordered down in the hold, and the gratings
were put over us; as well as a guard of
marines placed round the hatchway with their
muskets loaded and fixed bayonets, as though
we had been culprits of the first degree, or
capital conviccts. In this place we spent the
day and the following night huddled together
for there was not room to stand or sit
seperate; . • some were sea-sick, some
retching, others were smoking, whilst many
were so overcome by the stench, that they
fainted for want of air. (2)
(1) John Nicol, The Life and Adventures of John
Nicol, Mariner, edited by John Howell in 1822,
reprinted London, Cassell, 1937, page 39.
(2) Jack Nastyface (William Robinson), Nautical
Economy, or Forecastle Recollections, Cheapside,
William Robinson, 1836, pages 2-3.
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But it was too late for Nastyface to change
his mind.
Impressed Foreigners
Just before Trafalgar, Nelson ran up his
famous signal to the fleet: 'England expects every
man will do his duty.' England did not, however,
expect it only of the English, for they formed
barely half the fleet. The Irish were the next
largest group. There were also many Scots and a
large number of blacks from the West Indies and
the American South. Some of these were excaped
slaves, but many Americans, white and black, were
pressed into the Navy.
The English appear to have felt that they had
a certain ancestral claim on all these
nationalities. But in addition about a tenth of
the fleet were true foreigners, men from countries
that had never known English rule. During these
wars, indeed, many Frenchmen served in the English
fleet, and many Englishmen in the American and
French fleets. The poaching of American seamen
from merchant ships was, as is well known, the
official cause of the War of 1812.
Edward Jackson, for instance, was a free
black man from Philadelphia. The press gang caught
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him in Liverpool in 1795. He was put on the tender
Bruyton with other men to be carried to the fleet.
The volunteers were allowed to be on deck but the
pressed men like Jackson were locked in the 'press
room'. At night the volunteers seized the ship.
They had already been paid the recruitment bounty,
so there was rio reason to remain. They seized
muskets and threw the officer of the watch down
the hatch. Then they released the pressed men and
sailed the tender to the shore and freedom.
Jackson was later caught with another man. He
gave his name as 'Edward Jackson'. The court had
difficulty accepting a black man with a surname
and tried him for mutiny and desertion under the
name of 'Prince Edward the Black alias Jackson'.
They asked him if he had anything to say in his
defense. He had papers to show he was an American
with a wife and family in that country. He had
carried a 'protection': a letter from the American
government stating that as an American citizen he
could not be pressed. This he had shown to Mr.
Cragg, the Press Master in Liverpool. Cragg had
torn up the protection in front of his face:
I asked him why he tore it. He gave me no
answer but took me along with him. I thought
it very hard to be taken away in a foreign
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country, where I had neither friends nor
relations to do anything for me.
Jackson and his mate were acquitted on the
charge of mutiny and convicted on the lesser
charge of desertion. Each man was sentenced to
receive 300 lashes while being flogged round the
fleet. (1)
The Navy took men where it could, and was
often not very picky about their level of
seamanship. Lieutenant Hodgskins disapproved:
In 1811, I knew Africans, who had been stolen
from Africa, taken in a slave-ship,
afterwards cloathed, on board of a
guard-ship, and without being able to speak a
word of English, sent to man the British
fleet, to fight the battles of our country.
Such a thing is a burlesque upon a national
defense. (2)
Samuel Richardson, the gunner, remembered one
shipmate. The fleet was carrying many soldiers.
The young lord in command of the soldiers met a
(1) Jackson's court martial in Adm. 1:5335.
(2) Thomas Hodgskin, An Essay on Naval Discipline,
London, 1813, pages 97-8.
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lost-looking Scandinavian sailor on the docks. The
young nobleman, with a charming smile, invited the
sailor into his boat. The boat's crew rowed out to
Richardson's ship and the man was pressed there.
They had to get his name, place of birth and
rating. To every question they asked he replied
'Orla Hou'. They supposed that in his langauge
'Orla Hou' meant 'I don't understand you. ' So they
pressed him under the name 'Orla Hou'. When
Richardson left the ship five years later the man
was still on baord. He spoke fluent English and
was one of the best seamen in the ship. He still
drew his pay under the name of 'Orla Hou'. (1)
The Importance of the Press
The press gang was much reviled in the
eighteenth century, and the 'problem' of the press
was a hot topic among pamphleteers.(2) It remains
so. among naval historians today.
The classic attack on the press gang is
(1) William Richardson, A Mariner of England,
edited by Spencer Childers, London, John Murray,
1908, page 114.
(2) See J.S. Bromley, editor, The Manning of the
Royal Navy, Navy Records Society, Volume 119,
1974.
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J. R. Hutchinson, The press Gang Afloat and
Ashore. (1) This is full of entertaining stories
from the court martial records and has the merit
of reflecting the traditional sturdy English
plebain hatred of the press gang. It has the
considerable weakness of treating the events of
1690 and 1810 on an equal footing.
The most recent, and most sophisticated
defense of the press gang is that of N.A.IYI. Rodger
in The Wooden World. He argues:
It was, and is, tempting to offer facile
condemnation rather than workable
alternatives. But the political reality of
ei ghteenth-century England was that the very
forces which made the press so unpopular also
made it inevitable. Englishmen prided
themselves on their liberties, by which as a
rule they meant the rights of local authority
against central...The Navy, and consequently
the press, was pre-eminently an instrument of
central central government, and potentially
of 'tyrranny'..,. Thus, in the midst of war,
public opinion and the law still worked
strongly to hamper the Navy. Even men who
(1) London, Eveleigh Nash, 1906.
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were most in favour of the war were most
active in damaging the Navy's capacity to
fight it...The Admiralty had seen too many
schemes of conscription or registration
damned as instruments of deeptotism to have
any more hope of a system less arbitrary,
less brutal, and in truth less despotic, than
the press. Though it bore harshly,
erratically and inefficiently, it bore
largely on an inarticulate and politically
weak group, and the alternatives posed seemd
to threaten more powerful interests. So the
Admiralty was obliged to make the best of an
extremely unsatisfactory job. (1)
Rodger's argument is subtle and his prtl
vindication of the press gang following is an
inspired effort. (2) But in the end he relies on
the traditional argument of 'necessity t . The
argument is flawed, of course, because the British
Navy could always have tried proper wages. That
aside, the bottom line iè really a matter of
loyalties. For Rodger, as for the Admiralty, in
the end the Navy had to be manned.And from the
Admiralty's point of view that was of course true.
(1) Rodger, page 164.
(2) Rodger, pages 164-182.
66
This does not mean, however, that the historian
need assume that the victory, or even the
existence of the Royal Navy is an ultimate
criterion. It is just as possible to begin from
the standpoint of the sailors trying to avoid the
gang.
But in any case, the central question for my
argument in this chapter is not the moral validity
of the press gang. Rather, what I am arguing is
that several things combined to produce a great
hunger for men in the Admiralty. The first was the
technical nature of the fighting ship. The second
was the expansion of trade in the War, and
threfore of the merchant marine. The third was the
rising level of wages, and the fact that both
merchant and naval captains were drawing on what
was in some ways a limited pool of men. All of
these factors meant that the press was the main
way in which seamen were recruited. The really
important point for our purposes is that the
majority of seamen did not wish to be on board and
had a grievance against the manner in which they
had arrived. In William Johnson Neale's phrase, 'a
number of outraged individuals were collected in
our fleets.' (1)
(1) An Account of the Mutiny at Spithead and the
Nore, London, Thomas Tegg, 1842, page 3.
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Work
These outraged individuals soon learned to
hate the driving regime of work. Leech describes
it well:
The great disparity of numbers between the
crew of a merchant ship and that of a man of
war, occasions a difference in their internal
arrangement and mode of life, scarcely
conceivable by those who have not seen both.
This is seen throughout, from the act of
rousing the hands in the morning to that of
taking in the sail. In the merohantman, the
watch below is called up by a few strokes of
the handspike on the forecastle; in the man
of war by the boatswain and his mates... You
immediately hear a sharp, shrill whistle;
this is succeeded by another from his mates.
There. follows a hoarse, rough cry of 'All
hands ahoy! ' which is forthwith repeated by
his mates. Scarcely has this sound died upon
the air, before the cry of 'Up all hammocks
away!' succeeds it, to be repeated in like
manner. . No delay is permitted, for as soon
as the above-mentioned officers have uttered
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their imperative commands, they run below,
each armed with a rope's end, with which they
belabor the shoulders of any luckless wight
upon whose eyes the sleep yet hangs heavily,
or whose slow moving limbs show him to be but
half-awake. With a rapidity which would
surprise a landsman, the crew dress
themselves, lash their hammocks and carry
them on deck, where they are stowed for the
day. There is a system even in this
arrangement; every hammock has its
appropriate place... A similar rapidity
attends the performance of every duty. The
word of command is given in the same manner,
and its prompt obedience is enforced by the
same ceremonious rope's-end. To sulk is
therefore next to impossible: the least
tardineBs is rebuked by the cry of 'Hurrah my
hearty! bear a hand! heave along! heave
along! ' This system of driving is far from
agreeable; it perpetually reminds you of your
want of liberty; it makes you feel sometimes,
as if the hardest crust, the most ragged
garments, with the freedom ofyour own native
hills, would be preferable to John Bull's
'beef and duff', joined as it is with the
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rope's end of the driving boatswain. (1)
As in any armed services, a lot of the work
was cleaning and a lot of it was make-work. All
hands had to report before 4:30 a.m. to clean the
decks. They finished just in time for breakfast at
6:30. Sentries made sure nobody could sneak down
the hatches. The men were on their knees
scrubbing. A midshipman or mate stood in front of
them, moving slowly backwards. He made sure no man
advanced on his knees until his bit of deck was
thoroughly scrubbed. Sailors hated cleaning the
decks. (2)
lIany captains spent hours drilling the men in
the rigging and in gunnery. The speed of gunnery
made an enormous difference in battle. But it was
hard work lugging the great guns in and out. And
on no account were the men to fire the guns; the
Ordnance counted every cannon ball. For instance,
when Richardson was gunner he lost four cannon
balls overboard in a storm. He went to the captain
in a nervous sweat. The captain kindly told him
not to worry; he was hoping for a battle soon, and
then he could write off four oanno balls. (3)
(1) Leech, pages 15-16.
(2) Bechervaise, pages 110-11 and Nastyface, page
6.
(3) Richardson, page 141.
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The driving regime angered seamen. So did
corruption. King Charles is said to have told his
council one night; 'if ever you intend to man the
fleet without being cheated by captains and
pursers, you may go to bed.' (1) Like all the best
stories, this one may be apocryphal. But the
attitude it expressed was common among sailors in
later generations.
The corruption of pursers was legendary. (2)
The purser brought all the stores and handed them
out. He was a contractor in his own right, and the
post was bought and sold for large sums. All
pursers paid for provisions at 16 ounces to the
pound and then sold them to the men at 14 ounces
to the pound. One of the demands of the Spithead
mutiny of 1797 was for a 16 ounce pound.
Another demand in that mutiny was that the
surgeon stop selling the medicines. It is not
clear if the surgeons were any more corrupt than,
for instance, boatswains. Probably the men took a
lenient view of redirecting a spare sail. But when
there were no medicines they took offense.
(1) Hutc,hinson, page 63.
(2) Rodger, pages 87-98. extends his revisionist
project to a defense of the much maligned purser.
For a more balanced view see Dudley Pope, Life in
Nelson's Navy.
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Like other workers of the time, sailors held
a strong sense of 'moral economy' (1) They knew
their rights to proper rations and they were going
to have them. On shore workers tended to blame
merchants and middlemen for the high price of
bread. (2) Afloat, the captain was the centre of
any corruption. He signed the dishonest books
presented by the purser. He ran the ship and dealt
with any complaints. He told the men to shut up or
be flogged when they complained about missing
cheeses. The captain usually had some fiddles of
his own and took a cut of the others. In the
nature of things, it is difficult to prove this.
But it was in keeping with the temper of the age,
and it would be surprising if the Royal Navy was
the one public institution in Hanoverian Britain
not regarded as a public trough. And there is one
important piece of evidence. When the ship's
people complained about shortfalls in provisions,
it•was the captain they blamed and the captain
they protested to. On land workers blamed grain
(1) E. P. Thompson, 'The Moral Economy of the
English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century'. For a
particularly forceful statement of the seaments
moral economy, see The Journal of James Morrison,
edited by Owen Rutter, London, Golden Cockrel
Press, 1935, pages 18-20.
(2) See Roger Wells, Wretched Faces: Famine in
Wartime England, 1793-1801, Gloucester, Alan
Sutton, 1988.
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merchants rather than their employers. At sea the
men's anger about both corruption and work focused
on their boss: the captain. (1)
The Frontier of Control(2)
The ship was a community of hostile groups.
Officers and men understood this class system in
terms of the parts of the ship. They spoke of
people as places. The officers as a whole were the
'quarterdeck'. The men were the 'focele' (the
forecastle), or more commonly, 'the lower deck'.
Junior officers were 'midshipmen'.
On the next page there is a diagram of a ship
seen from the side. It is not an accurate diagram
of any particular ship. All ships had many more
rooms and most of them had more decks. No ship
with one gun deck would also have a poop deck. The
(1). For a good example of a protest about
inadequate provisions directed at the captain, see
the mutiny on the Terrible. The court martial
record is in Adm. 1:5333. See also Solicitors to
Admiralty, 14 March 1796, in Adm. 1:3684; Adm.
Hotham to Admiralty, 12 Sept 1795, 21 Sept 1795
and 20 Oct 1795, in Adm. 1:393, Letters 225, 228
and 242.
(2) The following section is based partly on Pope,
Life in Nelson's Navy, and largely on my own
reading in the court martial records.
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diagram is a social map. It shows the rough way a
sailor automatically divided any ship.
The sailors slept forward on the gun deck.
They played on the forecastle. They worked in the
tops: the foretop, the maintop and the mizzentop.
The officers slept aft on the main deck. They
played and worked aft on the quarterdeck and the
cabins directly below it. The sailor went to the
masthead as a routine duty. The midshipman was
'mastheaded' as a punishment. As it happens, the
rigging and the front of a sailing ship are the
cold, wet part. The back is the warm, dry part.
These divisions were not just for sleeping. A
frontier of control ran down the middle of the
ship. A sailor with business on the quarterdeck
always stood on the leeward side. That way his
head was lower than the captain's on the windward
side. (The wind makes a sailing ship tip to
leeward.) Jack Nastyface was 'never on the
quarterdeck but when ordered on duty, and was only
permitted to say "Aye, Aye	 sir", when spoken to,
at the same time touching the rim of my castor,
with all due respect ot my officers.' (1)
Nastyface had to be careful. Sometimes men
did come aft singly or in groups. The result could
be a court martial for mutiny. The court was
(1) Nastyface, pages x-xi.
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always careful to find out if such men had behaved
in a respectful manner. Had so and so talked
quietly or loudly? Did he really have his cap in
his hand and eyes cast down when talking to the
captain or had he merely gone through the motions?
The wrong answer could cost a man his life.
Many men patrolled the frontier of control.
The first line were the 'captains': the 'captain
of the foretop', the 'captain of the maintop', the
'captain of the mizzenmast', the 'captain of the
forecastle', and so on. There were two of each of
these, one in each watch. These men were working
foremen. They were skilled at their craft, they
therefore held a moral authority, and they did not
beat the men. They worked alongside the men and
drew wages at the same rate as other able seamen.
They lived in the foreward berth with the men, and
in a mutiny they went with the other seamen.
The second line of control were the warrant
officers: the cooper, carpenter, sailmaker, gunner
and surgeon. They lived amidships, between
officers and men. They sOmetimes beat the men and
in a mutiny almost always went with the officers.
Any 'captain' or officer facing a
recalcitrant man could call for the boatswain or
one of his mates. Their main job was driving the
landsmen. They would also beat any man singled out
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by a foreman or officer. The boatswain's mates
messed with the men, but they wielded the cat at
formal floggings. In a mutiny the boatswain went
with the officers, but his mates might go either
way.
If a man got cheeky or resisted the boatswain
could call for the ship's corporal or the
master-at-arms. In a crisis he shouted for the
marines. In battle the marines manned the guns
like everybody else, just as in landings they
fought side by side with the sailors. No seperate
force of marines was necessary for these tasks.
But their main duty was not to make landings
or board other ships. Rather, in any confrontation
the captain immediately called the marines to
accompany him below decks. Their weapons cowed the
sailors and they arrested the trouble makers. As
Captain Glascock wrote of the marines, 'In such a
crisis, every officer must be keenly aware of the
inestimable value of a few loyal and courageous
hearts.' (1)
On most days the marines did no work but
sentry duty. At night they slept between the
officers and the men. For formal floggings the
(1) An officer of Rank (William Glascock), Naval
Sketch-Book, volume two, page 51.
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people were drawn up on the main deck. The
officers stood above them on the quarterdeck. The
marines stood with the officers and levelled their
muskets down towards the main deck, the powder
already in the pan.
Two statistics show just how tense life was
on a man of war. At the height of the war the Navy
had 20,000 marines and 110,000 sailors. On a man
of war with a crew of about 600, almost 100 of
them would be marines. Their sole purpose, between
engagements, was to keep the men in order.
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Chapter Four: Punishment
Work produced constant tension. Because the
officers felt that the men would not start work on
their own, the boatswain's mates had to 'start'
them. Lieutenant Hodgskin describes starting as:
one man beating another with a piece of rope
as hard as he can hit him: the other being
perfectly defenseless, and forbid him even to
look displeased, as that is contempt or
disrespect... Starting is more generally used
for want of alacrity than for any other
crime.
In hoisting the topsails to the
mast-head, hoisting boats in and out,
hoisting in beer and water, and such like
duties, when they are not done with
smartness, the captain stationed a
boatswain's mate at different parts of the
deck, each with a rope's end,with orders to
beat every man as he passed.. . In performing
all the little pieces of duty, every man,
almost, as he ran and pulled on the rope, had
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to pass... Thus, whether good or bad, whether
old or young, whether exerting himself or
not, nearly every man in ship got a beating.
(1)
The rope's end might be two inches in
diameter. It might be a halyard eight inches
thick. Some boatswain's mates used bamboo canes
instead. Sometimes a starting was a full beating
rather than a passing thwack. An angry boatswain's
mate might lay into a man as he danced around to
avoid the blows. Or a cranky officer could order
an impromptu beating.
Midshipmen were often the worst
disciplinarians. Nastyface remembered one who
was a youth not more than twelve or thirteen
years of age; but I have often seen him get
on the carriage of a gun, call a man to him,
and kick him about the thighs and body, and
with his fist would beat him about the head;
and those, although prime seamen, at the same
time dared not demur.
When the midshipman fell in battle at
Trafalgar, 'the general exclamation was,
(1) Hodgskin, pages 62-3.
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"Thank God we are rid of the young tyrant." ' (1)
James Durand, on the other hand, reports that
his midshipmen asked the men to stoop so the boys
could beat them. Lieutenant Hodgskin, himself once
a midshipman, thought their viciousness came from
being away from their families so young and not
receiving a proper education on board:
If any man is not convinced, I can only wish
him to go on board ship, and see the hours of
the midshipmen alternately employed,
sleeping, playing and walking the decks, with
their hands in their pockets, that he may
hear their conversation and see their
amusements; and, if he would afterwards make
them judges of the actions of men, I should
pronounce him mad. (2)
Such summary beatings accounted for the
overwhelming majority of punishments. But when a
captain became really angry he was supposed to
wait until the next day for a formal flogging.
Captain Glasscock describes why in his book o
advice for young officers:
(1) Nastyface, pages 27-8.
(2) Durand, page 18; Hodgskin, page 69.
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An indulgence, therefore, in passion, under
circumstances of disapointment, mistake, or
mishap, should be rigidly repressed, which,
while the paroxysm lasts, tends to the
debasement of those who are its objects, and
robs the subject of either refloetion or the
free exercise of the native faculties of the
mind. If an anecdote were wanting to
exemplify the fatal consequences of
unrestrained passion, it would only be
necessary to refer to the melancholy fate of
the captain of La Revolutionairre who,
sailing under sealed order, fell on the deck
in a fit of anger at some of the crew, and on
being carried below, expired. (1)
Flogging
Punishment came in all shapes and sizes. But
the word 'punishment t
 meant one thing: flogging.
The cat-o'-nine-tai]. g
 was the symbolic heart of
discipline, and a formal 'flogging was the ceremony
of power. Samuel Leech describes the ritual on the
Macedon ian:
(1) Glascock, volume one, pages 243-4.
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A poor fellow had fallen into a very
sailor-like offence of getting drunk. For
this the captain sentenced him to the
punishment of four dozen lashes. He was first
placed in irons all night.., until the
captain bade the first lieutenant prepare the
hands to witness the punishment. Upon this
the lieutenant transmitted the order to the
master-at-arms. He then ordered the grating
or hatch of square holes to be rigged: it was
placed accordingly between the main and spar
(i.e. quarter) decks, not far from the
mainmast. While these preparations were going
on, the officers were dressing themselves in
full uniform and arming themselves with their
dirks. The prisoner's mesemates carried him
in his best clothes, to make him appear in as
decent a manner as possible. This is always
done, in the hope of moving the feelings of
the captain favourably towards the prisoner.
This done, the hoarse, dreaded cry of
'All hands ahoy to witness punishment!' from
the lips of the boatswain, peals along the
ship as mournfully as the notes of funeral
knell. At this signal the officers muster on
the spar deck, the men on the main deck. Next
came the prisoner, guarded by a marine on one
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side and the master-at-arms on the other, he
was marched up to the grating. His back was
made bare, and his shirt was laid lossely
upon his back. The two quarter-masters
proceeded to seize him up, that is, they tied
his hands and feet with spun yarns, called
the seizings, to the grating. The boatswain's
mates, whose office is to flog on board of a
man-of-war, stood ready with their dreadful
weapon of punishment, the cat-o'-nine-tails.
This instrument of torture was composed of
nine cords, a quarter of an inch round, and
about two feet long, the ends whipt with fine
twine. To these cords was afffixed a stock,
two feet in length, covered with red baize.
The reader may be sure that it is a most
formidable instrument in the hands of a
strong, skilfull man. Indeed, any man who
would whip his horse with it would commit an
outrage on humanity, which the moral feeling
of any community would not tolerate; he would
be prosecuted for cruelty; yet it is used to
ship MEN on board ships of war.
The boatswain's mate is ready, with coat
off, and whip in hand. The captain gives the
word. Carefully spreading the cords with the
fingers of his left hand, the executioner
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throws the cast over his right shoulder; it
is brought down upon the now oncovered
herculean shoulders of the MAN. His flesh
creeps- it reddens as if blushing at the
indignity, the sufferer groans; lash follows
lash, until the first mate, wearied with the
cruel employment, give place to a second. Now
two dozen of these dreadful lashes have been
inflicted: the lacerated back looks inhuman;
it resembles roasted meat burnt nearly black
before a scorching fire; yet still the lashes
fall; the captain continues merciless. Vain
are the cries and prayers of the wretched
man. t1 would not forgive the Saviour' was
the blasphemous reply to one of these naval
demi-gods, or rather demi-fiends, to a plea
for mercy. The executioners keep on. Four
dozen strokes have cut up his flesh, and
robbed him of all self-respect; there he
hangs, a pitied, self-despised groaning,
bleeding wretch; and now the captain cries,
Forbear! His shirt i's thrown over his
shoulders, the seizings are loosed: he is led
away, staining the path with red drops of
blood, and the the hands, 'piped down', by
the boatswain, sullenly return to their
duties. (1)
(1) Leech, pages 18-19.
Sometimes the hands were more than sullen.
Just below the surface the ship's company seethed.
At times they greeted each stroke with a moaning
so low that no one could be accused of it. At
times they did more. On the Victorious the
prisoner turned to the ship's company and said 'By
God I will not strip.' It appears that the captain
did not dare force him but left it to a subsequent
court-martial to award 150 lashes. (1)
In June 1802 the marines were drawn up on the
quarterdeck of the Audacious. In a low but clear
voice marine Joseph Hawkes said 'It's a damned
shame.' Another marine was pulled out of the line.
The captain slugged him and he was put into irons.
Next morning he was taken up to the quarterdeck,
where he said it wasn't him, it was Hawkes. The
court martial awarded Hawkes 300 lashes.
Flogging was a tense ceremony, a time when
officers watched the men carefully. On the America
in 1795 the sailors were lining up to witness
punishment. For reasons that are unclear, they
stood in rows with fixed bayonets. Lieutenant Lake
felt that Samuel Beech had been slow in lining up,
(1) Court martial of 12 Sept 1803, in Adm. 1:5363.
For a 8imilar case see the court martial of Jospeh
Steel of the Ville de Paris in 1806, in
Adm.1 :5375.
(2) Court martial of Hawkes in Adm. 1:3360.
so he began beating Beech with a stick. Beech
turned to face his tormenter, who raised his sword
to ward off an anticipated blow from the sailor.
Another seaman, Joseph Collier, made a remark over
his shoulder to Beech without turning round. At
this point Lake panicked. He had both Beech and
Collier arrested immediately. The court martial
acquitted both of them. (1)
Flogging was not always the end of
punishment. Captain Glascock, in his manual for
young officers, advises that:
The moment the painful duty is ended, no
inclination should be shown to keep the
recollection of it alive by any ill-timed
comment, or intimation (which, unfortunately,
is too much the habit with many, in other
respects, very judicious officers), that in
addition to his punishment the delinquent is
set down in the captain's private list. The
tendency of such an intimation is to make men
reckless of the future, and regardless of
character, which they, with a good deal of
reason, imagine is irrevocably, lost the
moment their name is enrolled in writing on
(1) Court martial of Beech and Collier in Adm.
1 :5333.
that hateful memorial, emphatically
denominated by sailors the 'Black List'. No
unprofitable task in the way of black-list
duty should ever be imposed. It is in the
recollection of many, that captains have
compelled seamen on this list to brighten the
'breeches of the guns', the 'belaying pins',
the ring bolts in the deck, and even a two-
and thirty- pound shot, tasks which the
sailor must himself perceive were useless.
(1)
Glascock was writing in 1826, eleven years
after the end of the wars. He noted that such
practices were gradually dying out in the Royal
Navy. They were, however, becoming newly popular
in the American Navy, particularly on the smarter
ships in the Mediterranean.
Of course, Glascock may not have been typical
of officers of his generation. He sometimes seems
a trifle soft. For instance, he was against
putting men in irons:
A man of spirit will naturally, brood and
repine at the unnecoessary disgrace thus
(1) Glascock, volume one, pages 245-6.
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inflicted for trifling offenses. The
injurious consequences of resorting to irons
in the latter case may be most aptly
exemplified by referring to numerous
well-known instances, where a string of men,
whose offences have been trifling have been
exhibited, each bolted by the leg on the
half-deck, or other most exposed part of the
ship, whilst visitors from the shore have
been conducted round the vessel by their own
officers. A sailor must be made of stone not
to feel keenly such ill-timed degradation.
The sentiment is not confined to the
prisoner: an inference is drawn by the
visitant.., most discreditable to the
character of the seamen and respectability of
the service. Thus the injury is twofold; at
once inflicting on the sailor unnecessary
degradation and pain, whilst it serves the
malignant purposes of the malcontents on
shore to claim to calumniate the character of
the constitutional fOrce, which has hitherto
been, and will ever continue, the natural
bulwark of these sea-girt isles. (1)
(1) Glascock, pages 250-1.
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A formal flogging was designed to terrify the
sailors. The pomp, the ritual, the dress uniforms,
the regulated and rhythmic brutality, all
contributed to the same effect. (1) But how did it
feel to the flogged man?
Flogging was shameful, and few men have left
records of their experiences. One man recalled
'Nothing but an 0, a few 0 my Gods, and then you
can put on your shirt. ' Another, a soldier,
flogged with the lighter military cat, wrote that
after the first few strokes:
The pain in my lung was more severe, I
thought, than on my back. I felt as if I
would burst in the internal parts of my
body... I put my tongue between my teeth,
held it there, and bit it almost in two
pieces. What with the blood from my tongue,
and my lips, which I had also bitten, and the
blood,from my lungs, or some other internal
part, ruptured by the writhing agony, I was
almost choked, and became black in the face.
(2)
(1) For a comparison see the discussion of
theatrical rituals of power in E.P. Thompson,
'Eighteenth Century English Society: Class
Struggle without Class?'
(2) Pope, The Black Ship, page 62.
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Punishments varied enormously. A court
martial could award a deserter 100 to 300 lashes.
A captain could give him a quick two dozen and
have done with it. The captain had great
discretion. The law said he could not award more
than a dozen without a court martial and twelve
lashes is indeed the most common punishment
recorded in the logs. But on occasion every
captain awarded more and noted the fact in the
official log. A few men got away with half a
dozen: many got two dozen. Some captains awarded
three or four dozen regularly. 63 and 72 lashes
were not unheard of.
Flogging sometimes killed. This did not have
much to do with the number of lashes, and most
victims died some time afterwards. Many men
survived 200 lashes. Some died after 36. Why?
The soldier quoted above remembered pain in
the chest and blood from the lungs. One blow with
a naval cat would knock down a standing man. The
prisoner was lashed to a grating, and each blow
slammed him against it. Dudley Pope did an
(1) Samuel Billings of the Excellent, for
instance, got 63 lashes for 'cheering on the lower
deck' on 4 Jan 1803. See the ship's log in Adm.
52:2992. Several men on the Hermione got 72; see
Pope, Life in Nelson's Navy, page 226.
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interesting experiment. He made a replica of the
old cat-o'-nine-tails. He nailed two inch by half
inch pieces of pine across a grating. He broke the
wood with one blow of the cat. So he tried inch by
inch pine. He broke it on the second blow. (1)
It is not hard to see how a man tied to that
grating might suffer a broken rib. That rib could
float loose and slice into the lung. This would be
very painful, and on an eighteenth century ship a
punctured lung could easily lead to fatal
infection.
When sailors remembered floggings, words like
'meat' and 'liver' kept springing to mind. Here
again the danger was infection. Men would not die
of the beating itself, but they could later die of
gangrene and other infections. This danger in
flogging is not mentioned in any contemporary
source. But it explains why some men survived 200
lashes and others died after 24, and why they
usually died after an interval following the
beatings.
But we should not exaggerate. The
overwhelming majority of flogged men survived. Nor
did all the witnesses feel that a flogging was
dangerous. Captain Chamier wrote a novel called
(1) Pope, The Black Ship, pages 332-3.
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Ben Brace, the Last of Nelson's Agamemnons. Ben
Brace says: TAS for corporal punishment - which
means a little back-scratching - I think I may say
that it could not be abolished without injury to
the service.' (1) He goes on to explain that men
would not work without terror. He was, of course,
right. A wage labourer can be threatened with the
sack. But the seamen were mostly pressed, and
every regime of forced labour requires the lash.
Captain Glascock summed up the case for flogging
in 1826: 'The materials of which our navy are
formed are, like granite, principally valuable for
their hard, tough and lasting wear-and-tear
quality.' (2)
Of course, Chamier, Glascook and 'Ben Brace'
were all captains. No lower deck memoir justifies
the lash. Whatever the pain, what sailors hated
most was the degradation. Leech describes the
scene as his ship heads for home:
Visions of an old fire-side, of many a humble
hearth-stone, poor, but precious, flitted
across the visions of our crew that night.
(1) Frederick Chamier, Ben Brace, the Last of
Nelson's Agamemnons, London, Bentley, 1836, quoted
in C. Northcote parkinson, Portsmouth Point, the
Navy in Fiction, 1793-1815, London, Liverpool
University Press, 1948, page 62.
(2) Glascook, volume two, page 102.
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Hardships, severe discipline, were for the
time forgotten in the dreams of hope. Would
that I could say that everything in every
mind was thus absorbed in pleasure! There
were minds that writhed under what is never
forgotten. Like the scar, that time may heal,
but not remove, the flogged man forgets not
that he has been degraded; the whip, when it
scarred the flesh, went farther; it wounded
the spirit; it struck the man; it begat a
sense of degradation he must carry with him
to the grave. We had many such on board our
frigate; their laugh sounded empty, and
sometimes their look became suddenly vacant
in the midst of hilarity. It was the whip
entering the soul anew. But most of our crew
were, for the time, happy. They were homeward
bound. (1)
Offenses
Men were flogged for many reasons. On the
Culloden in 1793, for instance, men were punished
for sleeping on watch, being drunk and
disobedient, fighting, neglect of duty and
attempted desertion. On 30 March 1795 James Warner
received 12 lashes for 'skulking and neglect of
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duty. On 11 June Robert Leeky received 24 lashes
for 'drunkenness and sundry misdemeanoure' . On 13
June Samuel Tickner received 12 lashes for selling
his trousers. (1)
Selling one's clothes was not an uncommon
offense. Sailors were pressed in what they stood
up in. The cold of the North Sea could kill a man
without stout canvas clothes. So the purser gave
the men clothes on credit and collected the money
when they were paid. Often the Navy did not get
round to paying the sailors for years at a time.
The men were allowed shore liberty in foreign
ports where the captain felt that they would not
desert. Their needs were few but strong. They had
no money to meet them, as they were only paid in
home ports, no matter how long at sea. If he
could, a sailor smuggled his spare clothes ashore
and sold them for the price of a good time on the
Genoa docks. But it was difficult. Officers kept a
close watch on men going ashore. They kept lists
of the men's clothes and there were regular
clothing counts. Sometime g
 a man must have sold
what he stood up in. When he reported for the boat
to take him back to the ship, his crime would be
obvious. A flogging would follow the next day.
This may seem harsh. But, as Captain Marryat said,
(1) The relevant logs of the Culloden are in Adm.
51:202 and Adm. 51:1130.
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'If there were no punishment for selling their
clothes, the men would soon be naked.' (1)
The two most common offenses were drunkenness
and 'neglect of duty'. 'Neglect of duty' meant
making a mistake. Lieutenant Hodgekins explains:
I have heard it avowed as a principle, by an
officer of the highest reputation in His
Majesty's service, and I have seen it acted
upon, 'that no such thing as an accident
could happen'; consequently, any misfortune
must have arisen in some person's neglect,
and some person must be punished to prevent
its recurrence...(Hodgskin goes on to give
examples).. . Some of the iron allotted to a
man to polish does not shine well; his
hammock has not been clean scrubbed; his
clothes have wanted mending; his shirt has
been dirty; or perhaps he may have neglected
the captain's stock, or the wardroom dinner:
These, and a thousand similar trifles, are
(1) Marryat, pages 18-19. To be fair, Marryat
regarded flogging men for selling their clothes as
a regrettable necessity when dealing with pressed
men. But he felt it was barbaric, and if his
suggested reforms were adopted this punishment
could be dispensed with.
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what seamen are flogged for, as neglect of
duty. (1)
It might seem harsh to flog a man for
drunkenness. After all, each day the Navy gave a
man a gallon of beer or eight double rums. Like as
not the officer who charged him was half seas over
as well at the time. But men were not usually
punished for such gentle social slipping.
'Drunkenness' meant the sort of falling-down drunk
achieved by smuggling drink aboard or by hoarding
rations.
Close behind drunkenness and neglect came
floggings for talking back and looking surly. (2)
This offense was variously called 'disobedience',
'contempt', 'disprespect', 'insolence' or even
'mutinous behaviour'. It was particularly likely
to happen when a drunken officer confronted a
sailor himself three sheets to the wind. The angry
sailor would fall into obscenities and sometimes
into threats. (3) But a man could be punished for
(1) Hodgskin, pages 42-3.
(2) Hy estimates of the frequency of flogging for
different offenses is based on exensive reading of
ships logs.
(3) The majority of the court martials for
'mutiny' in the Admiralty records are in fact
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much lees. According to Hodgekin:
It is not uncommon in the Navy for looks to
be punished as contempt, for a claim to
justice, as a right belonging to every
member of society, for a protestation of
innocence, particularly is supported by
reasoning, against the rash intuitive
convictions of a superior, to be punished at
this enlightened period of the world as
disrespect. (1)
Officers and Punishment
The ships' logs show great variations in
punishments. Some ships record at least one
flogging a week. Others can go a month without
recorded punishment. Where one officer swore at a
man another would order two dozen lashes.
The key officers were the captain and the
first lieutenant. The captain had the power to
order floggings, but the first lieutenant was in
prosecutions of just such individual angry drunks.
For more on the connection between grog, rage and
punishment, see James Peck, Nelson's Blood: the
Story of Naval Rum, Havant, Kenneth Mason, 1982,
pages 60-63.
(1) Hodgekin, page 56.
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charge of the day-to-day running of the ship.
Furthermore, captains spent a lot of time on
shore. Nastyface hated his told woman of a
captain' for being constantly away in London at
parties or in the House of Commons. (Like many
naval officers, the captain was also an M.P.) He
left control to the tyrannical first lieutenant.
Even when on board the captain 'flogged every man
that was reported to him by the... lieutenant,
without enquiring into the complaint, for that
would have been beneath his dignity as a man and
an officer. t (1)
It was always a tense time when the ship
changed officers. The men waited to see which way
the fresh wind blew. A new captain or first
lieutenant might be a harsh flogger. Just as
important, he would set the style for every
boatswain's mate with a rope's end. Leech remarked
on one unpleasant surprise:
While in port we experienced a change of
officers by no means agreeable to the crew.
Mr. Scott, our first lieutenant, an amiable
man, decidedly hostile to the practice of
flogging, left us; for what cause, we could
(1) Nastyface, pages 70-71.
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not ascertain. His successor, Mr. Hope,
though bearing a very pleasant name, was an
entirely different person. . . He was harsh,
severe, and fond of seeing the men flogged.
Of course, floggings became more frequent
therefore; for although a lieutenant cannot
flog upon his own authority, yet, such is the
influence he exerts over a captain, that he
has the utmost opportunity to gratify a
thirst for punishment. (1)
Such sadists were a minority among captains,
but firm floggers were the norm. Nastyface reports
that in his fleet of nine ships there were two
kind captains. Perhaps that was about average. At
the end of the voyage both kind captains received
presents of gold plate or cups, bought with
pennies contributed by the crew. It was a formal
way of expressing appreciation, The seven f loggers
however, Nastyface says, commanded men slow in
their movements, broken in spirit and always
speaking ill of the captain. (2)
Everybody appreciated a good officer. Even
Leech remembered Lieutenant Scott with admiration:
(1) Leech, page 21.
(2) Nastyface, pages 108-9.
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Punishment leads to revenge, revenge to
punishment. What is intended to cure, only
aggravates the disease; the evil enlarges
under the remedy; voluntary subordination
ceases; gloom overepreads the crew; fear
fills the breasts of the officers; the ship
becomes a miniature of the house of fiends.
While, on the other hand, mild regulations,
enforced without an appeal to brute force,
are easily carried into operation. The sailor
has a warm heart; show him personal kindness,
treat him as a man, he will then be a man; he
will do anything for a kind officer. He will
peril his life for him, nay, he will
cheerfully rush between him and danger. This
was done at Tripoli, when the brave James
offered his own arm to receive the fell
stroke of the Turkish scimitar, aimed at the
life of the bold Decatur, on board the
frigate Philadelphia. (1)
The average captain was neither kind nor
blood-thirsty. Lieutenant Hodgskin's captain was
(1) Leech, page 23. Leech characteristically gives
credit to an American officer, Decatur. But he was
also loyal to the memory of Lieutenant Scott of
the Macedonian.
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probably typical: a decent and religious man, he
tried his best for the service, but he had been
brought up to be a 'smart' officer.
I have seen this captain flog, I think,
twenty-six men, part of them by candle-light,
at both gangways, because their hammocks were
not properly cleaned.
The number of men is stated from memory,
as not thinking, at that time, it would ever
become a duty to state it, and reason upon it
to the public; and not being a spy upon any
man's action, I made no note of the affair,
however I might think it cruel; neither do I
remember the amount of the lashes, but I am
certain they were not less than one dozen
each man.
The only time the men were allowed for
scrubbing was one hour and a half during the
night; in this time they had their hammocks,
half a week's dirty clothes, and perhaps, a
bag to scrub. It was not because they had not
been scrubbed at all, but because they did
not look well: I should say it was flogging
men for impossibilities. It was in a warm
climate, and, in a warm climate before, this
captain had seen such things done; he would
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allow of no relaxation whatever, justly
observing, if he began to relax, he knew not
where to stop. (1)
Running
The people had a remedy for a brutal captain:
desertion. They called it 'running', a word with a
more neutral, even energetic, connotation. Most
sailors were pressed men with little desire to
stay on board. They were allowed ashore in foreign
ports because relatively few deserted there. But
in home ports sentries kept a constant watch and
the ship's boats rowed around to make sure nobody
swam ashore. The punishment if a man was caught
could be trrifying. But in art unhappy ship for
some men escape from certain hell now outweighed
the threat of possible hell later. Men ran from
every ship in most months, but a brutal captain
increased the rate.
Nastyface says that his captain was so
plagued by desertions that he had to recruit 2,100
men in two years to fill 600 places. He may have
exaggerated, but desertion was a fact of life.
Some men swam ashore in the dark. Sometimes a
(1) Hodgekin, pages 33-4.
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man could get his friends arid relatives on shore
to have him arrested for debt. Then he could pay
off the debt after the ship left. A boat's crew
could row the lieutenant back to the ship, watch
him jump for the side, and then row like hell for
the shore. At Bantry Bay, Ireland, in 1814:
the men were so determined, that they walked
down the side of the ship, in presence of the
sentinel at the gangway, and of the officer
of the watch, took possession of one of the
ship's boats, and notwithstanding they were
fired at with ball-cartridges, persisted in
their attempt, and ultimately succeeded in
gaining the shore. (1)
The great majority of deserters got clean
away. Since only a minority were caught, their
punishment had to be all the fiercer to cow their
mates. Jack Nastyface explains what this meant:
While lying at Spithead, in the year 1809 or
1810, four impressed seamen attempted to make
their escape from a frigate, then lying
there; one of their shipmates, a Dutchman, to
(1) I1arryat, pages 5-6; Natyface, pages 120-21;
Letter from Thomas Troubridge to Admiralty, 2
January 1795, in Adm. 1:2596, Letter 133.
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whom they had entrusted the secret, betrayed
their intention, and informed the commanding
officer of their designs. They were tried by
a court-martial, and sentenced to receive
three hundred lashes, each through the fleet.
On the first day after the trial that the
weather was moderate enough to permit, the
signal was made for a boat from each ship,
with a guard of marines, to attend the
punishment.
The man is placed in a launch, i.e. the
largest ship's boat, under the care of the
master-at-arms and a doctor. There is a
capstan bar rigged fore and aft, to which
this poor fellow is lashed by his wrists, and
for fear of hurting him - humane creatures-
there is a stocking put over each, to prevent
him from tearing the flesh in his agonies.
When all is ready, the prisoner is stript and
seized to the capstan bar.
Punishment commences by the officer, after
reading the sentence of the court-martial,
ordering the boatswain's mates to do their
duty. The cat-of-nine tails is applied to the
bare back, and at about every six lashes, a
fresh boatswain's mate is ordered to relieve
the executioner of his duty, until the
105
prisoner has received, perhaps, twenty-five
lashes: he is then cast loose, and allowed to
sit down iwth a blanket rolled round him, is
conveyed to the next ship, escorted by this
vast number of armed boats, accompanied by
that doleful music, 'The Rogue's MarchT.
In this manner he is conveyed from ship to
ship, receiving alongside of each a similar
number of stripes with the cat, until the
sentence is completed. It often, nay
generally, happens, that nature is unable to
sustain it, and the poor fellow faints and
sinks under it, although every kind method is
made use of to enable him to bear it, by
pouring wine down his throat. The doctor will
then feel his pulse, and often pronounces
that the man is unable to bear more.
He js then taken, most usually insensible,
to what is termed the sick bay; and, if he
recovers, he is told he will have to receive
the remainder of his punishment. When there
are many ships in the fleet at the time of
the court-martial, this ceremony, if the
prisoner can sustain it, will last nearly
half the day.
On the blanket being taken from his back,
and he supported or lifted to be lashed to
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the capstan-bar, after he has been alongside
of several ships, his back resembles so much
putrified liver, and every stroke of the cat
brings away the congealed blood; and the
boatswain's mates are looked at with the eye
of a hawk to see they do their duty, and
clear the cat's tail after every stroke, the
blood at the time streaming through their
fingers. (1)
The Admiralty clearly intended every an
contemplating desertion to see such scenes in his
dreams. But terror does not always work. Tens of
thousands, at least, deserted. And the above
quotation, after all, is from a book published in
1836 by a printer in Cheapside named William
Robinson. Robinson wrote the book himself, but it
was too risky for him to put his name on the title
page. He was a deserter. (2) The book's full title
was Nautical Economy, or Forecastle Recollections
of Events During the Last War, Deicated to the
Brave Tars of Old England by a Sailor, Politely
Called by the Officers of the Navy, Jack
Nastyface.
(1) Nastyface, pages 110-12.
(2) Oliver Warner, introduction to William
Robinson, Jack nastyface: Memoirs of a Seaman,
London, Wayland, 1973, page 9.
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Chapter Five: Forecastle Culture
The strict frontier of control separated
officers and men. Daily violence and occasional
theatre of terror combined to keep the men in
their place. But within their own space, forward
and between the decks, the sailors were able to
build and subtly defend a world of their own. They
created a counter-culture of the foreosatle,
centered on women, drink and solidarity.
To describe this culture in detail would
require a thesis in itself, and the material is
certainly there. But this thesis is concerned with
class conflict, and in this chapter I will merely
provide a minimum of necessary background
information on forecastle culture.
Drink
The Royal Navy expected its sailors to drink.
The Navy provided the drink free. Ships' crews
close to home drank beer. In the Mediterranean
they drank wine; everywhere else they usually
drank rum. One man's daily ration was a gallon of
beer, or a pint of wine, or a half-pint of rum.
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Half the ration was served at noon and half at
four in the afternoon. So each man had four pints
of beer for lunch and four pints at tea-time, four
double rums at lunch and four double rums for tea.
Of course, the beer and winere were somewhat
stronger then than now. In terms of what is served
ma modern pub, they were drinking five pints or
five double rums twice a day. (1)
Boys got a half ration free until they were
18. If they had any money they could buy the other
half. Officers were entitled to the usual ration
and to their own wine in the wardroom, which they
paid for. The rum was mixed with water, normally
in the proportion of three parts of water to one
part of rum. This did not mean that a man received
less rum, for the water was added after the full
ration had been measured out.
The Navy had taken its rum neat until the
1740s, when Admiral Vernon introduced the practice
of mixing in water. He hoped that the sailors
would drink more slowly and thus get less drunk.
Vernon always wore an overcoat made out of a cloth
called 'grogam', and his men called him 'Old
Grog' . His new drink was called 'grog' too.
Captain Home of the Defiance went further
(1) Ny discussion of grog is based on Peck,
Nelson's Blood.
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than Grogam and ordered his men to mix five pints
of water to one pint of rum. They mutinied. (1)
And restrictions on drink were often one of the
complaints in other mutinies. The sailors had a
storng sense of their traditional rights. This was
partially because they valued the same 'moral
economy' as the crowd ashore. (2) But it was also
because their rations and their drink were set by
the customs and rules of the Navy. Most of these
rules were written down and all supplies were
carefully accounted for. So if a. man's grog was
missing, somebody had taken it: probably the
purser or the captain or both. They also felt
entitled to refuse any changes in their allowance
of food or drink. They often did so, simply
refusing to touch the new rations. Many were
particularly attached to their grog.
(1) This mutiny is described in detail in Part
Three.
(2) See E.P. Thompson, 'The Moral Economy of the
English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century', and
Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, 'The Many Faces of the
Moral Economy: A Contribution to a Debate', Past &
Present, 1973, number 58, pages 160-68. An
outraged sense of moral economy runs right through
the attack on Bligh by Morrison, one of the Bounty
mutineers, in The Journal of James Morrison,
edited by Owen Rutter, London, Golden Cockrel
Press, 1935, pages 18-20.
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Denis Mahoney, for instance, was a seaman on
the Desiree in 1810. He was tried for striking a
superior officer, the boatswain's mate John
Toberry. The court-martial established that at six
in the evening the watch had been called up. They
were slack in coming up, and Toberry asked Mahoney
why he had not come up sooner. Mahoney said 'I am
here now' . So Toberry hit Mahoney. Then the seaman
retaliated. He grabbed the handkerchief around
Toberry's neck in one hand, pulled him down and
hit him once.
The trial record States that after the
prosecution witnesses:
The prisoner refused all invitation for
questioning any evidence, arid would not put
forward in his behalf; and the only defense
was - agreeable to the enclosed written paper
by himself.
'Law makers Must not be Law breakers
he Struck me and I struck him
the Captain Stopped 12 days grog from me
I must have my grog and you
May have my live.
Denis Mahoney.' (1)
(1) Trial of Mahoney, 10 March 1810, Adm. 1:5403.
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The court sentenced Mahoney to death.
Two hundred years ago people drank far more
than they do now. But even then Navy had a
reputation. The popular image of Jack Tar ashore
was an amiable drunk singing off-key with one arm
around a prostitute and his brains pickled. While
customs have changed since the eighteenth century1
the human body has not. A man who drank the Navy's
ration every day was an alcoholic, and a man of
war was community of 600 chronic alcoholics.
Historians sometimes write as if this were
glamorous. After 1815 the cold water and icy
Christianity brigade gained a foothold between
decks. They may not be easy people to empathize
with, but there was a reason for their growing
strength. Alchohol in large quantities is not good
for the human body. And as Hodgskin put it, 'There
is no place in the world where personal safety is
so much endangered as at sea. ' (1)
The captain could order men to the guns right
after grog had been been served. Drunken officers
would angrily patrol a line of drunken men at the
guns. Or the sails might have to be furled.
Drunken men would race up swaying rigging and out
on to the yards that yawed in the wind. Mistakes
(1) Hodgskin, pages 97-8.
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and floggings were common consequences. When the
three boys fell to their deaths on the Hermione,
it was six in the evening. Captain Pigot and all
the officers and men were drunk. (1) Most men were
summarily beaten or flogged for what they said
while drunk. But in the court martial records
there are several trials every year of seamen who
exploded in drunken rage during the early evening
against some boatswain's mate or lieutenant who
was harrassing them. (2)
The officers all tolerated heavy drinking.
Most joined in. Partly this was a matter of
custom, for drink was a seaman's right.
Nerchantmen did not provide the same quantities of
drink, and merchant skippers complained that once
a man had served in the Royal Navy he was drunk
for life and ruined for proper work.
The reason why the Navy gave its men so much
drink is not far to seek. Sailors were largely
pressed men. They were seldom allowed ashore. At
sea a ship 100 feet long contained 500 bitter and
sexually frustrated young men. They worked long
hours at hard, cold, wet and degrading work. So
they drank. And the officers realized, implicitly
(1) For the Hermione mutiny see chapter one.
(2) For the connecion between grog and punishment,
see Peck,pages 57-63.
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or explicitly, that it was easier to control them
that way.
Bored sailors spent a lot of time thinking
about drink. There were a hundred stratagems to
get more and a thousand yarns about the
strategems. The most common trick was perfectly
legal.
Each mess was a group of nine or so men who
ate together at their own table between decks. Men
chose their own mess. Some unpleasant people had
to eat by themselves. Each man took it in turn to
be cook for his mess. The cook collected the food
from the ship's cook and drew the rum ration for
the whole mess. When he shared it out he kept for
himself a special large measure: the 'plush'. On
some ships this was almost half the ration. He
could spend the day getting very drunk indeed.
Men also gave their rations to each other in
exchange for a similar favour another day. And
there were innumerable stories of smuggling drink
aboard. All these let the sailor achieve what he
wanted most: oblivion. As Leech said, 'to be drunk
is considered by almost every sailor to be the
acme of sensual bliss.' (1)
(1) Samuel Leech, Thirty Years from Home, Boston
edition, Tapan and Dennet, 1848, page 65.
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Women
Sailors drank more in port. The ships were
full of women, and they were expected to smuggle
drink on board for the men.
Sailors had no prejudice against women on
board. On most ships the gunner was encouraged to
bring his wife to sea. He berthed with the ship's
boys, and it was hoped his wife could provide
something of a mother's tender affections. It was
also hoped she might shield them from the tender
affections of the men.
Many petty officers and some favoured seamen
were allowed to bring their wives. This was an
indulgence permitted to the captain's favourites
and could be withdrawn at any time. In some cases
these women were legal wives. In other cases they
were port prostitutes who hitched up with a man
for the voyage. John Nicol, for instance, was on
the Goliath at the Battle of the Nile in 1798. He
remembered the 'boys and women who carried the
powder' for the guns. There was a woman from L,eith
who died of her wounds and another woman from
Edinburgh who 'bore a son in the heat of the
action'. (1)
= = = - a_a a = = = = a ____________________________________
(1) Nico]., page 193.
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Of course many sailors preferred men to
women. (1) But many must also have made do with
what came to hand. It is impossible to tell how
common this was. There is one suggestive habit of
speech. The insult between sailors was 'you
bugger'. Again and again the phrase crops up in
the mouths of officers yelling at the men, of
sailors joshing each other or provoking a fight,
of men searching for a word to emphasize an oath.
Nany sailors may have disapproved of sex with men,
but the possibility was clearly much on their
minds.
Still, for the majority of men ports meant
women. The press had torn them from their
families. Sailors were often pressed off
merchantmen as they returned from several years
voyage to the east. Unless he deserted a man
usually served from the date of impressment until
the declaration of peace. In theory he was paid
off if the ship could no longer sail, but in
practice he would be transferred to another ship
before the first was discharged. A man impressed
in 1793 remained on baord until the peace of 1802.
A man impressed in 1803 would serve ten years.
Some unlucky souls were not discharged in 1802 and
(1) See Arthur Gilbert, 'Social Deviance and
Disaster during the Napoleonic Wars', Albion,
1977, volume 9, pages 98-113.
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so served right through the wars. Because they
were usually not allowed ashore in home waters,
their families had to come to them.
This they did. In port the ship was full of
aged fathers, weeping mothers and comradely
sisters. A pressed man's children would come
aboard to see him. When Valentine Joyce of Belfast
served in the Channel Fleet his wife lived in
Portsmouth. This must have been common, for the
Channel Fleet spent much of the winter in port. A
man and his wife could make love together on board
ship, but they usually had to do it in a room with
three hundred other people. So they might sneak
off for a little privacy underneath the guns, a
practice that has given us the phrase 'son of a
gun'.
On pay day, which might only be once in three
or four years, most sailors would not have their
wives with them. The Admiralty only paid men in
home ports. Jack Nastyface describes a typical
occasion:
After having moored our ship, swarms of boats
came round us;...a great many of them were
freighted with cargoes of ladies, a sight
that was truly gratifying and a great treat;
for our crew, consisting of six hundred and
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upwards, nearly all young men, had seen but
one woman on board for eighteen months, arid
that was the daughter of one of the the
Spanish chiefs...
So soon as these boats were allowed to
come alongside, the seamen flocked down
pretty quick, one after the other, and
brought their choice up, so that in the
course of the afternoon, we had about four
hundred and fifty on board.
Of all the human race, these poor young
creatures are the most pitiable; the
ill-usage and degradation they are driven to
submit to are indescribable; but from habit
they become callous, indifferent as to
delicacy of speech and behaviour, and so
totally lost to all sense of shame, that they
seem to retain no quality which properly
belongs to women, but the shape and the name.
When we reflect that these unfortunately
deluded victims to our passions, might at one
time have been destined to be valuable
companions and comforts of man, but now so
fallen: in these cooler moments of
meditation, what a charge is raised against
ourselves; we cannot reproach them for their
abject condition, lest this startling
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question should be asked of us, who made us
so?
On the arrival of any man of war in port,
these girls flock down to the shore, where
boats are always ready; and here may be
wjtnessed a scene, somewhat similar to the
trafficking for slaves in the West Indies. As
they approach a boat... (the boatman) before
they come on board surveys them from stem to
stern... (He) carefully culls out the best
looking, and the most dashingly dressed; and,
in making up his complement for the load, it
often happens that he refuses to take some of
them, observing (very politely) and usually
with some vulgar oath; to one, that she is
too old: to another, that she it too ugly;
and that he shall not be able to sell them;
and he'll be d----d if he has any notion of
having his trouble for nothing. The only
apology that can be made for the savage
conduct of these unfeeling brutes is, that
they run a chance of not being permitted to
carry a cargo alongside, unless it make a
good shew-off; for it has been known, that,
on approaching a ship, the officer in command
has so far forgot himself as to order the
waterman to push off- that he should not
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bring such a cargo of d----d ugly devils on
board, and that he should not allow any of
his men to have them. At this ungentlemanly
rebuff, the waterman lays up on his oars
a-while, hangs his lip, musing on his mishap;
and in his heart, no doubt cursing and double
cursing the quarterdeck fool, and gradually
pulls away to shore again. And the girls not
sparing of their epithets on the occasion.
Here the waterman is a loser, for he takes
them conditionally: that is, if they are made
choice of, or whathe calls sold, he receives
three shillings each; and if not, then no
pay.
Thus these poor unfortunates are taken to
market like cattle; and whilst this system is
observed, it cannot with truth be said, that
the slave-trade is abolished in England.
I am now happily laid up in matrimonial
harbour, blest in a wife and several
children, and my constant prayer to heaven
is, that my daughters may never step a foot
on board of a man-of-war. (1)
A ship in harbour carried a lot of women.
When the Royal George went down in 1782,
(1) Nastyface, pages, 59-61.
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300 women drowned. (I) Or take Richardson's ship
when it received a visit from Princess Caroline in
1806. The whole ship was carefully cleaned
beforehand and 'hundreds' of women were ordered to
hide below until the royal guest had gone:
As her Royal Highness was going round the
decks and viewing the interior, she cast her
eyes down upon the main hatchway, and there
saw a number of girls peeping up at her. 'Sir
Richard', she said, 'you told me there no
women on board the ship, but I am convinced
there are, as I have seen them peeping up
from that place, and am inclined to think
they are put down there on my account..' She
told the captain to let the women up. They
lined the booms and gangways to view the
princess. (2)
Many sailors married prostitutes. Sometimes
it was only for a voyage. Often it was in the hope
of a life-long love. This may seem strange.
Captain Glascock tells what he takes to be a funny
story about a sailor in love:
(1) Leech, page 114.
(2) Richardson, page 226.
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A seaman, whose ship was on the point of
sailing from Spithead, was extremely
solicitous to obtain permission to go on
shore, for the purpose of leading to the
altar one of the chaste sirens of Sallyport.
(Glascock means a prostitute.)
Joe, during the time the ship's company
were at dinner, was seen dodging about the
decks, 'backing and filling', for a
favourable opportunity to make his simple
appeal to the sterner feelings of the first
lieutenant. He at length, however, appeared
to have 'screwed-up his courage to the
sticking place", and made an effort to go
aft...In his approach to the lieutenant, he
bore more than the appearance of a criminal
leading out to execution, than of an anxious
bridegroom on the eve of consumation of all
his eager wishes. But he felt it was too late
to retrace, so he proceeded to open the
business, with an awkward inflexion of the
body, and a twist of his shoulders, as a
token of profound respect. As yet a word had
not escaped him, and it appeared still
problematical whether, without encouragement,
his timidity would not compel him to carry
his secret with him to the grave.
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His head hung down, and except that now
and then he stole a furtive glance at the
lieutenant to help him out at guessing how
the 'wind lay', his wide eyes were intently
fixed on the buckle of his hat-band, which he
alternately twiddled with fore finger and
thumb of both hands, whilst in a supliant
tone, he hesitatingly began, 'Please, sir,
I've a bit of a favour to ax.' - 'Well, my
man, what is it?' replied the lieutenant. 'I
know', rejoined Joe, 'Its more almost nor a
man can expect'.., alternately shifting his
legs and jerking out his words
(Finally Joe brings him8elf to say what he
wants.)
'The girl be d----d!' exclaimed the
lieutenant; 'you don't mean to say, you want
to be spliced to that bare-faced hussy that
was aboard?' - 'Yes, i' you please, sir; the
strands are unlaid.' - 'Unlaid!' said the
lieutenant; 'you deserve to have the cat laid
on your back for being such an infernal fool.
Can you offer,' continued he, in a somewhat
more pacified tone, 'the least plausible
reason for even thinking of marrying so
common a strumpet?' - 'Yes, sir,' said Joe,
replying more promptly than hitherto, and
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with an air of self-satisfaction, indicating
hopes of carrying conviction as well as his
point, 'Yes, sir; 'Kase whenever the ship
comes into port, and she's aboard of another,
I can always shove alongside and claim her as
my own. (1)
Joe stands on the quarterdeck at a loss for
words, his hat in his hand and his eyes fixed on
the buckle of his hat band. Captain Glascock gives
an accurate picture of how men behaved on the
quarterdeck. This is what the court martial judges
meant when they asked if a man had petitioned in a
respectful mamer. A sailor faced a flogging or
worse if he looked his officer in the eye and
spoke like a man. 'Joe' is helpless, and Glascock
is making fun of him for behaving like a slave.
When Glascook told that story in the
wardroom, they must have laughed so hard they fell
on the floor. Officers could go ashore when they
wanted and partake of what pleasures they chose.
Joe was trapped on board with the sirens of
Sallyport. Lonely folk grab love where they can
and return a fierce and awkward commitment.
And sailors and prostitutes had much in
(1) Glascock, volume one, pages 202-5.
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common. A man escaped unhappy love or unemployment
or an unhappy family by running away to sea.
Sailors were often the bad boys whose spirits
could not be contained within the village. A
dishonoured woman often moved from unhappy love to
prostitution. Women were forbidden male jobs and
wild girls could not run away to sea. For them it
was the suffocating prison of domestic service or
the degradation of the bum-boats.
There were also practical advantages to
marrying a sailor. A wife could receive a portion
of her husband's pay. In Portsmouth a working
woman found it convenient to be able to present
her marriage lines, when the mayor had one of his
periodic rushes of blood to the head and tried to
clean up the town by banishing all single women.
(1)
In Port
It is hard to find oul exactly what went on
below decks in port. At the time writers used
vague phrases like 'furies and harpies' and
'degradation'. But it is clear that discipline was
relaxed. There was much less work to do. The men
(1) Nastyface, pages 63-8.
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had the lower deck to themselves, and the officers
did not trespass there. The women smuggled drink
on board, and the officers turned a blind eye.
There was a party atmosphere.
Christmas in port was a particularly drunken
feast. Leech eventually married a Yankee Nethodist
and turned temperance. He looked back with
disapproval:
The Sabbath was also a day of sensuality.
True, we sometimes had the semblance of
religious services, when the men were
summoned aft to hear the captain read the
morning service from the church prayer-book;
but usually it was observed more as a day of
revelry than of worship. But at Christmas our
ship presented a scene such as I have never
imagined. The men were permitted to have
their 'full swing'. Drunkenness ruled the
ship..Nearly every man, with most of the
officers, were in a state of beastly
intoxication at night. Here, some were
fighting, but were so insensibly drunk, they
hardly knew whether they struck the guns or
their opponents; yonder, a party were singing
libidinous or bacoanalian songs, while all
were laughing, cursing, swearing or
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hallooing; confusion reined in glorious
triumph. It was the very chaos of humanity.
(1)
Christmas was special. But the officers
generally encouraged a relaxation in port and
tried to promote a happy shi p . That was why they
usually ignored drink smuggling. And they
encouraged singing, which the men valued. Leech
remembered 'Happy Jack'
By such means as these, sailors contrive to
keep up their spirits amidst constant causes
of depression and misery. One is a good
singer, another can spin tough yarns, while a
third can crack a ioke with sufficient point
to call out roars of laughter. But for these
interludes, life in a man-of-war, with severe
officers, would be absolutely intolerable;
mutiny or desertion would mark the voyages of
every such ship. Hence, officers in general
value your jolly, merry-making, don't care
sort of seaman. They know the effect of their
influence in keeping away discontented
thoughts from the minds of a ship's company.
One of these official favourites paid our
frigate a visit while we lay at Lisbon. We
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had just finished breakfast, when a number of
our men were seen running in high glee
towards the main hatchway. . . The cause of
their joy soon appeared in the person a
short, round-faced merry-looking tar, who
descended from the hatchway, amid the cries
of 'Hurrah! here's Happy Jack!' As soon as
the jovial little man had set his foot on the
berth deck, he began specimen of his verbal
powers. The voice of song was as triumphant
on board the Macedonian, as it was in the
days of yore in the halls of Ossian. Every
voice was hushed, all work was brought to
stand still, while the crew gathered around
their favourite, in groups to listen to his
unequalled performance. Happy Jack succeeded
while his visit lasted, in communicating his
own joyous feelings to our people, and they
parted from him that night with deep regret.
A casual visitor in a man-of-war,
beholding the song, the dance, the revelry of
the crew, might judge them to be happy. But I
know that these things are often resorted to,
because they feel miserable, just to drive
away dull care. They do on the same principle
as the slave population in the South (of the
US), to drown in sensual gratification the
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voice of misery that groans in the inner man
- that lives within, speaking of the
indignity offered to its high nature by the
chain that eats beyond the flesh -discoursing
of the rights of man, of liberty on the free
hills of a happier clime: while amidst the
gayest negro dance, not a heart among the
laughing gang but would beat with high
emotions, and seize the boon with
indescribable avidity, should it be offered
its freedom on the spot. (1)
In the Caribbean slaves planned their great
revolts at happy parties which brought together
slaves from different plantations. The great
mutiny at Spithead seems to have been planned
during visits between different ship's companies.
For solidarity was at the heart of this
forecastle world, awash with drink and song. Other
sailors were mates: 'shipmates', 'berthmates',
'measmates'. Both officers and men spoke the
sailors as the 'people' of the ship. They were the
'ship's company', and that was an almost corporate
entity. The officers were not part of the 'ship's
company', nor of the 'the people'. The letters of
petition from the sailors to the Admirally would
be singned with no man's name, just 'Ship's
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Company, Goliath' . In a mutiny or demonstration
the ship's company acted together.
In many ways, the people were a collective
and that collective was the ship. This was
reflected in their langauge. The men of the
Hermione were called the Hermiones, the men of the
Montagu the Montagues, the men of the Bellerephon
the Billy-Ruff'ns, and so on. These collectives
reached their highest unity during demonstration,
strikes and mutinies. In order to understand what
the solidarity of the forecastle meant in
practice, we will have to look at these conflicts
in detail. But first, in the next chapter I turn
to the political background and industrial
traditions of the seamen.
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Chapter Six: Politics and Traditions
The press gathered in resentful men from
every port in the Mediterranean and Atlantic.
Enraged by bullying and corruption, they
protested. This was not new, but after 1798 the
meaning of the protest changed. The possible
consequences of resistance were suddenly without
limit.
The Scottish lawyer Cockburn remembered that
time: T Everything rung, and was connected with the
Revolution in France. . . Everything, not this or
that thing, but literally everything, was soaked
in this one event.' (1) From Boston to Istanbul
the minority who read newspapers followed every
twist and turn in the Revolution. Tom Paine
popularized the revolutionary message in The
Rights of Man, which sold some 200,000 copies in
Britain, a country of only ten million. Hundreds
of thousands more borrowed copies or listened as
(1) Quoted in Kenneth J. Logue, Popular
Disturbances in Scotland, 1780-1815, Edinburgh,
John Donald, 1979, page 133.
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others read. (1)
Many more people knew that the people of
Paris had destroyed the Bastille and cut off the
King's head. These two events reverberated in many
places, because they carried a symbolism many
could understand.
The state at this time was still largely a
body of armed men. Soldiers and sailors were the
overwhelming majority of government employees. War
and the law were still the main tasks of
government. The symbols of the state were the
soldiers, the judge, the noose. At the center of
these symbols was the prison. It was not an
accident that the London crowd attacked the
prisons in the Gordon riots and the Parisian crowd
went for the Bastille. But it was not just
metropolitan crowds who were moved by the
destruction of a great prison. Press ganged
Irishmen and enslaved Africans could also
translate the meaning of July 14th.
And the King of France was not only head of
state. He was also the first in rank in a world of
a thousand ranks and orders. When Louis lost his
head, the world of aristocracy lost its heart. In
(1) E. P. Thompson, The Making of the English
Working Class, London, Penguin, 2nd. edition,
1968, page 117.
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many different places people suffering diverse
oppressions understood that the French were
avenging themselves upon king and lords.
Moreover, Paris was the capital city of one
of the two great empires of the world. The king of
France was the king of kings, the French
aristocacy the most cultured and sophisticated
ruling class in the world. The people who already
looked to France for a lead could more easily
generalize from revolution in France than from
revolution in Geneva or Boston.
Also, the French Revolution for a time
weakened the imperial grip of both France and
Britain. France looked inwards and Frenchmen in
the colonies were split by internal conflicts. The
fortunes of war cut off client states and
colonies. English agents fomented in Haiti and the
Vendee, while French agents agitated British
slaves and Irish peasants.
For all these reasons, many different sorts
and orders of the oppressed decided that perhaps
their time had come. Inadvanced Holland the
democratic clubs were mostly men working at their
trades, and therefore the clubs were called 'the
leather apron' . In Northern Italy students and
poets rallied to the Republics, in Naples many of
the leaders of the Republic were priests. In
133
Poland the King joined the bourgoisie and the Jews
in insurrection against the feudal landlords.
There were slave insurrections on most large
islands in the West Indies, but it was not only
slaves who joined. In Grenada the leader was
Fedon, a free man of colour and an owner of slaves
and p lantations himself. On St. Vincent the rising
of small whites and Carib Indians was led by
Joseph, the war commander of the Caribs. In
Germany philosophers, poets and musicians were
electrified. (1)
These diverse peoples translated the ideas of
the French revolution to fit their circumstances.
One example will have to illustrate the point. On
San Domingo on 22 August the leaders of the slaves
met to plan the uprising. They were mostly African
born. Their leader, Boukman, was a priest of the
African religion. They sacrificed a pig and shared
its blood. Boukman led them in prayer:
(1) C.L.R. James, The Black Jacobins, London,
Allison & Busby, 1980 reprint; Michael Craton,
Testing the Chains: Resistance to Slavery in the
British West Indies, Ithica. Cornell University
Press, 1982; Eugene Genovese, From Rebellion to
Revolution Afro-American Slave Revolts in the
Making of the Modern World, New Orleans, Louisiana
State University Press, 1980; R.R.Palmer, The Age
of the Democratic Revolution: A Political History
of Europe and America, 1760-1800, Princeton,
Princeton University Press, 1970 edition, volume
two.
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The god who created the sun which gives us
light, who rouses the waves and rules the
storm, though hidden in the cloud, he watches
us. He sees all that the white man does. The
god of the white man inspires him with crime,
but our god calls upon us to do good works.
Our god who is good to us orders us to avenge
our wrongs. He will direct our aims and us.
Throw away the symbol of the god of the
whites (the cross) who has so often caused us
to weep, and listen to the voice of liberty,
which speaks in the hearts of all. (1)
Boukmari combined Africa and Paris, Voodun and
liberte. He translated the French Revolution.
In Belfast in 1791 the Society of united
Irishmen wsa founded by a Protestant lawyer, an
army officer and twelve wealthy Presbyterian
merchants. Inspired by the secular revolution in
Catholic France, these men looked to a united
effort by both Protestants and Catholics to reform
the Irish parliament. The United Irishmen grew
quickly and began enrolling humble folk. By 1795
they were seeking French help to overthrow the
English; they had become Republicans. By 1797 they
(1) James, page 67.
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were forging an alliance with the Defenders and
the Whiteboys. The Defenders were a Catholic
peasant organization that fought land wars with
Protestant peasants. The Whiteboys maimed the
cattle and attacked the persons of greedy
landlords. In 1798 these disparate groups rose
more or less together: Presbyterians, United Men,
Defenders and White Boys. (1)
In Scotland in 1792, the people planted the
Tree of Liberty in the main square of many towns
and villages. In Edinburgh they celebrated the
King's Brithday with three days of rioting against
Dundas, Scotland's political boss. The Friends of
the People, founded by Edinburgh lawyers and other
moderates, was taken over by a rougher class of
men from Glasgow and called a national convention
in imitation of the French. (2)
In Britain's largest port in 1792, nine
London 'tradesmen, shopkeepers and mechanics' met
in a public house to discuss the high cost of
provisions and went on to found the London
Corresponding Society. As with the Dutch
(1) Marianne Elliott, Partners and Revolution: the
United Irishmen and France, New Haven, Vale
University Press, 1982.
(2) Logue, pages 133-147; Henry Meikie, Scotland
and the French Revolution, Glasgow, 1912.
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democratic clubs, most rank and file members were
wage workers. The Society grew quickly. In 1795
they held a monster public meeting in Islington,
and three days later a crowd of much the same size
surrounded the King as he rode through the streets
to open Parliament, stoning the coach and shouting
'No War! No King! No Pitt! Peace!' Thompson
estimates these crowds at a quarter of a million
of London's one million inhabitants. (1)
In short, the example of the French
Revolution changed the political understanding of
slaves, mulatto plantation owners, urban artisans,
German musicians, Scottish colliers and Carib
Indians. It is not surprising that it influenced
the politics of British sailors as well.
(1) Thompson, pages 20-21 and 157-58. Albert
Goodwin, The Friends of Liberty: the English
Democratic Movement in the Age of the French
Revolution, London, 1979, pages 884-6 and 372,
queries this and suggests the figure was closer to
30,000. Estimating crowd sizes is always a
complicated matter at the time, let alone two
hundred years later. It may seem unlikely that
twenty per cent of London would demonstrate. But
the events of 1989 remind us that democratic
movements can mobilize monster demonstrations of a
quarter of the adult population. In 1795 the
Londoners brought their children as welil.
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Sailors
Many seamen in the navy were conscious
revolutionaries. From 1793 to 1797 the Irish
courts sent thousands of political prisoners into
the Navy. In 1797 Pelham, the Home Secretary,
estimated that 15,000 Defenders and United Men had
been sent into the Navy. (1)
Many of these men must have joined their less
political fellows in deserting as soon as
possible. Some must have fallen overboard and some
died of yellow fever. Some will have been falsely
accused and some will have given up politics.
Nevertheless, at any given time after 1795 there
were probably at least 2,000 Irish revolutionaries
in the fleet. Almost every ship would have had at
least one active revolutionary like Lawrence
Cronin of the Hermione. In 1798 the United
Irishmen had branches on several ships ., with 28
members in the branch on the Defiance alone.
Valentine Joyce was botha United Irishman and the
leader of the great mutiny at Spithead in 1797.
(2)
Working beside these political prisoners were
(1) Wells, pages 81-82.
(2) Wells, pages 79-109 and 145-151.
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many thousands more who had joined strikes,
demonstrations and revolts on land. Between a
quarter and a third of the sailors were Irish, and
a quite a few were black. Many sailors who had not
joined unrest ashore must have heard about it from
those who had.
Sailors, moreover, were men of the world.
They travelled for a living. They came from ports
and fishing villages with their backs to the land
and their faces to the sea. By 1800 a significant
minority of sailors had helped to put down slave
risings. For these men insurrection was not an
abstract concept. In the 1790s, if not later, all
sailors knew that strikes and armed revolts were a
possibility for men of their station. And, of
course, their officers could no longer be sure
what the ultimate consequence of armed mutiny
might be.
The ideas of the French Revolution crop up in
many parts of the Navy. But they are subtly
changed into words that fit the reality of the
struggle between officers and people aboard ship.
Like Boukman, the sailors translate. Listen to
Leech, for instance:
The difficulty with naval officers is, that
they do not treat with a sailor as a man.
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They know what is fitting between each other
as officers; but they treat with their crews
on another principle; they are apt to look on
them as pieces of a living mechanism, born to
serve, to obey their orders, and administer
to their wishes without complaint. This is
alike a bad morality and a bad philosophy.
There is often more real manhood in the
forecastle than in the wardroom. . . It is
needless to tell of the intellectual
degradation of the mass of seamen. 'A man's a
man for a' that T• (1)
Again, Richardson's ship captured a privateer
in 1796:
Her crew were a complete set of democrats,
who could not suppress their indignation at
seeing the officers' servant doing any menial
office for them, they said, 'Wh y did not the
officers do it themselves?' (2)
(1) Leech, page 1
(2) Richardson, page 129.
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In 1797 the fleet in the Thames estuary
joined the great strike over pay. They addressed a
leaflet to their countrymen on land:
Shall we who have endured the toils of a
tedious, disgraceful war, be the victims of
tyranny and oppression which vile, gilded,
pampered knaves, wallowing in the lap of
luxury, choose to load us with? Shall we, who
in the rage of the tempest and the war of
jarring elements, undaunted climb the
unsteady
 cordage and totter on the top-mast's
dreadful height, suffer ourselves to be
treated worse than the dogs of London
Streets? Shall we, who in the battle's
sanguinary rage, confound, terrify and subdue
your proudest foe, guard your coasts from
invasion, your children from slaughter, and
your lands from pillage- be the footballs and
shuttlecocks of a set of tyrants who derive
from us alone their honours, their titles and
their fortunes? No, the Age of Reason has at
length evolved. Long have we been
erideavouring to find ourselves men. We now
find ourselves so. We will be treated as
such. (1)
(1) Dugan, page 278.
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The man who wrote that leaflet was a child of the
French Revolution. But his words ('Long have we
been endeavouririg' ) also echo years of struggle by
men and women far removed from the Age of
Revolution.
Traditions
Rediker, in The Devil and the Deep Blue Sea,
has unearthed a wealth of information on the
tradition of resistance on merchant ships. (1)
This resistance took the form of desertion,
protest, sometimes mutiny, and at certain periods
piracy. But he notes that in the second half of
the eighteenth century the strike came to be a
more and more important tactic for merchant
sailors. (2)
The Liverpool strike of 1775 will provide an
example. (3) In that year there was a dramatic
fall in trade in this great slaving port. The
sailors waited uneasily for the masters to try to
force down wages. On one ship the rate for a
(1) See especially pages 205-288.
(2) Rodger, pages 288-298.
(3) R. B. Rose, 'A Liverpool Sailor's Strike in
the Eighteenth Century', Transactions of the
Laricashir and Cheshire Antiquarian Society, 1958,
volume 68, pages 84-91.
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voyage was cut from 30 shillings to 20. The seamen
took down the rigging so the ship could not sail,
and nine of them were promptly arrested. That
evening a crowd of 3,000 women and sailors
released the nine men from goal.
Three days later, on the Monday evening,
flying pickets went from ship to ship. Thomas
Crockett of the Betsy remembered that 'a great
number of sailors, about 150 in number, armed with
sticks and larger clubs were coming round the said
docks boarding all the vessels therein and taking
out all the people they found at work on board.'
(1)
The strike was organized by a committee of
nine sailors. Two men emerged as leaders: Jemmy
Askew and a Mr. H. Blow. Every morning the pickets
met at the docks to get instructions.
Tuesday morning a crowd of sailors and women
demonstrated outside the Exhange. Since the
merchants ran Liverpool, this was also the town
hall. The merchants hired and armed 300 men to
quell the strike. That night the strike breakers
fired on the crowd outside the Exchange, killing
several sailors.
The next morning, Wednesday, roughly i,000
(1) Rose, page 88.
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sailors put red ribbons in their hats arid 'broke
open the dockside warehouses and the gunsmith's
ship for arms and ammunition, and marched on the
Exchange'. The subsequent indictment said they
were armed with 'cannons, guns, musketts,
musquetoons, blunderbusses, pistols, swords,
cutlasses, knives, clubs, sticks, stones, bricks
and other offensive weapons'. (1) They set up
their six cannon, taken from the ships, and began
a methodical bombardment of the Exchange which
lasted all day. They flew the red flag above their
guns. They also marched to the homes of prominent
slaving employers, took their possessions into the
street and burnt them.
The merchants sent desperate requests for
reinforcements to the dragoons in Manchester, and
at the same time they negotiated with the sailors.
The next afternoon the cavalry rode into town and
arrested 50 of the leaders of the strike. One of
them was a woman later charged with inciting the
men to fire on the Liverpool goal.
Only eight men were convicted. They were not
sentenced to death, but were sent into the Navy
instead. It appears that the negotiations had
produced an agreement to hold wages firm and
(1) Rose, page 89.
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punish the rioters lightly. (1)
It was not an accident that slavers were at
the heart of the Liverpool riot. In the eighteenth
century the ship was central to the imperial
economy. Ships carried coal, slaves, sugar, rum,
cotton and cloth. The most militant workers were
often the slaves, the miners, the coal-heavers,
the shipwrights, the dockers, the cloth-workers,
the shores ide quarrymen, the smugglers and the
sailors. (2)
Many of these people drank in the same pubs
as sailors. Out-of-work sailors might turn to
quarrying or dock work. In the winter Cornish
smugglers and fishermen went inland to work in the
tin mines. In Dorset sailors hid from the press
gangs in the Portland stone quarries, protected by
the quarry workers. In Liverpool the men and women
in other trades joined the sailors in 1775. In
1791 the sailors and shipwrights of Liverpool went
(1) This is how I read Rose's evidence on page 91.
Rose himself feels it was a defeat for the
strikers.
(2) For an introduction to the literature on this,
see Walter J. Shelton, English Hunger and
Industrial Disorders: A Study of Social Conflict
during the First Decades of George III's Reign,
London, Macmillan, 1973; John Stevenson, Popular
Disturbances in England, 1700-1870, London,
Longman, 1970, pages 113-180; Rule.
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on strike together for six weeks. In London
sailors took the coal heavers' work while they
were on strike in 1776, but sailors were in the
front row of London mobs in 1776 and thereafter.
(1)
The Liverpool riots were unusually violent,,
but in other ways they were typical of 'collective
bargaining by riot'. (2) In 1792, however, there
was a change. That year a sailors' strike started
in Bristol, and from there it spread to ports all
over England and Scotland. These strikes combined
the old trdition of pay strikes with the new
spirit of revolution. From Newcastle one employer
wrote to the Prime Minister:
When I look around arid see this country
covered with thousands of Pittmen, Keelmen,
Waggonmen and other labouring men, hardy
fellows strongly impressed with the new
doctrine of equality, and at present composed
of such combustible material that the least
spark will set them ablaze, I cannot help
thinking the supineness of the Magistrates
very reprehensible. . . P.S. Shocking to
(1) Rose, page 92; Shelton, pages 164-184.
(2) See chapter one of Eric Hobsbawm,
Men, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968.
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relate, the mob at this moment are driving
some seamen or officers that have discovered
a reluctance to comply with their mode of
proceedings naked through the town before
them. (1)
The magistrates were not the only supine
authorities. The local army and the Naval officers
also did not care to take on the sailors and their
allies, for nobody knew what the consequences
would be. The strike was relatively peaceful
because the sailors were so strong and confident.
(2)
The port of Aberdeen shows how politics and
strikes combined. In June of 1792 te people
burned Dundas in effigy. In December they planted
a tree of liberty in the main square and the
authorities uprooted it. A few days later the
sailors descended on the harbour and stripped the
(1) Thompson, The Naking of the English Working
Class, page 112.
(2) See N. McCord and D.E. Brewster, 'Some Labour
Troubles of the 1790s in North-East England',
International Review of Social History, 1968,
volume 12, pages 366-378. They see the officers on
the spot as sensible and moderate men, but the
evidence seems to suggest they were simply
frightened.
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rigging from the ships. They joined the movement
for higher wages that had hit the other ports, and
set watches to make sure no sailor worked. The
Lord Provost wrote that he had had no idea that
the organization of the sailors was 'so extensive
in its numbers or so formidable for the Method,
regularity and resolution of the actors.' The
masters agreed to arbitration and the sailors seem
to have won. (1)
The Navy had its own traditions of protest.
In chapter two we referred to Rodger's account of
how mutinies over pay and against unpopular
commanders were an accepted part of naval life at
mid-century. (2) We will take one example of a
protest rather nearer our time.
In March 1783 the war was over and the crews
in Spithead 'insisted on being instantly paid
their wages, and discharged from the Navy,
otherwise they were determined to run their ships
ashore and destroy them. ' When they were paid,
several ships' companies came ashore together,
'with colours flying and bands playing, and all
was complete harmon y . ' Another group, however,
determined to express their hatred of the
(10 L,ogue, pages 148-153 and 160-161.
(2) Rodger, pages 237-244.
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midshipmen, dressed up a boy in the uniform of a
midshipman and compelled him to clean the shoes of
anyone they met in the streets: in front of the
same group, to make a further point, marched a
petty officer 'greedily gnawing on a bone with
little or no meat on it. ' (1)
Across the channel the sailors in the French
Navy welcomed the revolution. All of their
officers, by law, were aristocrats, and now all
France was attacking the aristocracy. In the
second half of 1789 there were riots in every
port, and from 1790 on there were mutinies on most
ships in the French Navy. Officers were beaten up
in the streets, thrown into prison and led to the
guillotine. Work discipline broke down, the
sailors often refused sailing orders, and by 1793
three-quarters of the officers had left the fleet.
At one point that year the Channel Fleet in Brest
was under the control of a committee composed of
one officer and one sailor from each ship. (2)
British sailors could easily keep in touch
with events in France. In 1793 Toulon went over to
the British, taking with it a third of the French
(1) A. Geddes, 'Portsmouth during the great French
Wars, 1770-1800', Portsmouth Papers, 1970, number
91, page 5.
(2) Nahan, volume one, pages 35-79.
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Navy . Throughout the war British and French
fishing boats crossed the Channel as they had
always done, and nobody was barbarous enough to
attack them. Smugglers ran back and forth from
Normandy to Cornwall. American merchant ships
would run to France on voyage and England the
next. All of these men who used the sea would pass
around the news from France in public houses.
Newspapers and political tracts, we should
remember, were not the only way the ideas of the
Age of Reason travelled.
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Chapter Seven: Resistance
The press gathered in unwilling men, the
driving regime of work embittered them and harsh
punishment was meant to keep them within the
bounds of discipline. But this was an age of
unrest, and the people always had the option of
collective p rotest. Nobody, officers or men, ever
forgot this. This chapter will introduce the most
common forms of protest.
Letters
Proababl y
 the most common form of protest was
writing a letter. The officers usuall y called them
'anonymous letters', but they were not the work of
a single angry individual. They were signed by
'Eurydice Ship's Compan y ', or 'Marines of the
Bellerephon', or as we have seen above, simply
'Winchelseas' . They were letters from the people
as a whole.
In exceptional circumsances individuals did
sign letters on behalf of the ship's company. This
sometimes happened when the people were already in
active revolt and were negotiating with the
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captain. At Spithead in 1797, for instance, the
delegates of the fleet felt safe enough and proud
enough to sign their own names.
The people chose a sailor with good
penmanship and style to write for them. Sometimes
he wrote in the caprenter's store room or an
officer's empty cabin, safe from hostile eyes. But
the letters were not secret, and in any case the
men had little real privacy from each other. Often
the writer worked between the hammocks, consulting
the whole ship's company on the wording.
The sailors sent their letters to some
powerful and possibly sympathetic man. If they had
a cruel lieutenant and a kind captain, they wrote
to the captain about the lieutenant and threw the
letter on the quarterdeck at night. Usually they
wrote to the admiral about the captain and gave
the letter to a relative or prostitute to mail on
shore. Where they thought the admiral useless,
they wrote direct to the Admiralty office in
London.
Working people on shore often wrote petitions
to powerful people, for British society was a
complex web of interest, influence and corruption.
It was widely believed and largely true, that if
one could gain the interest of the right man, he
could fix anything. The sailors' letters have the
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same respectful, even crawling, tone as these
petitions. Nevertheless, on both ship and shore
there was always a silent threat behind any letter
from a group of workers: We are together. We are
organized. We stick by each other, and you will
not discover the writer of this letter. Therefore,
if you do not redress our grievances, there may be
trouble. (1)
The Bellerephon provides an example. On 29
September 1795 nine marines were tried for
'attempting to make mutiny among the whole party
on board, by complaining of harsh and improper
treatment... and being accessory to the writing of
a publick letter.' (2)
At the root of the matter was a grievance
over job descriptions. Narines were supposed to do
sentry duty and nothing else. But those on the
Bellerephon had to do much seaman's work, even
including cleaning the decks. And while they were
on their knees cleaning the boatswain's mates
(1) For parallels on shore, see E. P. Thompson,
'The Crime of Anonymity', and Douglas Hay,
'Property, Authority and the Criminal Law', both
in Douglas Hay and others, Albion's Fatal Tree:
Crime and Society in Eighteenth Century England,
London, Allen Lane, 1795.
(2) Trial of Benjamin Kelly and others, in Adin.
1 :5333.
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abused them. So they wrote to the marine commander
on shore requesting a transfer.
It was a polite letter. The shore commandant
told Major Walker Smith, captain of the marines on
the Bellerephon, to look into it. Unfortunately,
somebody traced the handwriting to marine John
Cook. Summoned to the quarterdeck and faced with
the evidence, he broke down and agreed to testify
against his mates at a court-martial. This was
most unusual. In civilian life Cook had practised
as an attorney in Lancaster, and he may have been
unfamiliar with working class conventions of
solidarity.
He was transferred to another ship
immediately. The officers probably thought he
would be happier there, and perhaps remain in
better health. At the trial Cook said the whole
marine company had been in favour of writing the
letter. He named nine men whose berths were near
his.
Cook said that everybody had told him their
objections, and he had then summarized them in the
letter. The other marines had told him that this
was often done. The marine commandant confirmed
this in his evidence. He said that he had given
the letter to Walker Smith to investigate, and
then thought no more of it, for he received many
1 4
such letters. At this point one of the judges
seems to have taken fright, for he asked the
commandant if the meant the marines on different
ships in the fleet were conspiring to write
similar letters. The commmandant reassured him
that all the letters were on different subjects.
The prosecutor at the trial was Lord
Cranston, the captain of the Bellerephon. The
usual string of officers testified that Lord
Cranston was 'very sweet' to the marines, and that
he was 'particularly kind and open' to them
whenever he had them flogged at the gangway.
Then Walker Smith, the commandant of marines,
testified. He was discreet and carefully
ambiguous, but he made it clear that he and the
first lieutenant hated each other. He allowed the
court to understand that the lieutenant was
persecuting the marines in order to get at him.
Walker Smith also said that they were the finest
body of men he had ever commanded, and that they
had fought with great bravery when released from
irons as the ship went into battle. The court took
the hint. They convicted all nine marines but
declined to punish them. Instead, the court
admonished them not to write letters in future.
This case shows how letters normally worked.
Lord Cranston had scented organized discontent and
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so charged the men with 'attempting to make a
mutiny' . The letter, however, had not threatened
mutiny, and some officers even approved of the
complaint. The court did not think it was mutiny.
We seldom have such a window on the writing
of letters. Although an enormous number were
written, (1) very few of their authors were
brought to trial: on average one or two a year in
the whole Navy. We can see why from the case of
Bryant McDonogh. (2)
Mc Donough was a seaman on the Eurydice in
1796. He wrote a letter for the Eurydices to the
Admiralty, complaining about Fir8t Lieutenant
Colville. He wrote that Colville had them cleaning
the decks from four in the morning, and if a man
took any rest he was struck in the face. He then
bled on the 'holystone' : the prayer-book shaped
rough atone used to clean the deck. Colville then
made the man wash the blood away and reported him
to the captain for dirtying the holyetone.
McDonough also said that Colville flogged men with
no provocation, and he alluded to 'other
(1) The petitions sent to the Admiralty are
collected in Adm. 1:5125. The great majority of
petitions were sent to line officers and have been
lost.
(2) Trial of McDonough, 8 July 1796, in Adm.
1 : 5336.
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grievances too numerous to mention'
The Admiralty promptly sent two captains from
other ships to enquire into the case. As usual,
they could find no sailor stupid enough to confirm
the charges in front of Colville. Accordingly,
they cleared the lieutenant.
Colville used the direct method to find out
who wrote the letter. He assembled the ship's
company and told them he would 'stop every
indulgence it is in my power to give till I find
the men or men who are concerned.
McDonough had often been kind enough to write
letters home for men who could not write down
their words themselves. These men did not come
forward to name him, but his hand was well known
and several of the company appear to have
identified it. A funny thing happened on the way
to the court martial.
The first witness was John Blake, the
purser's steward. The prosecutor showed him the
letter . Blake said the writing was like
NcDonough's hand in some characters, but different
in others. William Colly, the captain of the
forecastle, said that McDonough had indeed read
him a copy of the letter, but it was not the same
letter as the one produced in court. He thought
the one he was looking at now was probably the
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work of James Martin. As it happened, Martin had
recently run from the ship in Ireland and got
clean away. Samuel Buckner, foremast man, did
remember somebody saying 'Shall we go down in the
fore cock pit and write that now?' But he could no
longer remember who had said those words. Thomas
McSeed, master's mate, was called and sworn. He
was asked one question: 'Do you know anything of
your knowledge to prove that the prisoner wrote
the letter you have read?'
McSeed answered, 'I do not.
Michael Divine, the captain of the foretop,
had been in irons with McDonough off Belfast. He
could not remember McDonough confessing anything
to him then. He certainly had not had any
conversation about a confession with George
Hendrick. John Saunders also could not remember
anything. He especially did not remember telling
the captain that many of the ship's company had
known about the letter. John Burn, boatswain's
mate, swore that the letter did not look like the
prisoner's hand to him.
The final witness was George Hendrick, the
boatswain's mate who had not had the conversation
with Michael Divine. Hendrick knew nothing about
the letter. He had never heard of it before the
officers brought the matter up. The prisoner
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offered no defense and was acquitted.
The case shows the remarkable solidarity of
the forecastle. But the witnesses were not simple
seamen. All but two were petty officers or
'captains', the men Colville had to rely on for
the daily working of the ship. On many other ships
petty officers, in particular, were often
witnesses for the prosecution.
The Eurydices had probably been leaning on
their petty officers. But both the petty officers
and the warrant officers seem to have felt the men
had a shadowy right to petition. The Navy and its
courts could not approve of writing letters. But
while individual officers like Colville might be
enraged, in most cases the authorities tolerated
written complaints. After all, even the worst
traditional despots always trumpeted the right of
the people to petition.
This does not mean that letters were
completely innocent. There was always a veiled
threat, and after 1797 the threat was pretty much
out in the open. That year the fleet petitioned
Admiral Howe for an increase in wages. He ignored
the petitions and the sailors went on to stage a
mutinyu wich shook the state and left Ireland open
to invasion. After that, an admiral might choose
not to respond to a petition, but he could not
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treat it as of no consequence.
Protest
If the letter was the first resort of many a
ship's company, it was not the last. Sailors could
stage elaborate bits of theatre to make their
point. William Richardson, for instance, was
serving on the Minerva in 1793. The 19 year old
captain did not like people talking on deck, and
he hated swearing:
Not an oath was allowed to be spoken, but as
there were so many new pressed men in the
ship it was almost impossible to avoid it,
and when any was heard to swear their names
were put on a list, and at seven the next
morning were punished, though not severely,
few getting more than seven or eight lashes;
yet it was galling, and how I escaped God
only knows...
Though the punishment was light, it
displeased the men very much, who had not had
time to divest themselves of this new crime
they had been so long accustomed to, and was
nearly attained with serious consequence.
Every evening, weather permitting, it was
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customary for the people to have a dance, and
one of these evenings the lanthorns were
lighted as usual, and hung on each side of
the launch. . .and the fiddler on the topsail
sheet bits began to play away on his violin,
but nobody came to dance.
By-and-by the gunners' wads began to fly
about in all directions, the lights were
extinguished, the lanthorns knocked to
pieces, and a wad rolled into the admiral's
cabin as he walked there. The old boy soon
saw that something was the matter and sent
for Captain Whitby; but when Captain Whitby
came he pretended that the knew nothing was
the matter with the ship's company. The
admiral's steward came into the cabin at the
time, and being asked if he knew what was the
matter with the people, replied that he heard
the men say that there was too much dancing
at the gangway in the morning to keep them
dancing in the evening. (The men were flogged
at the gangway.)
So the admiral, seeing through it
immediately instead of using severe means (as
many a tyrant would have done, and perhaps
caused a real mutiny), adopted a better way,
and that was in cautioning Captain Whitby not
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to use the cat on such light occassions, and
never flog a man without his permission. (1)
The protest was carefully calculated. Dancing
was a privilege, not a duty. It was supposed to be
fun, and the captain could not make the men have
fun without looking the fool. Moreover, they only
threw the gunner's cloth wads. They could have
used cannon balls.
On dark nights they sometimes rolled cannon
balls along the deck in the hope of breaking the
legs of unpopular officers. The officers do not
seem to have reported the matter. It must have
been hard to identify the culprit in the dark, and
a report would have exposed the officer's
unpopularity to his superior. So most officers
singled out for this treatment seem to have kept
one ear cocked for the roll and jumped the balls
as they came.
Richardson reports another inventive method
of dealing with an awkward captain, William
Taylor. In 1795 Richardson was on the Prompte. The
Promptes were never given shore leave, and so many
ran. The embarrassed Captain Taylor ordered a
tight watch at night to make sure no potential
(1) Richardson, pages 105-6.
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deserters were on the move:
So strict a guard was kept at night that a
man could not go to the head without being
challenged by the sentries with 'who comes
there?'... So one day, when the captain went
on shore, the girls of the town had made up
their minds to have a little fun on the
occasion with him, and as he came near they
ranged themselves into a line, and one of
them cries out 'who comes there?' another
replies 'William Taylor': 'Pass him along,'
says another, and then they set up a hearty
laugh, which so humbled him that there was no
more 'passing' the people to the head of the
ship afterwards. (1)
On other days the 'girls of the town' were to
be found on board the Prompte as the 'wives' of
the sailors. On land, though, there was nothing
that Taylor could do to them.
Sometimes only mute protest was possible.
During the War of 1812 Samuel Leech deserted from
the British Navy to the American Navy, which had
been modelled on British lines. Leech did not have
(1) Richardson, pages 117-18.
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to deal with the confusion of new ways. On the
Boxer one of Leech's shipmates was trying to pilot
the ship. He ran aground, doing the ship no harm:
The captain flew into a passion, ordered him
to the gangway, and commanded the boatswain's
mate to lay on with his rope's-end. I did not
witness the flogging, for the hands were not
called up to witness punishment, unless
administered by the cat-o'-nine-tails, but
one of my messmates said that he received at
least a hundred lashes. I saw him several
days afterwards, with his back looking as if
it had been roasted, and he unable to stand
upright. He wore the same shirt in which he
was flogged for some time afterward. It was
torn to rags, and showed the state of his
back beneath. His object in wearing it was to
mortify and shame the captain for his
brutality. (1)
Demonst rat ion
We have already dealt with the demonstration
on the Winchelsea in the introduction. The
(1) Leech, pages 81-2.
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Excelent provides another example. (1)
On Christmas Eve, 1802, the West Indian fleet
was electric. The war had come to an end, or so
they thought. But there was still considerable
slave unrest in the West Indies, and in Haiti the
slaves were more or less in control. Some sailors
would have to stay to support the planters.
The commodore decided that the Excellent
would have to stay behind, and the rest of the
fleet could sail for England. He then transferred
three of the Excellents to the Castor so that they
could go home. This favouritism was the last
straw.
The master's log tells what happened on
Christmas Eve: 'In turning the hands up, found the
ship's company aft in a body. On orders being
given for their going to their duty they dispersed
with evident marks of discontent. ' And that, the
officers probably hoped, was that. At this stage
nobody wanted to prosecute, so they called it
discontent, not mutiny.
After all, it was Christmas Eve. Christmas in
a home port was usually one long party, with
unlimited drink, songs, fights, vomit and no
(1) Court martial of Matthew Loyal and others,
27-19 December 1802 in Adm. 1:5362, and ship's log
in Adm.52:2992.
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discipline between decks. The custom was not
observed on the Excellent this year, but a certain
rowdiness could be tolerated.
The commodore must have had other worries at
the back of his mind. The Excellent had been sent
out to keep an eye on the black revolutionaries in
San Domingo. (1) The example could be contagious.
After all, in these waters five years before the
people of the Herinione had killed Captain Pigot
and his officers. When the fleet returned to
England, the Excellent would be vulnerable on her
own, as the Hermione had been. Moreover, the
sailors on the ships returning to England would
live, for the most part. The majority of those who
stayed behind could expect to die from disease. A
sensible officer would hesitate to make enemies of
his men in these circumstances.
On Christmas morning a stream of petty
officers led small deputations to the quarterdeck.
On many ships the petty officers took the men's
(1) Richardson, pages 188-9, says the Excellent
came out to the West Indies to put down the
Haitian revolt. On pages 183-95 he gives a
fascinating picture of the tensions in the West
Indies at this time from a sailor's point of view.
He had worked on a slaver himself, and was
part icularj sensitive to the danger of slave
revolts.
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grievances to the captain. On other ships the
'captains' of the tops and the deck stations took
this role. It was an important line of
communication. The petty officers and 'captains'
were usually old and respected seamen. They were
part of the forecastle world and also agents of
the captain's discipline. They were expected to
approach the captain respectfully, their hats in
their hands.
Not all captains encouraged this custom. On
some ships the men must have felt it would be a
waste of time to talk to the captain, but all
ship's companies knew of the practice. At court
martials the judges sometimes told the seamen that
they should have gone to their officers in this
proper and respectful manner.
On the Excellent things were not that simple.
Boatswain's mate Matt Loyal led a deputation onto
the quarterdeck. When the commander asked who had
sent him there Loyal was said to have replied:
That the ship's company had to know why they
could not go home with the Castor. And that
the men were grumbling about their wives
(and) children, and that he had an old mother
who he had not seen for eight years. He said
that when the Castor got under weigh the
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ship's company meant to follow in the
Excellent and see if it was war or not.
He meant that they would check the rumour
that peace had been declared. He was also
threatening to seize the ship.
Loyal led his deputation off the quarterdeck.
The commodore called him back on his own, and
said, 'Take care, you are speaking a little too
fast.' The officers were still treating the events
as a petition from the petty officers, but they
were getting rattled.
The people went below for their dinner. Loyal
reported to them. He told them not to send him aft
again. He had been at sea many years, he said, and
well understood the difference between home and
abroad, but he could do no more. If they wanted to
talk to the commodore, they could go themselves.
Those may not have Loyal's exact words. I
have taken the speech from his evidence at the
court martial, where he was fighting for his life.
But note that there are two ways of reading that
speech.
The men immediately gave three cheers and
shouted 'Home, home.' Sailors sometimes gave three
cheers for the admiral. They usually gave three
cheers when they headed into battle. The great
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Spithead mutiny had started with three cheers from
the rigging of the flagship.
According to the log:
Hearing the Ships Co. Cheer on the lower deck
the marines rushed on deck and the officers
of the ship, and armed with all possible
despatch. The commodore. . .and a guard of
marines and other officers went on the lower
deck and pulling out the chiefs of the
disturbance, had them secured, and sent to
the Blenheim. Having dispersed the people and
made every regulation to prevent any other
disturbance happening. . .Kept a guard under
arms to go round the decks with the officers.
Matthew Loyal and 22 other men were put in
irons and tried for mutiny. Thirteen were
acquitted: one quartermaster, eight able seamen
and two ordinary seamen. Ten men were convicted.
One was sentenced to 200 lashes, four to 500
lashes each, and one man to 800 lashes. All six
were seamen. Four petty officers were sentenced to
death: a quartermaster, a quarter gunner, Loyal,
and Crabb, another boatswain's mate.
The officers did not bother to wait for the
usual appeals to the Admiralty. The next day the
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four petty officers were hanged in front of the
fleet. At the same time all the other convicted
seamen were pardoned as a sign of the commodore's
humanity.
At their trials Loyal and Crabb had argued
that the petty officers were only doing their duty
in representing the men to the officers. It is
difficult to tell if this was an honest defense in
Loyal's case. Crabb certainly organized protest.
But it is clear that the Excellents were using
customary forms of protest which suddenly turned
into 'mutiny'
It is time now to refer back to Rodger's idea
of customary and unwritten laws for protest. The
case of the Excellent both conforms to Rodger's
picture of an earlier period and deviates from it.
Clearly the Excellents thought they were obeying a
set of unwritten traditional rules. They conformed
to Rodger's three criteria. They were not in the
presence of the enemy. The nation was at peace, at
least with France if not with its own subjects in
the West Indies. The mutiny did not take place at
sea. It was in pursuit of a traditional right in
the Service: men had often demonstrated to be paid
off when peace came after previous wars. Vet four
men were hanged.
Is this because at some point the Excellents
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went over a traditional line? In one way, yes. But
this point was not fixed. At one point the
commodore called Loyal back and told him he was
going too fast. He was warning Loyal that the
demonstration was getting too rowdy. He was also
asserting that he could declare the men mutinous
at that point. But he actually acted when they
cheered. Something had changed in 1797. After
that, a cheer might be part of a rowdy
demonstration. It might be the signal to take the
ship. Nobody knew.
These customary protests were not formal
rituals, where everybody knew what would happen
next. Life on ship was potentially explosive, for
the men were embittered arid they heavily
outnumbered the officers. The ships themselves
were isolated and usually too dispersed for there
to be an immediate source of reinforcements for
the officers. This was true even when ships were
lying at anchor together, for they usually lay
several hundred yards apart to avoid fouling each
other. The hierarchy of command was therefore
tightly organized, constantly vigilant,
obsessively violent. There were arms chests
everywhere. Both sides remembered victorious
mutinies and savage court martials. Any protest
could shift abruptly into armed mutiny. Collective
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complaint might be redressed, or might be answered
by swift hangings. Once the people started
muttering and gathering in small groups, nobody
could be sure what would happen next. This
uncertainty, paradoxically, explains much of the
moderation and caution both sides showed in most
confrontations.
Perhaps an anachronistic comparison will help
make the point clear. During the 1980s there was a
riot in Tottenham against police brutality. During
the course of the riot the crowd killed a
policeman. The day after one of the leaders of the
local working people said that the police had got
what they deserved, 'a bloody good hiding'.
If we look at this as a historian of the
eighteenth century would, we can see a forthright
assertion of traditional values by a riotous crowd
and a pithy statement of these values by their
leader. This is a reasonable way to look at the
event. But we should remember that this was not
how it seemed in British politics to those
involved at the time. Nany found the justification
of killing a policeman deeply offensive, and the
local politician was eventually forced to retract
it. The police did not passively accept the moral
economy of the English crowd: they did everything
they could in subsequent years to imprison as many
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rioters as possible and make life unbearable on
the local estate. From the perspective of enough
historical distance, one can see the Broadwater
Farm demonstration as a 'safety-valve' . But that
was not how it appeared or felt to those in the
crowd or the Metropolitan Police.
Clearly, this is an anachronistic example.
London and London politics had changed much in two
hundred years. But I use it to bring home the
point that what may seem to a historian a
safety-valve may seem to those involved a ticking
bomb. We should not forget that many of the
traditional riots we know about from the
eighteenth century, we know about because some of
the crowd were subsequently put on trial for their
lives.
Summary
This brings us to the end of Part Two. Let us
summarise the argument so far.
We start with the work. The line-of-battle
ship was the most sophisticated machine of its
day, and the guns required hundreds of men to work
them. From 1793 on, the war created an endless
hunger for seamen in both the merchant service and
the Navy. The only way the Navy could see to fill
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this need was the press. This gathered together
large groups of angry men.
This in turn created a situation unusual in
the late eighteenth century: workplaces of
hundreds of workers. These workers were bound
together by shared work, dangers and traditions.
Sailors had traditions of protest, strike and
mutiny, and a traditional culture of solidarity.
But this was also the epoch of the French
Revolution. There certainly were some organized
revolutionaries in the fleet and many more who now
believed in the Rights of Man. But more important
was the new sense of possibility, of activity. The
French had killed their king and destroyed their
prison. Merchant seamen in 1792 had both
demonstrated against their king and struck against
their masters.
This was the background to the class struggle
on board ship. This struggle was not an occasional
feature of shipboard life. It began every morning,
when the boatswain's mates beat the people up on
deck to work. The class struggle in industry today
is a struggle over the conditions and rewards of
work. In this way the Navy in 1795 was closer to a
twentieth century car factory than an eighteenth
century English farm. We can understand this
struggle in terms of control from the quarterdeck
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and resistance from the lower deck.
The front line of conflict was over work. As
we shall see later, this was most often conflict
between the topmen and the officers over their
work aloft. But on ship the Navy was both employer
and provider of goods. This meant that any
conflict over provisions also became a conflict
over the shifting frontier of control in the ship.
The officers' first line of control was
starting, The violence endemic to shipboard life
did not grow out of sadism. The naval officers
were right when they said it came from 'the
necessities of the Service'. But starting on its
own was not enough. The officers needed a complex
ritual of terror. At its simplest -flogging- this
was a normal part of shipboard life. All ships
flogged, and most flogged several men a month.
But neither starting nor flogging on their
own solved the problem of control. The sailors had
a tradition of desertion, protest and
demonstration. They used it. At times officers
allowed these protests and at times they redressed
the mens' grievances. At times they reacted with
the full force of court martial, floggings round
the fleet and possible hangings.
This, then, is the background to mutiny in
this period. In Part Three we will look at two
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mutinies in detail: the Culloden in 1794 and the
Defiance in 1795. There are several themes in
these analyses. The first theme is simply an
attempt to show what can be done with the court
martial records. They are unique documents for
this period, enabling us to see the struggle
between gentlemen and workers in the sort of
detail we will never be establish for strikes on
shore. If this thesis only establishes the
richness of these sources for the historian of the
making of the English working class, it will have
done its work.
The second theme is to continue the dialogue
with Rodger. Both of these mutinies were mutinies
of a new type. They were neither traditional
protests not Cecil B. DeNille mutinies: they were
armed strikes. I will try to show how these
mutinies differed from earlier protests. I will
also try to show this was not because the sailors
were the scrapings of the bottom of the barrel or
a new kind of landsinan. The leaders and the
participants in these mutinies were an alliance of
landsmen and skilled men bred to the sea, of
Irishmen and Englishen and Scots.
The third theme is to look at the mutinies as
episodes in 'class struggle'. This is an emotive
term, so it is necessary to explain exactly what
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is meant. I have argued above that class is best
understood in terms of relations to work. On a
ship, the 'people' were the wage workers. This is
not a metaphor: they in fact worked for wages, and
the great majority had worked for wages all their
lives. The officers represented their employer's
authority. The rest of the thesis will be devoted
to conflicts between officers and men for control
over aspects of their shared lives. There is a
tradition of explaining this struggle in terms of
sadistic captains on the one hand, and fair trials
on the other. The struggle will not be explained
in these terms in Part Three. The actions of the
two captains make sense in terms of their
positions. So do the actions of the admirals and
the admiralty, and so do the actions of the
people. We will look at the 'struggle' in terms of
how these people contested for control, what their
tactics were, what limits they faced because of
previous struggles and what lessons they had
learned from these struggles. We will try to
desribe a struggle which for those involved was
not fixed. We will watch people who did not know
what would happen next, but who guessed and tried
to weigh the consequences of different strategies.
The court martials after the two mutinies
will be seen as part and parcel of this struggle.
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The law was as much an episode in the struggle as
the armed demonstration. This does not mean that
the officers had no regard for justice. No system
of soical control or class rule survives without a
combination of force and at least passive consent.
A class cannot rule sitting on bayonets, and it
cannot rule simply with sermons. The law worked in
the way it did on board ship because it combined
force and consent, vengeance and justice, terror
and ritual. The law worked in a complex and
contradictory way. This cannot be understood
properly without a detailed look at how the law
worked in particular cases.
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ART THREE:
Two Mutinies
179
Chapter Seven; The Culloden Mutiny
Part One was a general introduction to
discipline and protest in the Royal Navy. In Part
Two the emphasis shifts from the general to the
particular. The intention is to show how much we
can learn from detailed analyses of two mutinies:
the Culloden in 1794 and the Defiance in 1795.
Troubridge
On 9 November 1794 Thomas Troubridge took
over command of HMS Culloden. Troubridge knew the
ship was eleven years old and 'crank' ; it did not
sail well. But the Culloden was a 74 gun ship of
the line, and he could count himself lucky to be
in command.
A naval officer's career largely depended on
interest: which influential people one knew.
Promotion on merit alone was rare. Troubridge had
no 'influence' and was fortunate to rise. His
father was a baker in the Strand. He must have
been at least a small master baker to get his son
accepted as an officer, and he may have been quite
a respectable businessman. But he was certainly
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not rich, and other officers felt that Troubridge
came from a humble home. In the words of the
Dictionary of National Biography, Troubridge had
to be 'the architect of his own destiny'. (1)
His previous command had been the frigate
Castor. In May Troubridge and the Castor had
escorted a convoy of merchantmen out of Jersey.
They soon ran into several French warships.
Troubridge had to strike his flag. A few days
after his surrender he was present at the first
major naval engagement of the war, the 'Glorious
First of June'. Unlike the other ambitious
captains in the British fleet, Troubridge was
locked in the boatswain's store cupboard of the
French flagship. He spent the battle cursing the
guard at the door. (2)
The British captured the French flagship and
thus recaptured Troubridge. He immediately faced
(1) John Marshall, Royal Naval Biography,
Supplement, Part One, 1827, page 279. See also
Ludovic Kennedy, Nelson and his Captains, London,
Collins, second editon, 1975, page 75, and 'Sir
Thomas Troubridge', DNB, volume 19, pages 1183-84.
The main source for this chapter and the next is
the trial of the Culloden mutineers in Adm.
1:5331. All quotations not credited to another
source are taken from this transcript.
(2) Kennedy , page 76.
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a court martial for the loss of the Castor. The
Navy always tried the officers and men after a
ship was lost. This was by no means a formality.
Nany officers were broken in rank and some
'dismissed the service'. But Troubridge emerged
from the trial with flying colours. The court
raced through the business, cleared him of any
blame and commended him for his actions. (1)
But Troubridge was now ashore on half pay. As
is often the way with pay, half pay was much less
than one half of full pay. Nor did it compensate
for the many skims and sources of unofficial
income open to a captain on active service. But
more important to Troubridge, he was an ambitious
man who had spent the last twenty years climbing
the ladder rung by slow rung. Now war gave
captains the opportunity to display their courage
and merit. Troubridge could not be sure that peace
would break out the next year. He must have chafed
at the bit. After four months on shore he was
given command of the Culloden.
He was in trouble almost immediately.
Tuesday, November 18th was a stormy night. The
Culloden was moored at single anchor at St.
(1) The court martial of Troubridge and his
officers for the loss of the Castor is in Adm.
1 : 5331.
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Helens, down the coast from Spithead. At one in
the morning the ship ran aground abaft. Troubridge
quickly ordered the guns moved forward to raise
the stern and free the ship. The ship's company
went into the hold to break open the water casks.
Then they pumped the water out to lighten the
ship. Within an hour the ship 'struck very heavy'.
The rudder was knocked off, and Troubridge was
forced to run up a distress signal, but nobody
came. The other ships in the small fleet were
fighting the gale too, and one of them had also
run aground.
The gale continued all that day, and the
pumps were constantly manned. The men threw
provisions overboard to lighten the ship. On
Thursday they were still aground and still
pumping. Troubridge ordered the men to jettison
two and a half tons of shot. The Navy Board
usually enquired closely about the fate of every
missing cask and the gunner had to account for
every cannon ball. Troubridge was clearly worried.
Friday the men were still pumping and
throwing casks overboard. Saturday afternoon they
finally got the ship off, with the loose rudder
lashed to the side. The Culloden could not make it
back to Spithead without a rudder and had to be
towed in by the frigate Fox. Troubridge and his
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shame passed before the watchful eyes of the
fleet. (1)
The Admiralty demanded a written explanation
of the captain's reasons for anchoring in such
shallow water. Troubridge's reply was defensive,
almost desperate, in tone. There was a heavy sea
and very low ebb tide, he explained:
I believe so much sea has not been seen for
many years... I imagine that the place the
Ship struck on was a Knowl, I have not had
time to sound since. . . it appears from the
uneveness of the ground that the Chart now
published is erroneous with respect to
soundings, if ships were to lay at St. Helens
in common with S.E. Gales, I have no doubt
but that accidents would frequently happen.
He added that other captains took the same risks,
and the anchor had probably moved a little. (2)
(1) For the accident see the ship's log for 19-23
November in Adm. 51:1130, and Captain Mann to
Admiralty, 22 November 1794, in Adm. 1:2128,
Letter 76.
(2) Troubridge to Admiral Parker, 26 November
1794, Adm. 1: 1008, enclosure in Letter 509.
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There was something in what Troubridge said.
However, naval ships had been anchoring safely at
St Helens for centuries. In addition his admiral
had already complained to their Lordships in
London that 'if the ships had considered
themselves obedient of my motions thoseaccidents
would not have befallen them. ' (1)
Troubridge may or may not have known about
the knife in his back, but he did know that he
could not afford to lose a second ship. He could
not even risk an exensive refit, for that in
itself would probably mean a court martial. Even
an acquittal there would leave a sadly blemished
record.
So Troubridge kept reassuring the Admiralty
that nothing was really wrong. Repairs could be
done quickly and easily. The rudder might have
been damaged, but the gudgeon pins that supported
it were all right. Eight days after running
aground, Troubridge was able to assure their
Lordships in London that he would 'be ready by
Saturday for sea every exertion in my power their
Lordship may depend on.' (2)
(1) Admiral Howe (Parker's superior) to Admiralty,
21 November 1794, in Adm. 1:101, Letter 506.
(2) Troubridge to Admiralty, 23 and 26 November
1794 in Adm. 1:2595, Letters 73 and 74.
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Of course he meant the exertions of his crew.
But the people of the Culloden saw things
differently. Selfish to the core, they cared less
for their captain's career than they did for the
lives of the five hundred men on board. They all
felt that the ship needed an extensive refit or
she would sink the next time the put to sea.
The Cullodens
The Cullodens had been in the thick of the
fight at the 'Glorious First of June' five months
before. The ship had been badly hurt then, and
unable to sail without help for some days. Two of
the Cullodens had been killed in the battle.
The previous year the Culloden had gone on a
cruise to the West Indies. On the voyage out John
Pope and John Williamson had fallen overboard and
were drowned, Daniel Driscoll had died of illness
and John Peters had drowned. In the West Indies
John Tottle and James Watts had died of illness,
Rees Watkins had fallen 'from the foretop to his
death, and George Grubb and John Knight drowned.
The ship sailed for England on 1 August 1793. In
the middle of September sick men began dying:
William Pasaoe on the fifteenth, John Harris on
the seventeenth, Thomas Search on the nineteenth
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and the captain's clerk five days later. Within a
week a further five men had died: Richard Batten,
John Coombe, Henry Collins, John Ward and Abraham
Dyke. (1)
On 30 September the Culloden reached England
and fresh provisions. The ship fell upon a convoy
and impressed many seamen to make up their
numbers. One hundred and twenty-two men lay sick
in the hold, the majority with fevers or the
'flux'(dysentery). Ten had ulcers. Others had
contusions, rheumatism, consumption, gravel or
shrivelled testicle. (2)
The Culloden had a particularly long sick
list, but the experience of losing more men to
illness and the sea than to battle was the norm.
The war against France lasted from 1793 to 1815.
In the fourteen major battles of the war the Royal
Navy lost 1,875 dead. More than 72,000 died from
illness and accident, and 13,600 were lost in
(1) The ship's logs for 1793, in Adm. 51:202,
gives the details of deaths.
(2) The sick list is an enclosure in a letter from
Admiral Gardner to Admiralty, 2 October 1793, in
Adm. 1:316. It is the only sick list I have ever
come across, and Gardner must have thought it
particularly bad.
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ships that went down. (1)
This goes a long way towards explaining
something which at first sight appears
contradictory. The sailors were often mutinous and
many admired French ideas of equality. Yet
everybody who served in the Royal Navy was
impressed by the enthusiasm and heroism Jack Tar
showed in battle.
Jack Nastyface, for instance, hated the Navy
and hated the officers. He also fought at
Trafalgar. He idolized Nelson:
From the zeal which animated every man in the
fleet, the bosom of every inhabitant of
England would have glowed with patriotic
pride... Men from the ships that bore the
brunt of the fighting would meet on shore.
They would say, 'Oh, you belong to one of the
Boxing Twelves, come and have some black
strap and Malaga wine, ' at the same time
giving them a hearty shake by the hand. (1)
Sailors were proud and patriotic. This did
not mean that they were blood-thirsty. Sir William
Dillon, for instance, was a patriot, a snob and a
(1) Nastyface, pages 16 and 36.
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flogger of the old school. He first saw battle as
a midshipman at the 'Glorious First of June'.
Afterwards the crew had to clear the decks:
The number of men thrown overboard that were
killed, without ceremony, and the sad wrecks
around us taught those who, like myself, had
not before witnessed similar scenes that War
was the greatest scourge of mankind. (1)
The sailors had contradictory feelings. Leech
fought on the HMS Macedonian in 1812 against the
USS United States. The American ship won, and
Leech deserted to the Americans. He married a good
woman from Connecticut, and thirty years later he
tried to explain his feelings in the battle to an
American audience:
Such was the terrible scene, amid which we
kept on our shouting arid firing. Our men
fought like tigers... I felt pretty much as I
suppose every one does at such a time. That
men are without thought when they stand among
the dying and the dead, is too absurd to be
(1) William Dillon, A Narrative of My Professional
Adventures, edited by N.A. Lewis, Navy Records
Society Number 93, 1953, volume one, page 138.
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entertained a moment... Still, what could we
do but keep up a semblance, at least, of
animation? To run from our quarters would
have been certain death from the hands of our
own officers; to give way to gloom, or to
show fear, would do no good, and might brand
us with the name of cowards, and ensure
certain defeat. Our only true philosophy,
therefore, was to make the best of our
situation, by fighting bravely and
cheerfully. I thought a great deal, however,
of the other world; every groan,every falling
man, told me that the next instant I might be
before the judge of all the earth. For this,
I felt unprepared; but being without any
particular knowledge of religious truth, I
satisfied myself by repeating again and again
the Lord's prayer, and promising that if
spared I would be more attentive to religious
duties than before. This promise I had no
doubt, at the time, of keeping. (1)
At Trafalgar Nastyface and the Boxing Twelves
were on the winning side. Leech's captain ran up a
massive 'butcher's bill' before accepting the
(1) Leech, page 46.
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humiliation of being the first British captain to
strike to the Americans. Leech's pacifism may have
had something to do with this experience. But
notice that Leech and Nastyface were both radicals
and deserters, yet they fought as patriots.
It takes a leap of the imagination to
understand their attitude towards war. In our time
the horror of war is at its worst on the
battlefield and under the bombs. In their time it
was at its words in camp and on shipboard. Now
officers who want to defend war feel they must
underplay the slaughter. Then Dillon, Nastyface
and Leech all condemned the slaughter. But Dillon
liked the war and the Navy, while the two seamen
hated both. Similarly, the democrats on shore
staged mass demonstrations against the war. But
their slogans did not protest at the slaughter.
Instead they condemned the war taxes, the press
gangs and the high cost of bread.
For the sailors the two worst horrors were
the West Indies and a ship lost at sea. The
Cullodens were lucky. They cruised to the West
Indies, spent four months mainly sailing around,
and returned. But among the soldiers who served on
land there the mortality from yellow fever was
terrible. Many sailors, too, regarded a long
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cruise in the West Indies as a death sentence.
Samuel Richardson was a gunner. When he was sent
to the West Indies his wife wanted to come with
him. He tried to talk her out of it, but she
insisted. Some of the crew were transferred to
other ships, but most died. When the ship returned
to England Richardson, his wife and two others
were the only people on board who had made the
outward voyage. (1)
John Nicol went to the West Indies, too:
While we lay at St. Kitts, I took the country
fever, and was carried to the hospital, where
I lay for some days; but my youth, and the
kindness of my black nurse, triumphed over
the terrible malady. When able to crawl about
the hospital, where many came in sick one
day, and were carried out the next to be
buried, the thoughts of the neglect of my
Maker, and the difference in the life I had
for some time led from the manner in which I
had been trained up in my youth, made me
shudder. . . I could now see the land crabs
running through the graves of two or three
whom I had left stout and full of health. In
(1) Richardson, page 195.
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the West Indies, the grave is dug no deeper
than just to hold the body, the earth
covering it only few inches, and all is soon
consumed by land crabs. (1)
The fever spared many like Nicol. But when a
ship went down most of the hands went with her.
The Royal George capsized at Spithead in 1793
while being heeled over for cleaning. Most of her
men and almost all of the 300 women on board
drowned. The Navy did not teach its sailors to
swim. A large ship carried three boats; two large
ones for the officers and one small one for 500
sailors. As the ship went down the sailors swarmed
up the rigging, fighting to keep above the waves.
The custom that the captain should be the last to
leave had not yet been invented.
This was the fate the Cullodens feared. The
surviving evidence shows that the Culloden was an
old ship with weak masts and constant leaks. She
sailed badly, particularly to windward. Indeed,
Nelson thought Troubridge to be 'as full of
(1) Nicol, pages 50-51.
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resources as his old "Culloden" was full of
defects.' (1)
The documentary evidence does not show if the
Culloden was seaworthy after running aground. But
the Cullodens themselves were agreed that the ship
was not fit to be taken out. Hundreds of them were
willing to risk their lives to stop the ship
(I) Mahari, volume one, page 75.
(2) The evidence on the sea-worthiness of the
Culloden is enormous and not entirely consistent.
Gardner to Admiralty, 2 October 1793, in Adm.
1:316, includes a review of the state of the
Culloden on return from the West Indies by the
ship's carpenter, Dikes. Another report by Dikes
some months later is included in Captain Rich to
Admiralty, 1 March 1794, in Adrn. 1:2331. Dikes
found a lot of defects, particularly problems
sailing to windward and a weakness of the knees of
the masts. The year after the mutiny the ship did
lost the mainmast in a storm: see Admiral Hotham
to Admiralt y , 26 November 1795, Adm. 1:393, but
this was not uncommon. For the state of the ship
in 1797, see the mixed reports in letters from
Admiral Jervis in the Mediteranean, in Adm. 1:396,
Letters 21, 107, 141 and 242. The ship's logs for
1793 and 1794 are in Adm. 52:1876, 51:202, 51:1130
and 51:1150. These contain running accounts of
repairs. Also suggestive are the large number of
shipwrights and kindred trades carried on the
ship's muster book for victuals only at intervals
over these two years: see Adm. 36:12166-12169.
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sailing. Most of them had sailed together for
about two years, and about a third of them were
skilled men bred to the sea. It would be
reasonable to trust their collective judgement
over Troubridge 'S.
The people let the officers know they were
upset. They began to murmur. 'Murmuring' was a
common tactic. Small groups of men would gather
and talk to each other by the lee rail. As an
officer passed they became suddenly quiet. Raised
voices drifted up from below through the
forehatch, but the words were indistinct. Subtle
changes in look and manner made it clear that the
people were angry. Such signs also gave warning to
the officers that the men might be contemplating
further steps. So it was in the Culloden. In his
defense at the court martial Francis Watts said
'there were continued Murmurings in the Ship
before the Mutiny.'
James Calloway was flogged the day after the
ship returned to Spithead. He got 24 lashes for
'mutiny and contempt toa superior officer'. (1)
The sentence was stiff but not unusual. The
offense was unusual. 'Mutiny' could cover a
multitude of virtues. It might mean getting drunk
(1) Ship's log, 27 November 1793, Adin. 51:1130.
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and cursing an officer. It sometimes meant
planning an insurrection, but the penalty for that
was more than two dozen lashes. It could mean
refusing to do a job and shouting about it. At
this time and place it probably means that
Calloway had said something about the state of the
ship and refused to withdraw it.
The men went beyond murmuring. At the trial
Lieutenant Griffiths said that 'some days previous
to the Fourth they refused to bring their hammocks
up. When piped and on Captain Troubridge and the
officers going below they called out a new Ship'.
The day's work began with men bringing their
hammocks up to air, so in effect this was a
lightning strike. On some ships at some times such
a demonstration would have been treated as mutiny.
The Cullodens could have been tried and hanged.
But Troubridge probably felt he was in no position
to become involved in a trial which would
highlight the recent accident. He talked the men
back to work.
The demonstration probably happened on
Tuesday 2 December, two days before the mutiny. At
the court martial Lieut. Owen wa asked, 'Had any
complaint been made on the 2d. December after the
ship had struck?'
He answered, 'None had been made on 2d.
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December in a regular manner. t Witnesses at court
martials chose their words with great care. We may
assume that there was a complaint on that day in
an irregular manner.
At some point in this week some of the
Cullodens decided there was no real hope of moving
Troubridge. They began to organize a mutiny.
Probably they made the decision on Tuesday night
following the hammocks protest. The ship was due
to sail on Saturday, 6 December. Murmuring
continued, and by Thursday night many people on
both sides sensed that something was about to
happen.
Nut my
Dvid Hyman collapsed into his hammock at
seven o'clock on Friday night. He was tired from a
long day rowing the ship's launch into town and
back. Hymans was a 22 year old Irishman from Cork.
(1) He was no sailor, for he was still rated as a
(1) All the data in this chapter and the next
about men's ages, birthplaces and ranks are taken
from the ship's muster books. The relevant volume
for the mutiny is Adm. 36:12169. This needs to be
checked with earlier volumes since men often
changed rank. The earlier volumes are Adm.
36:12166-12169. These ages are approximate. For
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landsman after two years in the ship. But the
officers trusted him enough to put him in the crew
of the launch, with all the consequnet
opportunities for desertion ashore.
Hyman could not sleep. At about eight o'clock
Isaac Flinn was making a noise on the fore hatch
gratings. Hyman desired him to make no more noise,
as I was much fatigued, and on duty the most part
of the day. On this the boatswain replied, "You
are a very bad fellow, and what business have you
at this time?"' (1)
Soon after this Hyman fell asleep. He woke to
find the master, John Murray, beating him about
the face. Hyman asked 'What did you do that for'?'
Murray told him that it was because of the
affair that was about to happen. Hyman told the
master to go away, The master walked aft, slapping
the men in their hammocks as he went. He was
presumably trying to frighten them and defuse the
mutiny.
a more detailed discussion of interpreting the
evidence in muster books, see Appendix Two.
(1) This account of the beginning of the mutiny is
taken from a paper someone wrote for Hyman in his
defense, which is included in the court martial
record. It may be that the original dialogue was
more pithily phrased.
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It did not work. To quote Hyman, 'In a few
minutes after, Lieutenant Owen and the ship's
corporal came down the fore hatchway. And about as
near as I can judge, about forty or fifty men,
huzza'd forward in the bay, and a number of shot
rolled aft along the deck.
Some of the men called to the others to stand
fast heaving the shot and hear what Owen had to
say. He tried 'to reason with them' . With one
voice they replied from the dark that the ship had
struck and they would not go to sea. They demanded
a new ship or this one overhauled' . Some
moderate voices said they had no objections to
their officers and were prepared to serve with
them on another ship. Some militant voices added
that if they went to sea they 'would not fire a
shot, but would be taken by the French'. The men
began throwing cannon balls at Owen in the dark,
cramped space between decks. He fled back on deck.
(1)
The mutineers swept through the ship below
decks. They were hunting for skulkers hidden
behind the bulwarks and gentlemen cowering in
their berths. Joseph Curtain was a 21 year old
(1) The remainder of this account of the mutiny is
based on the evidence of other witnesses, not on
Hyman's defense.
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landsman from Cork. He shouted that they must
drive all the quarter masters and quarter gunners
on deck: 'We are not to be hung on account of
themt.
All over the ship men made split-second
decisions. Loyalists leapt for the hatchway
ladders. Most of them got up on deck before the
people pulled the ladders down, so that the
waverers could not go up and the marines could not
storm down the ladders. The people put sentries on
each hatch. They surrounded the hatches with
hammocks to conceal the identity of the activists
below. They broke into the magazine and handed out
muskets and cartridges.. Armed sentries guarded
every critical point below decks., Barricades went
up in case the officers tried to come down again.
Samuel Triggs took charge of the guns. He was
a 27 year old Cornishman bred to the sea. (1) He
had been in the ship just under two years, and had
years a seaman behind him. His officers had always
regarded him as a 'diligent, sober, deserving
man,' but he had now had enough. He got a gang to
manhandle two of the guns so they faced towards
the hatchways the marines would have to come down.
Triggs stood by one of the guns holding a lighted
(1) Adm. 36:12169 gives his age as 46 and Adm.
36:12167 gives his age at entry to the Navy as 26.
Probably the clerk miscopied.
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slow match. He was to remain there for the five
days and nights of the mutiny.
Up on deck Troubridge began to count his
officers. His clerk took down the name of every
loyal man for future reference. Troubridge found
he had the ma3ority of his officers, but four
petty officers and four midshipmen were still
below. (They were cowering from the polite but
firm mutineers.) Troubridge also had all but six
of the marines, and he had thirteen seamen. Over
300 men remained below. They had the guns, the
muskets, the ammunition, the food, the water and
the initiative. Troubridge realized he had to
negotiate.
He headed for the after hatchway to talk to
the people. There was hubbub from the decks below.
Some of the people threatened to shoot up the
hatchway. Cornelius Sullivan kept poking his
musket up through the hatch and threatening to
shoot Troubridge. Sullivan was a 22 year old
landsman from Bandon in Ireland. He was angry and,
unlike most of the mutiñeers, drunk. The people
shouted up the hatchway their demand for a new
ship. One voice added that bringing three or four
other ships alongside would not make them give up
their purpose. Sullivan remembered an insult from
First Lieutenant Whitter. He jeered up at
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Troubridge, 'Where is Whitter with his empty
pistols now? Why does he not come down and
frighten us now?'
Troubridge retreated from the hatchway and
sent off a letter to the admiral. Below decks the
men consolidated their organization. Francis Watts
had been a leader from the beginning. He was only
21, and like all the other leaders we know of, he
had joined the Culloden early in 1793. He had been
to the West Indies and back and fought at the
'Glorious First of June' . He was no sailor: he was
rated as a landsman. His station was in the
afterguard, a largely unskilled job pulling on
ropes. Much of the time, however, he actually did
duty as a tailor.
Watts was born in Launceston in the centre of
the Cornish tin-mines: union country. He probably
did not join the Navy from Cornwall, however. Many
miners moved seasonally to the coast, but the
press gangs were scared of the militant Cornish
fishermen. He might have joined from London, where
trade unionism was strong among tailors. (1)
Wherever he had been pressed, Watts was
certainly a worker by trade and an organizer by
inclination. On shore many such craftsmen were
(1) Rule, pages 152-7.
202
self-taught intellectuals. Watts was not. He could
not read. So he went in search of somebody to
write out watch bills for him.
Seaman John Walker agreed to do it. Watts
wanted the men divided into nine watches. Walker
listed twenty-seven men in each watch. 243 were
'watched' in all. Each watch had a corporal who
placed the men at their sentry stations. Each
watch stood sentry for two hours in eighteen.
The leading mutineers began to administer
oaths to every man below, handing a big Bible to
each in turn. A silent crowd would surround the
two men. If a man showed any hesitation the crowd
shouted for him to kiss the book and swear.
We do not know the exact wording of the oath.
The sailors took oaths seriously, and at the
subsequent court martial even those prosecution
witnesses whose evidence helped to hang their
shipmates refused to repeat the words of the oath
they had taken. They would only say that the
general meaning was that they would reveal nothing
to the officers afterwards. Some witnesses added
that they would not surrender until they had a new
ship.
Every man below was sworn. The officers were
not sworn, but confined to a cabin so they could
not see what was going on. Similarly, it looks as
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if the women were not sworn. In all the court
martial evidence women are never referred to,
thought this does not mean they were not present.
Everybody knew, of course, that women were never
called as court martial witnesses, so there was no
need to swear them.
Everything points to a careful organization
and tight discipline throughout: the way potential
scabs were driven on deck, the hatches stripped of
ladders, barricades built and the magazine broken
open, and the way men were watched and sworn. One
thing above all else points to careful discipline.
As on any evening, several men were drunk at the
beginning of the mutiny. The mutineers had broken
into the magazine at the first opportunity.
Between them and the spirit room was one paltry
lock, which they could have broken with ease.
Nobody touched it. Three hundred thirsty tars went
cold sober for five days and nights.
Who planned and led the mutiny? This is not
an easy question to answer. The Cullodens tried
very hard to shield their leaders. Nevertheless,
there are some pointers, and we shall return to
them in the next chapter.
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Negotiations
As the people were being sworn below,
Troubridge was writing off to Admiral Lord
Bridport, his immediate superior. By early morning
the admiral despatched his fifth lieutenant,
George Delanos, to talk to the Cullodens and
report back. The men allowed Delanos below to
negotiate directly with them. He told them he
would represent their demands to the admiral and
promised them a fair deal. They told him they
wanted a new ship. Some men also shouted that they
wanted rid of Lieutenant Whitter. Others shushed
them, emphasizing that a new ship was their only
demand.
Delanoe went back to Admiral Bridport, who in
turn reported to Parker, the admiral in command on
land in Portsmouth. Parker did not know what to
do. The Cullodens were armed and prepared to
fight. On the other hand, he did not know how the
Admiralty in London would react if he gave in to
them and offered the men a complete refit for the
Culloden. Parker decided to write to their
lordships and to send Lord Bridport and two
captains to talk to the Cullodens.
The three officers came on board on Saturday
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morning, thirty-six hours after the start of the
mutiny. They spent their time 'expostulating and
reasoning with a part of the crew... without being
able to make any seeming impression of their
determination, which All on the Ship having been
on shore, insisting on that Account of her being
docked, or their removal to another ship. ' (1)
The Cullodens decided to submit their case in
writing. As letter-writer they chose James
Johnston the Second, a twenty-three year old
landsman from Godalming, near Guildford. (2) His
letter survives. The handwriting is good and the
style clear. He obviously had some education, but
he was no gentleman:
H.N.S. Culloden Saturday Morning
My Lord,
I am desired and appointed by the Ship's
Company to address your Lordship on a subject
which is very disagreeable to me, and must
certainly be to every individual concerned
especially where the lives of so many Brave
(1) Parker to Admiralty, 5 December 1794, Adm.
1:1008. Letter 541.
(2) He was called the Second to distinguish him in
the muster rolls from another Culloden of the same
name.
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Sailors is at stake. Your Lordship seemed to
approve of our former conduct and likewise
was pleased to Compliment us thereon, and
especially when we were most depended on,
that was when we were to contend for the
Honour of our King, Officers & Country we did
it without the least reluctance and gladly
embraced the favourable opportunity to
distinguish our courage and valour, in so
Glorious a Victory - we now ask your Lordship
candidly to consult your feelings (as we know
you are possessed of the Nicest feelings
possible can be inspired in the Breast of
Nan) and see if our case does not deserve to
be Minutely and favourable looked into they
therefore hope your Lordship wiLL cosider
their State, as it seems rather precarious
and as they seem to be all of one opinion
that the Culloden is not fit for his
Majesty's Service without being either
overhauled or more properly examined and is
surprised that any Ship Wright should report
a Ship sound after so many and Violent
strokes as she received at different times
especially when the damage lies so far under
water, likewise thinks it is impossible to
assertain the true State the Ship's botttom
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is in. There is another objection which seems
rather displeasing that is the indifferent
usage of our first Lieutenant Mr. Whitter -
in the first place he has represented us a
set of Cowardly Rascalls. and that he was the
person that should have cowed'd them with a
small empty Pistol, which is enough to
irritate the mildest and couldest tempers in
Mankind in the next place his usage
altogether is quite diffeent from any we have
hitherto received. They therefore hope your
Lordship will take the trouble of Visiting us
once more when we will be best able to Treat
with your Lordship upon what terms wwe can
can most Amicable and Horiourable Settle. be
Pleased to favour us with the sight of their
Lordship's letters from the board of
Admiralty thats concerning the present
Crisis.
I am my Lord your
very Humble and
Obedient Servant, A delegate.
Johnston wrote his letter as the usual
respectful petition, full of the common
politeriesses and flattery. But behind the
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customary phrases, we can hear the people between
decks feeling their power. The case is clearly and
professionally stated. The sting comes in the last
line 'to treat with your Lordship upon what terms
we can most Amicable and Honourable Settle'. This
is the language enemies and equals use for
negotiations: 'treat.. .terms. . .settle' . And the
men wished to settle with their honour intact.
Honour was usually reserved to gentlemen.
Moreover, the mutineers did not believe that the
admirals necessarily possessed honour. That is why
they ask to see the correspondance from the
Admiralty. They imply that Lord Bridport might
have been concealing the Admiralty's true
intentions. As we shall see, he was.
The signature sums it up. Johnston is Lord
Bridport's very humble and obedient servant. He is
also 'a delegate'. The word comes from the French
Revolution, and was used by British radicals and
trade unionists. It means the democratically
elected representative of people in struggle.
The Cullodens were confident. On Friday
morning the moderates had shushed those who
complained about Lieutenant Whitter. They probably
wished to appear reasonable and to stick to the
important demand. By Saturday, however, the
Whitter-haters had the upper hand. Johnston
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attacked him on behalf of the whole ship's
company.
What did they have against Whitter? It is
difficult to tell. The character of the first
lieutenant was of enormous importance on any ship.
Whitter had been a lieutenant on the Culloden
since early 1793. But he had only been promoted to
first lieutenant on 27 November 1794, right after
the accident and a week before the mutiny. Until
then the Culloden seems to have been a reasonably
happy ship, as these things went. The Cullodens
had known Whitter for some time. They must have
watched his behaviour in his new post with nervous
expectation.
This is what made the incident of the empty
pistols so significant. We do not know if he
actually snapped an empty pistol in somebody's
face. The best guess is that he threatened them
with his pistol during the hammocks protest and
afterwards crowed over them about their retreat.
Whatever he did, the people took it as a sign he
would not make a good shipmate.
There is a postscript to the letter. Johnston
must have read out what he had written to his
mates, only to find that they wanted changes. The
addition is in Johnston's hand, but the writing is
shakier. He probably wrote it standing up:
210
PS. The Ship's Company surrendurs on the
following propositions. 1st a new ship of the
Old one Docked or all the people at present
between decks (word unreadable here) on board
of different ships as your Lordship think
most proper & your Lordships word and honour
not to punish any man concerned in the
present business or to mention or remember it
there after.
The letter combines tact and threat. The
postscript is the blunt bottom line. Incredibly,
it was signed by Johnston and William Leader. A
third man's name is written and then crossed out
so that it cannot be read. That was probably
Watts: one witness said he helped with the letter.
The letter was handed up the fore hatchway on
the end of a cleft stick. It was taken by Fourth
Lieutenant Digby Willoughby. He duly carried to to
Captain Troubridge. The beleaguered captain
carried it across to Lord Bridport and opened it
in the admiral's presence. Even in a crisis, the
admiral was sheltered from direct contact with the
power of the people.
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The Windsor Castle
Admiral Bridport took the letter to Admiral
Parker on shore. Parker reported to the Admiralty
in London. Their lordships' response was coloured
by what had just happened on the Windsor Castle.
(1)
The Windsor Castle was a 98 gun line-of-
battle ship, part of the Mediterranean fleet. On
the evening of 9 November 1794 the hands were
turned up. They refused duty and assembled on the
lower deck 'in a most riotous and mutinous manner,
pointing to the foremost guns aft, seizing the
small arms which were in the Gun Room, and firing
several of them off, barring in the Ports fore and
aft.
The officers and marines attempted to force
the lower gun deck, but failed. The captain came
on board and led the marines below again. The
people kept shouting for a new captain and a new
lieutenant.
Next day the men wrote the admiral a letter:
(1) The following section is based on the court
martial of Captain Shield and Lieutenant McKinley
of the Windsor Castle on 11 November 1794 in Adm.
1:5331. The letter from the men is an appendix to
the transcript.
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Admiral Hotham
Sir
Necessity has Obliged us to proceed to our
present Oeconomy, which necessity is thus.
Since Admiral Cosby left us we have had a
very Different Kind of Usage to that we had
at the time he was with us, for no man can go
aloft now, But what he is in dread of being
punished with Lashes, their wine is stopt and
given to another part of the Ships Co. which
is quite contrary to the rules of the Navy,
and Yesterday Morning the scouring stone was
not to be found, all the Main top Men was
Called up to Know what was become of it,
every man said he knew nothing of the matter,
a Brick was immediately put in the hands of
every man in the ship (we were in three
watches) and all hands of them was made to
scour the 2nd and main deck, and last evening
bricks were issued out again to the main top
men, the first lieut., told them in a short
time they should have a heavyer burden on
their backs, two or three of them smiling
together on a different affair, was pooped,
and one seized up to missen riggen, them men
that came on liberty from other ships, was
called up and pooped for reasons we know not,
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which hurted us very much, and we never had
the like usage before, we should have
presented the case to Admiral Linzee before
we had proceeded thus, but, we very seldom
have the opportunity of seeing him and no
petitions is admitted to him. for these
reasons we desire other officers and better
usage, for at present we are used in a cruel
and oppressive manner, and we wish no more
than to share a similar usage with the
Brittania's ships company. (and the Boatswain
to exchange duty, for we cannot live with his
tyranny)
We hope that your honour will take this
into consideration, and mitigate the
oppression of your msot Obedient humble
Servants
Windsor Castles Ships Co.
The complaint about the boatswain is jammed
in between the lines in small handwriting. It
looks like an angry afterthought.
The letter reflects the 'moral economy' of
the Windsor Castles, their outraged sense of
traditional rights. Their 'usage' is not moral.
Their wine is stopped 'quite contrary to the rules
of the Navy'. On Sundays they had their one moment
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of permitted relaxation when they entertained men
from other ships in the fleet. Their private space
was violated and their guests punished. The shame
'hurted us very much'
The maintopmen were clearly at the centre of
it all. 'No men can go aloft now' and punishment
of the topmen is constant. The first lieutenant
could not find the scouring stone, the large block
of stone used to scrape the deck during cleaning.
His mind immediately flew to the possibility that
the maintopmert had heaved it right over the side.
He was probably right: a scouring stone was far
too big to lose. Somebody had deep-sixed it, and
they meant to convey a message to the officers.
There was clearly a conflict between officers
and topmen here, and the root of it was conflict
over work aloft and work cleaning. The maintopmen
were the elite of the crew, mostly bred to the sea
and usually able seamen. They were also often the
informal leaders of the ship's compnay. This was
no revolt of disgruntled quota men and politicized
landsmen.
The most striking thing about the letter is
the tone. It is polite, detailed, logical and
firm. It does not plead and it is not defensive.
There is no crawling. The letter is the work of
men fully aware that they held the initiative.
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The Mediterranean was largely enemy
territory. The Windsor Castle had guns and the men
were prepared to use them. The ship was more than
a match for any single line-of-battle 74.
Moreover, the fleet could not afford to lose men
and ships in a civil war.
The day after the letter Admiral Linzee came
on board. He attempted to 'bring them to a sense
of their duty t . (1) They would not budge. So
Captain John Shield and First Lieutenant George
McKinley were rowed across to the St. George to
face a court martial.
This was quite extraordinary. At first glance
the admiral appeared to be taking the side of the
men. Certainly, he was at least treating their
complaints with the respect they deserved.
However, this was not how the men saw it. The
admiral sent a letter to the ship's company,
asking them to produce a list of witnesses against
their officers. The people were assembled on deck.
They replied that the paper they had submitted was
all they had to say. They would produce no
witnesses. (2)
One can perhaps surmise that the men felt the
(1) Ship's log, 11 November 1794, in Adm. 52:2537.
(2) Ship's log, 11 November.
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witnesses might be punished later. One might even
venture to suggest that the whole thing was a
judicial charade designed to break the mutiny.
Nothing, of course, could be more foreign to the
traditions of British Justice. But it does appear
that the Windsor Castles entertained some such
suspicion.
The court martial could only have confirmed
their doubts. A string of petty officers from the
Windsor Castle testified that they had never heard
or seen anything but perfect behaviour of the most
humane kind from the captain and first lieutenant.
The court cleared them on the grounds that no
witnesses had come forward to back up the charges.
The court was careful not to say that the charges
were untrue. The captain and first lieutenant
walked free.
In theory they still commanded the ship, but
in practice the Windsor Castles now commanded
themselves. The morning of the court martial,
Captain Gore came on baord and read an order from
the admiral taking over command. Unimpressed, the
crew remained on the lower gun deck. At six that
evening the court martial gave its verdict. Nobody
knew who was in charge. An hour later Admiral
Linzee came up the side. He assembled the crew and
gave them everything they were asking for. A new
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captain and a new first lieutenant read their
commissions to all hands. (1)
Nobody was punished. The next day the ship's
log recorded the crew 'drying sails and other .jobs
as the service required' . (2) Armed and
disciplined mutiny had won the sailors their
demands and prevented victimization.
Endgame
There are obvious similarities between the
mutinies of the Windsor Castle and that on the
Culloden four weeks later. The Cullodens may or
may not have known about the Windsor Castle. One
ship had come to Portsmouth from the Mediteranean
since the mutiny, but it was still in quarantine.
The Admiralty, on the other hand, did know.
The Windsor Castle was a precedent, and giving an
amnesty to the Cullodens could make that a habit.
Without terror, the Admiralty might well face a
rash of mutinies. So the Admiralty wrote to Parker
that he should give in to the Cullodens and send
the ship to the Hamoaze for repairs. But they
(1) Ship's log, 12 November.
(2) Ship's log, 13 November.
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instructed him not to promise an amnesty. (1)
Admiral Parker, caught in the middle,
dithered for two days. He sent Captain Pakenham to
negotiate with the obstinate Cullodens. According
to Pakenham, he persuaded the men that the ship
was seaworthy. He pointed out that for some days
the pumps had produced only black bilge-water, a
sign that there was no longer a leak. He said the
men saw the point of that. Nevertheless, they
refused to come up without an amnesty. (2)
At six in the morning on Tuesday 9 December
Parker received a letter from the Admiralty. He
was instructed to put two three-deckers alongside
the Culloden and take the ship. Parker replied
that the wind was blowing too hard at that moment
for him to communicate with the ships at Spithead.
(3)
Parker was stalling. On the second day of the
mutiny Surgeon's Mate George Jarvis had gone below
decks on the Culloden. He was needed for a gravely
ill man in the sick bay. Before he was taken down
there the Cullodens swore him to silence. While he
(1) Parker to Admiralty, 7 December 1794, Adm.
1:1008, Letter 551.
(2) Report from Seymour and Pakenham enclosed in
Parker to Admiralty, Letter 551.
(3) Parker to Admiralty, 9 December 1794, Adm.
1:1008, Letter 556.
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was below decks, however, he was taken aside by
three of the loyalists trapped with the mutineers.
They told him that some of the Cullodens were
threatening to blow up the ship.
Jeremiah Collins was one of the loudest of
the intransigents. He was an able seaman from
Cork, and at the age of forty had spent much of
his life at sea. He told one man that 'he was the
man who would blow the ship up with an Inch of
Candle before they could get their ends.' This was
not an idle threat. An inch of candle in the
magazine would detroy the whole ship and all
aboard in seconds. He told another man, 'by the
holy St. Jesus, before we will come up without
coming to honourable terms I'll blow them to the
bounds of buggery.'
Surgeon's mate Jarvis realized that the men
who were telling him this were very frightened.
They were not a front for the mutineers. Indeed,
two of them later testified extensively against
the mutineers. They wanted Jarvis to warn the
officers when he went back on deck.
Admiral Parker could not know how seriously
to take such a threat. But he did know it would be
a considerable risk to try to take the Culloden.
Nobody knew what would happen if seamen were sent
to put down mutineers, because nobody had ever
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dared to try it. It was quite possible that the
men on the other ships would refuse to fight. Then
Parker would effectively be facing a mutiny of the
whole fleet.
As soon as he could contact the fleet, Parker
told the captains of the Royal George and the
yal Sovereign to prepare to take the Culloden.
But first he sent Captain Pakenham to talk to the
men again. (1)
Pakenham talked to the men down the hatch.
There was dispute afterwards about what he said.
At the court martial one of the judges asked
Pakenham if the men proposed any conditions for
their surrender. He replied. 'Yes, they desired to
give my word and honour for pardon for them. But
this I declined as did also Captain Troubridge,
and indeed it was not thought of by us.'
This is not really believable. Pakenham and
Troubridge must have at least thought of meeting
the men's demands. Parker was under intense
pressure from London. Troubridge was finished if
they stormed the ship, and Pakenham was the man of
the moment. He must have been tempted to promise
amnesty and betray later. The captain of the
Defiance was to take this line in 1795, and the
(1) Parker to Admiralty, Letter 556.
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Admiralty was to try it on at Spithead in 1797.
(1) It could solve everything so neatly.
In later years the sailors of the fleet
believed that Pakenham had offered an amnesty. (2)
There were whispers at the court martial, which is
why Pakenham was asked if the men had any
conditions. Unfortunately, however, the most
pertinent document is missing. The Admiralty
records contain a letter from Parker reporting on
the end of the mutiny. Parker writes that he
encloses a report from Pakenham, but the enclosure
is missing. (3) Enclosures and letters are often
missing from the Admiralty records. The other
letters and enclosures about the Culloden in 1794,
however, are all there. Perhaps the letter was
destroyed, or perhaps one of the Lords borrowed it
and forgot to return it.
In any case, the popular tradition can all
too rapidly become encrusted in legend and rumour.
And if we are to believe the sailors, we have to
disbelieve the word of a British officer under
oath at a court martial where the lives of several
(1) See Chapters ten and twelve below.
(2) Dugan, pages 108-9.
(3) The enclosure should be in Adm. 1:1008, Letter
557.
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men were at stake. One can only assume that in the
stress of the moment, the Cullodens suffered a
mass auditory hallucination.
Pakenham finished speaking to the people, and
below decks they discussed what to do. Samuel
Triggs, the 'corporal of the gun'. said, 'We
better go on deck. If our muskets are fired we
will all be hanged. The longer we stay the worse
it will be for us.' The people decided to come up.
As they came up the hatchways Pakenhamd gave a
hand up to Francis Watts, the young Cornish
leader, and called him a 'good fellow'. The ship's
company fell in for muster. The mutiny was over.
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Chapter Ten: The Defiance Mutiny (1)
On 29 December 1795 the Defiance, a 74 gun
man-or-war, sailed up the Firth of Forth arid
anchored in the Leith Roads near Edinburgh. The
ship had been in the North Sea and off the coast
of Norway for three months. The weather had been
filthy. (2) The people were looking forward to the
possibility of shore leave.
It was Sunday morning as the ship sailed up
the Forth. Landeman John Graham was writing up a
journal for Midshipman Mudie. He may have been
paid to do it, or he may have been unable to
refuse the officer a favour. In any case, copying
that journal later cost him his life.
Graham was twenty-one years old and came from
East Whitton. Like many of the crew, he was a
(1) This chapter and the next are largely based on
the trials of the Defiance mutirieers in Adm.
1:5334. The data on age, place of birth and rating
on board are from the ship's muster books for
1795-6, in Adm. 36:11909-11910.
(2) Captain Home to Admiralty, 3 January 1796 in
Adm. 1:1915, Letter 311.
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'quota man' . (1) Captain Home had been raising men
since early spring, but in July the admiral
thought the hip 'very indifferently manned'. He
atributed this to the large number of men
discharged to hospital, sick below, or run.
Captain Home felt that the admiral blamed him. (2)
Home was not the only officer desperate for
men in 1795. At the beginning of the war two years
earlier the press gangs had swept the ports. Now
many experienced sailors were already in the Navy.
Many of the ports seem deserted and forlorn, with
no young men on the streets. But the Navy was
still expanding, as were the army and the militia.
Unlike those services, the Navy was draining a
shrinking pool of skilled labour. The press gang
alone would not provide the answer.
So in 1795 the government set up the 'quota'
system. Each city or council had to raise so many
men for the Navy each year. The local
(1) The high proportion of quota men can be seen
from the muster books. By and large the quota area
is different from the place of birth.
(2) Home to Duncan, enclosed in Duncan to
Admiralty, 27 July 1795, Adm. 1:522, Letter 137;
Duncan to Admiralty, no date, in Adm. 1:522,
Letter 143.
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authorities paid a cash bounty to each man who
signed up. This bounty varied from place to place
and time to time, but it was often quite large. It
could be five pounds, ten pounds or substantially
more. It might appeal to men facting debtor's
prison, or in the bad year of 1795 to men with
hungry families. It may have temtped sailors who
wanted a collosal blow-out before they shipped
again. The magistrates sometimes supplemented the
quota by giving poachers and revolutionaries a
choice between transportation and the Navy. In
Buckhamishire, for instance, Richard North was
given the choise of the army or the Navy for
getting Elizabeth Foulkes with child. In 1795 a
bricklayer's apprentice got the same sentence for
stealing a scaffold board. (1)
Captains did not like quota men. Naval
historians have largely followed their lead. The
traditional quota man is a puny, lousy,
undernourished dirty thief, the scum of the
streets and the sweepings of the prisons. He was
more than likely carrying typhus or revolutionary
ideas. He is sometimes held responsible for the
mutinies in the fleet.
(1) Clive Emsley, 'The Recruitment of Petty
Offenders during the French Wars, 1793-1815',
Mariners Mirror, 1980, volume 66, pages 199-208.
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The picture is unfair, for the sailors
already had some naughty ideas and many quota men
were able seamen bred to the sea. Nor should we
think less of a man for stealing a chiken or
getting into debt. But perhaps the captains found
it dificult to rid themselves of a certain
contempt for men who had volunteered for the Navy.
John Graham had signed up as part of the
Whitby quota. Like the other quota men on the
Defiance, he had collectd the local bounty. But he
had also expected to collect the normal naval
bounty paid to men when they volunteered. This was
denied to the Defiances, and they were angry about
it. The captain petitioned the Admiralty on their
behalf, but without success. (1)
The whole North Sea fleet had trouble raising
men. The other ships had no complement of marines
at all, but they carried soldiers to do the job.
The admiral complained that the soldiers were
nearly useless, being either sick or incompetent.
(2) The Defiance did not even have soldiers, and
this was to be crucial in the mutiny.
Every captain relied on the marines to
control the ship. The Navy had sent Lieutenant
(1) Home to Duncan, enclosed in Duncan to
Admiratl y , 27 July 1795, Adm. 1:522, Letterl37.
(2) Letter 137 again.
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Bligh to Tahiti without marines in order to make
space for the breadfruit trees the Bounty was to
collect. When Bligh attempted to get tough with
his men, there were no marines to back him up. So
his ferocious rage began to sound like bluster,
and the habit of power slipped through his
fingers. (1)
Without marines and soldiers, there would be
no sentries. So Captain Home had some of the
people issued with small arms. From among them the
master-at-arms selected various men to be
'constant sentries' . Most of these men seem to
have been foremast hands. And many of the foremast
hands seem to have stuck with the captain in the
mutiny.
At least one sentry had no stomach for the
duty. John Prime was a thirty-two year old
ordinary seaman. He was born in Suffolk but had
joined as part of the Port of London quota. In
court he later complained that:
I was to do rio duty. than that of Sentinel
(saving) the getting up of the Top Gallant
Yards, and in with the Captain's barge... One
time in particular when I came off my post at
(1) The best analysis of this process is in Gavin
Kennedy, Bligh, pages 17-112.
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mid-day (being at three watches) I went to
the galley to cook my dinner. I had not been
there long 'ere Mr. Wrangham asked, why was I
not at work. I told him I had just come off
sentry at twelve o'clock. He immediately took
up one of the boatswain's mates canes and he
truck me with it. From this I went below to
the master arm's birth, considering the
orders I had received from his as a
protection against such violence. I would
have gone to the quarterdeck, but from the
treatment usually met with by shipmates I
could have had but little hopes of redress
from that quarter.
I had not long remained 'ere he (Mr.
Wrangham) visited me a second time, when he
knocked me down with his fist. It was now Mr.
Blair (the master-at-arms) remonstrated to
him on the impropriety of his conduct. He
replied he'd have me flogged and instantly
complained of me to Mr. Hewitt, first
lieutenant. When I was called aft... I
related the transaction. Judge then how
severe it was for me to here meet with
treatment worse than before. Mr. Hewitt
kicked me off, and said if I appeared again
he would flog me.
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I then went to work with the masters
until seven or eight o'clock in the evening,
and when the others were turning into their
hammocks I was posted on the poop till
midnight. Thus to stand sentinel at three
watches and work when I was off like the
others, who had no such duty: I considered a
grievance
Notice that sentence: 'I would have gone to
the quarterdeck, but from the treatment usually
met with by shipmates I could have had but little
hopes of redress from that quarter'. The men
trusted neither Captain Home nor First Lieutenant
Hewitt. And note also that the sentries messed,
worked and berthed with the other sailors. Marines
and sailors, by contrast, had seperate berths and
seperate jobs.
When the ship moored in Leith Roads the men
hoped for shore leave: 'liberty'. The captains of
the other ships in Leith Road sent their men into
Edinburgh in small groups of twenty or thirty at a
time. The men were on their honour to return so
that the next group could go ashore. The majority
of naval ships in this period did not allow such
leave, but where it was tried it seems to have
worked well. Sailors certainly thought it the only
265
decent system.
Captain Home was not having it. This was
probably because he felt his superiors blamed him
for the high desertion rate. So he followed the
more usual naval practice and forbade his men any
shore leave. Then he followed another common
practice. He had himself rowed into town by John
Prime and the other bargemen. He slept ashore and
left First Lieutenant Hewitt in charge of the
ship.
Mutiny
The next Saturday night the people of the
Defiance got down to some serious angry drinking.
At eight o'clock on Saturday night all seemed
normal between decks to Master's Mate William
Watson. He went on deck to take over as master of
the watch on the Defiance. The first he knew of
the mutiny was half an hour later. He was watching
Acting Lieutenat Malcolm go down the starboard
ladder into the waist. He saw Malcolm 'instantly
seized and pulled down and took out of my sight
aft under the half deck. ' Then 'there was a
general cry through the ship of "out all lights".
The people were running in different directions
through the ship. ' They drove off the sentries on
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the gangway to the quarterdeck. The quarterdeck
soon filled with 'armed people who came from
different directions'
Enthusiastic mutineers swept through below
decks. If any man refused to rouse and join them,
they cut down his hammock and spilled him on the
deck. The lights were all out. At intervals men
called out that they would have liberty and more
grog. Mostly there was a 'profound silence' . It
was broken only by the sound of cannon balls
rolled along the deck to prevent officers moving
about in the dark.
Watson went down to the wardroom to report
the mutiny to First Lieutenant Hewitt. Hewitt went
up to the main deck where
I observed the people to be very noisy and
riotous between decks. I immediately enquired
amongst them the cause of the uproar which
then prevailed. Some of them made answers.
'They wanted liberty and better usage, and
liberty they would have.' I begged them to be
peaceable and quiet and go to their hammocks.
And that as soon as ever day light appeared
in the morning I would hoist out one of the
Cutters and send Mr. Hughes the fifth
lieutenant with a letter to Sir
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George Home, requesting he would indulge them
leave to go ashore twenty or thirty at a
time, as he thought proper. It had very
little weight with them. For they were
determined to go on shore that night and some
of them called 'All hands out boats'.
Hewitt found that he 'could not previal on
them to desist from their intentions'. He scuttled
up the main hatchway. Somebody threw a cannon ball
up the hatchway after him.
On the quarterdeck Hewitt found a group of
loyal men. Quietly, he ordered them to cut the
tackle of the ship's boats to stop the mutineers
from getting them into the water. Hewitt sent the
clerk and three petty officers into the jolly
boat. They rowed silently into the night to find
Admiral Pringle on the Asia and beg for help.
On the gun deck the people were hauling out
the starboard foremast gun. They pointed it aft.
There was powder in the pan and shot in the
barrel. Somebody stuck a crowbar down the mouth of
the gun. If the officers tried to charge, the
crowbar would whip through them.
It appeared to Hewitt that the mutineers
'were now in complete command of the ship'
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Watson, the master's mate, had other ideas. He
quietly began to unship the quarterdeck guns. He
wanted to point them aft so they could fire into
the mutineers. Robert NcLawrin saw him.
McLawrin was a local man, Edinburgh born, who
had shipped as part of the Sunderland quota. He
was a skilled able seaman, and did duty as captain
of the afterguard. To Watson he seemed to be 'one
of the leaders of the mutineers'.
According to Watson, McLawrin
stopped at the gangway and called to the
others 'to come up for they were casting the
quarter deck guns loose'. He with a number
more came up and surrounded men and asked who
gave me orders to cast the guns loose. I
answered him, I had orders for what I was
doing. Some of them laid hold of me and
dragged me away from them: (McLawrin) telling
me that I had no business with the guns.
NcL,awrin and some of the others went to cast
the boats loose. They wanted to row for shore and
probably never return. But the tackle had been cut
and they could not leave.
By now it was ten o'clock at night. Hewitt
was back below decks endeavouring:
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to prevail on them to return to their duty
and go peaceably and quietly to their
hammocks. While I was speaking to them, I
received a blow on the shoulder with a
handspike, which nearly I believe beat off
half the sleeve of my coat and bruised my
shoulder.
I asked them if they meant to murder.
Some of them answered that not a hair of my
head should be hurt and made enquiry amongst
themselves who it was that struck me. But
that was not discovered. I thought it not
safe to trust myself any longer amongst them
and immediately went off the quarter deck.
By this time Admiral Prirtgle had made a
signal for all boats manned and armed to come
to our assistance. And when the people found
that, they hauled the lower deck ports up;
shotted the lower deck guns and run them out;
with a full determination to sink every boat
that should attempt to come alongside. The
officer came into the ship. The boat was
obliged to put off immediately for fear of
the people's being knocked on the head, by
the shot that was thrown into her from the
lower gun deck ports... Pistols were at this
fired out of the ports, but I didn't know
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whether shotted or not, in order to
intimidate the boats from coming alongside.
The boats played round the ship. And as they
either went ahead or astern, so the people
assembled either on the poop or the
forecastle to keep them off.
Midshipman Robert Hones was in charge of one
of the circling boats. From the poop NcLawrin
shouted at him 'Keep off, you bugger, keep off'.
He returned to his ship. Hewitt considered the
balance of forces and ordered his men to te.1 the
boats to keep off.
Hewitt may have been influenced by the
adventures of Lieutenant James Dunbar, the officer
who leapt aboard from the Jupiter's boat;
On my coming quite close I was repeatedly
told to keep off. And on my ascending the
side after having got on board, some person
or persons on the gangway showed me some
opposition. The person most forward appeared
so diminuitive that I got on board without
any resistance. When I got on the
quarterdeck. . . There were assembled a number
of men apparently inoffensive.
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A few minutes later Lieutenant Dunbar was in
the waist of the ship:
Some men came by the larboard gangway and
began relating their complaints. I
recommended their going quietly below and
await the result of the next day, or until
their captain came. A voice unknown seemed to
be displeased with my conduct or person. It
is proper to observe that the greater part of
the ship's company were in a state of
drunkeness and as if they were recovering
from their inebriety.
At this time the othcr boats of the
squadron were approaching the Defiance,
rowing up in her wake principally. And the
mutinous part of the ship's company ordered
them to keep off or they would fire into
them. About this time a number of men armed
with pikes came upon the quarterdeck from the
larboard gangway, whether with any personal
intention towards an attack on my life I know
not. But not caring to risk the issue,
judging any resistance imprudent, I retired
hastily upon the poop being close pursued by
the mutineers.
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According to the surprised witnesses on the
quarterdeck, they saw about a dozen men chasing
Dunbar. They were variously armed with pikes,
cutlasses and tomahawks. One enraged sailor was
armed with the cook's burgoo stirrer. As Dunbar
ran up the ladder to the poop, he slipped. He fell
back almost into the arms of the man behind him.
Then, according to Dunbar:
I ran over the taff rail. Still pursued by
the boarding pikes, I descended precipitately
down the stern ladder. I was discovered in
that situation, and a voice exclaimed 'There
is a bugger on the stern ladder. ' All the
boats at this time were out of reach and I
thought of nothing but my own preservation.
Some of the well disposed at that time in the
Wardroom threw open the windows.
Some loyalists and officers had instinctively
taken refuge on the quarterdeck. Others had headed
for the wardroom (the officers' mess). Here were
gathered a few officers and many of the foremast
hands who had stood constant sentry duty. The rear
window of the wardroom opened over the rudder.
They gave Dunbar:
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Such relief that I was enabled to get down
the rudder and secret myself on it close
under the coat. At this time I may observe,
for it struck me so at the moment, that I was
the object of their revenge.
Below Decks
Below decks both sides had moved to gain
control of the magazine. Matthew Hollister was the
gunner's yeoman, the man in charge of the
storeroom outside the powder magazine in the
bottom of the ship. Ho].lister was a forty-two year
old L,ondoner. He was an experienced sailor who had
joined as part of the Chestre quota. At the
beginning of the mutiny he was asleep in his
hammock.
He was awoken by Gunner's Mate William
Hyndson. Hyndson told Hollister that the ship was
in a state of mutiny and he had the keys to the
storeroom. They went there together. Hyndson
gathered up some pole axes and slow matches and
took them up to the quarterdeck to arm the
officers.
Shortly afterwards the outer door was
shattered. Three men spilled into the storeroom,
where Hollister still stood. Michael Cox was a
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forty year old ordinary seaman from London. John
Lawson was an American from New York, a thirty-two
year old able seaman. William Morrison, an
ordinary seaman from Clerkenwell, was only twenty.
All three were much in liquor, Lawson most of all.
They were after arms and powder for the mutineers.
Hollister told them that he had no powder, it
was all in the inner storeroom. Between them and
the powder was a stout door. It was always
securely locked. Every experienced sailor knew one
spark in the powder magazine could blow up the
whole ship. It had happened before, and in the
1790s people lacked an easy familiarity with great
explosions. They were a new horror. When the
French L'Orient, 120 guns, exploded at the Battle
of the Nile in 1798, the whole battle stopped for
a few minutes. Nobody spoke and the guns were
still. Men and women on both sides just looked.
(1)
The Navy was careful with its powder. There
was no light in the powder room itself. The yoeman
of the powder room worked by the light from a
lantern outside the storeroom, on the other side
of a thick screen. The women and boys who fetched
the powder had to wear thick cloth wrappings
(1) Ludovic Kennedy, page 131.
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around their shoes, lest static electricity blow
the ship sky high.
Now Matt Hollister and the yeoman of the
powder room faced three drunks with naked candles.
The drunks wanted to take their candles into the
powder room. The yeoman opened an arms chest to
show it was empty of powder. Young Morrison took
some pole axes, tomahawks and gun wads out of the
arms chest. Morrison told Hollister that if there
were no keys he was going to break the door down.
He then went to work on the inner door with a
crowbar.
At that point Lieutenant Hughes came below.
All three men raced after him to see what was
happening. A few minutes later William Parker took
up a position in front of the magazine. He had a
cutlass in one hand and a pistol in the other.
Parker was an experienced able seaman. He was
'captain of the maintop' arid, at twenty-four,
young for the job. He originally came from
Scarborough but had joined the ship in London. He
was a leader of the mutiny from the start. At nine
p.m. he had been carrying a cutlass and directing
his mates to point the guns aft. Half an hour
later he was one of the leaders of the men trying
to get the boats out. Some time around ten p.m. he
realized what was happening outside the magazine.
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He did not want to be blown up, so he went to
stand guard.
Robert McLawrin caine up to Parker. McLawrin
had already led the men on to the quarterdeck, and
now he wanted to get into the magazine. Parker
barred his way and McLawrin hit Parker across the
mouth twice.
'If you strike me again I will give you the
contents of this pistol,' said Parker. 'You do not
know the consequence of going into the magazine
with lights. It's only that you're in liquor, or
you would not attempt such a thing, to end the
lives of the ship's company or the ship.t
McLawrin slunk away. The three men who had
first broken open the magazine were now feeling
their drink. Matthew Hollister saw Lawson standing
outside the magazine: 'He seemed very much in
liquor. Very ill. He was standing like a statue
and white as a sheet.' Young Morrison returned to
his hammock briefly about midnight. He had
'shitted his trousers' and had to change. All
three men were asleep by early morning. Parker
remained on guard all night. When any attempted to
pass he said, 'Take care, gentlemen, of what you
are doing. Before any man shall go down with a
naked light, either they or me shall suffer
death.'
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Disorganization
Not all the people of the Defiance were part
of the mutiny. Many were resting in their hammocks
or hiding in corners. William Kiddy, for instance,
was one of the foremast men.When the mutiny began
he took his wife and children forward to the
manger. They waited out the night with the sheep,
and then when the muster was called at noon on
Sunday, Kiddy went on deck.
Another man was brewing a pot of tea in the
galley for his mother when the mutiny began. It
took him half an hour to make the tea, and then he
took it down to her. He sat by her until morning,
except for one trip on deck to make water.
The ship was full of women. Many of them
would have had experience of drunken sailors in an
angry mood. There were a large number of very
drunk men running around the ship shouting and
flourishing their tomahawks. Many of the women
took refuge aft by the steward's room.
The mutiny was disorganized. The chaos around
the magazine shows this clearly. The magazine was
crucial. The mutineers needed powder, because
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without it, they would be unable to fight off the
other ships in the fleet. But there was no
immediate disciplined attack on the magazine.
Instead there were three easily distracted drunks
with naked candles. William Parker had been one of
the leaders of the mutiny, a part that must have
come naturally to him, for as captain of the
maintop he was perhaps the most skilled and
respected to the able seamen. His leadership in
daily work probably led easily to leadership in
the mutiny. But when Parker saw what was happening
around the magazine, he stopped being a mutineer
and became a sentry. In a properly organized
mutiny, Parker would have detailed men to stand
watch over the magazine. Then he would have begun
to take out arms and powder carefully and gently.
Almost all mutines were carefully planned
beforehand. For one thing, any rebellion on a ship
with a full complement of marines did not stand a
chance without detailed organization. Even when
Captain Pigot ordered the Hermiones to throw the
lubbers overboard, the men waited two nights to
organize the mutiny properly. No matter what the
provocation, sailors very rarely simply rioted.
The Defiance, however, seems to be an
exception. On the Culloden the majority of the
ship's company had served together for eighteen
279
months. All the leaders of the mutiny had been on
board for eighteen months. All the leaders of the
mutiny had been on board for this period. They had
survived a long cruise to the West Indies. They
had come back with men dropping every day and a
hundred and twenty-two men in the sick bay. They
had been through battle together at the 'Glorious
First of June' , and they had seen captains come
and go. They were a unit, a 'ship's company'
The people of the Defiance hardly knew each
other. Most had been on board three months, and
desertion was rife. They had seen no battles and
only one short cruise. There was no informal lived
solidarity from which organization could grow.
The Muster
After midnight the ship began to settle down.
Lieutenant Hughes wandered around making sporadic
efforts to persuade little groups of men to return
to their duty. At about two in the morning Captain
Home finally returned on board. Two other captains
,joined him. The admiral had sent them to find out
the seamen's grievances and, if possible, end the
mutiny. All three captains went below to talk to
the men. Some of the people told them they wanted
liberty to go on shore. Home kept them on board
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like convicts, they said. Others insisted on no
more five-water grog. Some emphasized that they
wanted no more Captain Home, either.
At about this time some people broke into the
spirit stores. By five in the morning most people
were asleep. The two visiting captains went to
report to the admiral, leaving a forlorn Captain
Home on the quarterdeck.
When morning came it was clear that the
people were still in control. The two captains
returned to try to talk the men back to work.
Below decks the mutineers began to beat out the
drum roll 'Call to quarters' . The people sprang to
their stations by the guns. The ports went up and
the guns rolled out. The sailors were at their
quarters, ready for batle. They were telling the
captains that they controlled the ship and they
would fight any attempt to take it.
William Handy had been patrolling the deck
since early morning. He was a twenty-eight year
old Londoner. When he was pressed in Rochester he
had rated himself a landsman, although he seems to
have been an experienced sailor. He did duty as
'captain of the mast' and now he was performing
the same job for the mutineers. He paced back and
forth along the deck. Sometimes a man popped up on
the deck hoping to join the loyalists on the
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quarterdeck, arid Handy ordered the man below. In
his hand he held the cook's burgoo stirrer. Six
hundred men ate considerable burgoo porridge, and
the stirrer was a stout piece of wood shaped like
an oar but somewhat smaller.
When the drums began to roll, Handy led a
party of mutineers on to the quarterdeck. Handy
carried his stirrer and the others held cutlasses.
They ordered the loyalists to go below and man the
guns with the others. Some seamen demurred. Handy
had to thwack one man with the stirrer before he
would go below. Another was punched in the head
and knocked down. But with a little gentle herding
and some violent oaths most of the loyalists were
persuaded below. The officers were left on the
quarterdeck with a few stragglers.
The officers had to negotiate. The two
visiting captains went round the ship talking.
They promised to convey the people's grievances to
the admiral. It is unclear what else they
promised, but they managed to persuade the men to
report for muster. The boatswain's pipes sounded
at noon and the crew fell in for muster. After the
muster Home put eight men into irons as
ringleaders.
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Confrontation
William Parker, the sentry at the magazine,
was one of the eight. Another was Robert McLawrin,
who had led the attack on the quarterdeck on
Saturday night, and a little later had hit Parker
in the mouth. With them was William Handy, now
without his burgoo stirrer.
The eight prisoners were on the quarterdeck,
as far aft as possible. Each man had chains round
each ankle, and a straight bar was slotted trhough
a ring on each chain. The prisoners therefore sat
in a row, threaded along the bar like beads.
Somebody rigged an awning to protect them from the
sun.
The loyalists and the officers stood forward
of the prisoners. They looked down upon the people
in the waist and barred the way to the prisoners.
The atmosphere was uneasy. Home ordered the men to
run in the guns, but nobody obeyed. The officers
held the quarterdeck and little else.
Somebody wrote out a letter for the captain
to take to the admiral:
We the Ships Company belonging to His
Majesty's Ship Defiance are sorry to trouble
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you with our present grievances which are
stated as follows --
We are sorry to inform You that being
Commanded by Sir George Home who makes our
case quite disagreeable to us, we are allowed
a proportion of Rum of one half pint per day,
that he pleases to have mixed for us with a
proportion of five Waters, which renders our
Grog of no service to us being thereby
spoiled. in the 2nd. Place there are no
Cheese on board unfit for mens use and not of
the quality allowed by they Navy, for that we
have looked for redress, but being answered
by our Captain. Who gave us Priviledge to be
a Judge of Provisions. Allowing that we/as we
must suppose! were no Judges of Provisions,
3d. We have then on board an Acting
Lieutenant. Mr. Markam who when he gets
intoxicated uses us in the most brutal
manner, by striking and abusing us unbecoming
to human beings, 4th we have no Liberty
granted us which all the ships here has
Liberty, but oust the same as Pisoners their
7 of our Men in Irons, which they being
intoxicated in liquor and they were more
taken notice of than any of the Rest, and we
hope that You will look over Them, it will be
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a bad Consequence to go to Sea with Ship
without redress.
Defiance Ships Company
This letter was probably written by John
Graham, the same landsman who had copied the
ship's log for Midshipman Mudie. (1) Graham had
joined as part of the quota for Whitby, and
Yorkshire speech, then and now, often misses out
the definite article. That is why Graham wrote
'with Ship without redress'. 'We hope that You
will look over Them' means 'We hope you will
overlook them.
At the end of the letter there was a a quiet
threat. If the ship put to sea without redress,
the people would act. It was left unclear if they
would mutiny or take the ship and run for France.
At about three in the afternoon the two
captains went back to the admiral's flagship,
taking the letter with them. As he left, Captain
Latchmere told Captain Home he would have to
release the prisoners before dark. If he did not,
the men would release themselves.
(1) The letter is attached to the court martial
record. Graham probably wrote it, and he certainly
wrote the later letter from the ship's company
quoted in the next chapter.
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As the afternoon wore on, the people began to
form groups in the waist: the open deck directly
below the quarterdeck. There was a general
murmuring. The officers could hear constant loud
shouting, but few individual voices were clear.
Foremast man John Prime was still angry about
being a constant sentry and working three watches.
He kept popping up to shout that he would do no
more duty as a sentry. Some voices shouted that
they should all go aft to free the prisoners.
Others repeated the original demands: 'Liberty and
no five-water grog. ' Below decks there was a
constant cheering arid the rumble of cannon balls
rolling along the deck.
At six dusk was closing in. The officers
sensed movements in the waist to rush the deck.
Soon they would be defenseless in the dark and
unable to tell mutineer from loyalist. There were
scores of loyal men on the quarter deck. Captain
Home ordered them to take up arms to subdue the
people.
Nobody obeyed.
The loyalists may have felt frightened and
outnumbered, and they may have been unwilling to
kill their shipmates. Captain Home ran up the
signal to the other ships in the squadron asking
for assistance. The flagship did not reply and no
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boats came. Home did what he had to do. He ordered
Lieutenant Hewitt to release the men in irons. But
first he retired from the quarterdeck to sulk in
his cabin, leaving the public humiliation to
Hewitt.
Hewitt ordered the men released. He said to
William Parker, 'As you are now at liberty once
more, I hope that you will take care and behave
yourself better in future.
'You may depend on it,' rpelied Parker.
Hewitt took another prisoner by the arm and
led him to the gangway to the forecastle. In full
view of the ship's company he said, 'You have got
your liberty. Avoid such things in future and
return to your duty. Go below to your hammocks,
and no more will be thought of it.'
Some of the crowd in the waist were still
shouting. They refused to believe the prisoners
had all been freed. Hewitt repeated his promise
that there would be no further trouble. He said
they could come up on the quarterdeck and look for
themselves if they wanted.
The people realized that they had won. They
gave three cheers and returned happily to their
duties. But they still expected a reply to their
letter from the admiral. What they did not know
was that Lieutenant Hewitt had no intention of
287
keeping his promise.
Admiral Pringle read the men's letter. He was
unsure what to do, but the Calcutta was part of
his squadron. Admirl Pringle could turn to her
brave and decisive captain for advice, and Captain
William Bligh had some previous experience with
mutineers.
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Chapter Eleven: Defeat and Court Martial
Admiral Pringle called his captains to a
council of war. William Bligh advised his fellow
officers:
Many places were mentioned, & the best way
discussed, how to subdue this mutiny, & I did
not hesitate to declare that a party of
troops embarked on board of another ship &
laid alongside, was the most effectual manner
that I knew of, because they could be
protected, which by any other means they
would not if resistance was made.
	 )
Pringle took Bligh's advice. As he had no
marines and could not get any soldiers on short
notice, he borrowed two hundfred fencibles. The
fencibles were a part-time home-guard force under
the control of the Navy. Many of them were seamen
(1) Gavin Kennedy, 'Bligh and the Defiance
Mutiny', Mariners Mirror, 1979, volume 65, pages
65-68. Unless otherwise indicated this chapter,
like the last, is based on the trial of the
Defiance mutineers in Adm. 1:5334, and the data in
the mustere books in Adin. 36:11909-11910.
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and fishermen who had joined as a protection
against the press gang. There had been several
recent mutinies by fencibles and militia. Pringle
could not really trust them, but they were all he
had. (1)
He put them on board two seventy-four gun
ships, the Jupiter and Edgar, ordering both ships
to weight anchor and put themselves alongside the
Defiance. But then at the last minute Admiral
Pringle changed his mind. He had his reasons.
John Nicol was one of the seamen on the Edgar
that day. He later remembered:
While we lay in Leith Roads, a mutiny broke
out in the Defiance, 74; the cause was, their
captain gave them five-water grog; now the
common thing is three-waters. The weather was
(1) There were four seperate mutinies by fencible
regiments in Scotland between March 1794 and June
1795; see John Prebble, Mutiny: Highland Regiments
in Revolt, 1743-1804, London, Penguin, 1975, pages
262-391. These land fencibles were not the same
force as the sea fencibles used by Pringle, but
both land and sea fencibles were militia forces.
For the militia mutinies as a whole, start with
Roger Wells, 'The Militia Mutinies of 1795', in
John Rule, editor, Outside the Law: Studies in
Crime and Order, 1650-1850, Exeter Papers in
Economic History, number 15, 1983.
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cold; the spirit thus reduced was, as the
mutineers called it, as thin as muslin, and
quite unfit to keep out the cold. No seamen
could endure this in cold climates. Had they
been in hot latitudes they would have been
happy to get it thus, for the sake of the
water; but then they would not have got it.
The Edgar was ordered alongside the Defiance,
to engage her, if necessary, to bring her to
order. . . She was manned principally by
fishermen, stout resolute dogs. When bearing
down upon her, my heart felt so sad and
heavy, not that I feared death or wounds, but
to fight my brother, as it were, I do not
believe the Edgar's crew would have manned
the guns. They thought the Defiance men were
in the right; and had they engaged us
heartily, as we would have done a French 74,
we would have done no good, only blown each
other out of the water, for the ships were of
equal force; and if there were any odds, the
Defiance had it in point of crew. (1)
Pringle ordered Bligh to take eighty men in
open boats and seize the Defiance. Bligh did not
(1) Nicol, pages 180-81.
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like it, for the boats were too vulnerable.
However, we can guess at the admiral's point of
view. If the Edgars and the Jupiters refused to
fight then Pringle would face a mutiny of the
fleet. If they fought he could lose hundreds of
men and might lose three ships. In 1795 food
riots, strikes and monster demonstrations were
blazing across Britain. (1) If the Defiance won
the battle the broadsides would be heard by every
angry demoncrat and hungry mother in the country.
If Bligh and his men in the boats were blown to
smithereens, that would be a most unfortunate
tragedy, but the Royal Navy could live with it.
Breaking the Mutiny
On the Defiance one of the mutineers was
already a prisoner. John Prime was still angry
about standing sentry duty and working three
shifts. At eight o'clock Monday morning Corporal
Bradly reported to Lieutenant Hewitt that Prime
was still refusing to be a sentry. Hewitt ordered
him directly to do his duty, and Prime refused
directl y . Hewitt had him arrested.
A litte later Leonard Bearby and Martin
(1) See John Ehrman, The Younger Pitt, London,
Constable, 1983, volume 2, pages 441-176, and
Wells, Insurrection, pages 44-65.
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Ealey were working in the head. Ealey was
twenty-seven, an able seaman born in Waterford who
had joined as part of the London quota. Saturday
night Ealey had been among those driving the
skulkers forward. Bearby, a foremast man, had
refused to leave his berth. Ealey was ver y much in
liquor and had beaten Bearby brutally. On Sunday,
Ealey had been one of the eight men released from
irons. At some point during that day Bearby had
gone on the quarterdeck and told the captain about
the beating.
Now Bearby was washing the swabs in the head
and Ealey was wringing them out. Ealey told Bearby
'What a bad fellow I was for offering to swear
against him and take his life away and all that.
And I told him I would not wish to take his life
away and made him an offer of half a guinea.
Bearby, frightened, was trying to buy off Ealey's
anger with two weeks wages. Ealey refused the
money.
A bit before noon the men of the Defiance
could see the boats coming. Somebody threw a
letter on to the quarterdeck:
We, the Ships Co. of H.M. Ship Defiance under
your oomd. (all and Singular) make bold to
inform you, that we are not agreeable that
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any Marines shall come on board, till we have
an answer from the Admiralty, and then we
will with the greatest Pleasure comply with
any terms conformable to the Rules of His
Majesty's Navy, and furthermore we are
agreeable to do the duty of Marines until
this affair is settled, and till them, never
a man shall go out come into the Ship, except
Officers of Commanders --
2nd. There is a quantity of Men upon
record who gave in their Names to the Ships
Clerk Mr. Thompson as Royalists, these we
ordain to get out of the Ship (to make room
for Marines as soon as we have convenience to
receive them) and no other. Given in under
our hands this 19th day of Oct. 1795,
Your Humble Servants and dutifull Ships
Company upon Honble Terms. (1)
The gloves were off. The loyalists are
described as 'Royalists'. At that time and place
the opposite of a Royalist was a Republican, and
to be a Republican was to be a revolutionary.
The letter is proud, angry and arrogant. The
people 'make bold' , they 'ordain' . The writer, as
(1) There is a clerk's copy of the letter enclosed
in Pringle to Admiralty, 19 October 1795, in Adm.
1:522, Letter 275.
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before, is John Graham. But this time he writes in
the tone and style of a man addressing his
inferior. The militants were feeling their power.
They were also bluffing. The letters from the
Windsor Castles and the Cullodens were polite,
clear and firm. They did not need loud words,
their organization and their guns spoke for them.
But no Defiance, mutineer or officer, knew what
would happen as the boats approached.
John Sullivan started climbing the rigging.
Saturday night he had chased Lieutenant Dunbar
over the poop with a boarding pike in his hand. At
two on Sunday morning he had come on to the
starboard gangway and called, 'Let us go down and
break the spirit room open for we will have grog.
Sunday night he had been in and out of irons. He
did his regular duty in the tops, and now he was
climbing there, hoping to stay out of sight. A
lieutenant saw him and shouted at him to come
down. Sullivan descended sheepishly and stood
quietly on the deck.
The boats came alongside. There was a 'great
noise below' . From the waist and the lower deck
hundreds of voices roared, 'Keep off, keep off,
we'll sink you'. On the quarterdeck the master and
the officers began to cast off the guns.
Bligh later wrote about those moments:
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With these two boats I proceeded in two
division until close to the Ship. When from
the orders I had given the respective
officers, the Divisions opened and rowed to
each Gangway and preceded by myself & a
Major, the Commanding officer of the Soldiers
in a seperate Boat. Instantly the cry was one
& all - 'clear away the Guns -sink them' , and
we cheered the troops not to mind this, but
to come on,, which they did,, and got up on the
Poop without any hurt but a slight Bruise or
two & a boat stove with the shot that were
thrown out of the ports. We had now the
remaining soldiers to get on board, which I
effected very speedily and without any
resistance which it was expected I should
have met with, both in going out and coming
in: but I had only a few fellows who pointed
at me said there he goes. (1)
The sailors had clearly heard about Bligh,
and they may have used other phrases besides
'there he goes.'
The mutiny was broken. Captain Home emerged
(1) Gavin Kennedy, 'Bligh and the Defiance
Mutiny'.
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from the shadows to reclaim effective command from
Lieutenant Hewitt. He clapped the eight men back
into irons and the questioning began. Soon
seventeen men were in irons and Admiral Pringle
had them transferred to the locked room on one of
the press tenders. This was unusual, and suggests
that he may not have trusted the crews of his
other 74s.
Pringle was certainly nervous. He wrote to
the Admiralty that the Defiance was quiet. But
though the fencibles 'have gone upon their service
with alacrity ', he said he would be happier with
real soldiers on board. Indeed, he thought it
essential to keep control of the ship. (1)
Three days later Pringle finally found 135
officers and men of the 134th regiment to replace
the fencibles. However, he still had no marines on
any of his ships and could only find a handful of
soldiers to do sentry duty on his flagship. He
wrote to the Admiralty:
It is impossible for me to stir from that
ship (the Defiance) or carry her to sea on a
cruise, as I cannot esteem her in safety till
(1) Pringle to Admiralty, 20 October 1795, Adm.
1:522, Letter 278.
297
she is in some of His Majesty's Ports, and
indeed it appears highly advisable to me that
Her present Crew should be turned over to
other ships. (1)
So Pringle sailed his whole squadron four hundred
miles down the coast to join the fleet at the Nore
buoy in the Thames estuary. A contingent of
marines from Chatham came on board the Defiance.
(2)
Trial
Three months after, on 20 January 1796, the
trial of the seventeen mutineers began. William
Bligh had received the signal to report to serve
on the court martial. He objected to his admiral
that he had been the principal officer in putting
down the mutineers and therefore had seen the ship
in a state of mutiny. He felt it was his duty to
mention this fact for the information of the
admiralty and 'in justice to the prisoners'.
(1) Pringle to Admiralty, 21 and 23 October 1795,
in Adm. 1:522, Letters 280 and 283.
(2) Log of the Defiance, 6 March 1796 in Adm.
51:1101.
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Bligh was released from court martial duty. (1)
The trial lasted twenty-two days. Captain
Home was an unusually disorganized and incompetent
prosecutor. There is no reason to believe that
this seventeen selected victims were the leaders
of the mutiny. The crew in their letter had said
that the eight men clapped in irons were no more
guilty than the rest. They were just drunk and the
officers noticed them more. But these eight men
did conduct a joint defense. They asked the court
to delay the case until their attorney arrived.
The court said they would hear the prosecution
witnesses immdediatel y , but they would wait for
the attorney before hearing the defense.
The attorney drew up a joint written defense
for all eight men. He argued that Hewitt had
promised forgiveness when he released them from
irons. Robert McLawrin 7 Martin Ealey and John
McDonald signed the defense with their names and
the other five men with their marks.
Each of the eight defendants called
Lieutenant Hewitt as a witness and each asked him
identical questions. Under pressure an embarrassed
Hewitt admitted that he had publicly promised an
(1) Bligh to the Admiral at the Nore, 14 January
1796, Adm. 1:726, Letter 56.
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amnesty. But he added that he had done so under
duress and had had no intention of keeping his
promise. The court, of course, did not care what
Hewitt had promised. If the prisoners had done
what they were accused of, then they were guilty.
Two of the seventeen defendants were
discharged 'not proven' . Six cases were found
'proved in part' . Two of these were sentenced to
one hundred lashes and four to three hundred
lashes. One of them was John Graham, the letter
writer. John Prime also received three hundred
lashes for refusing sentry duty. So did William
Parker, who had spent the long night guarding the
magazine.
On 11 February the court sentenced nine men
to death. On the twentieth Prime, Graham and Froud
were flogged round the fleet. On 6 March an extra
forty-five marines came on board the Defiance.
That evening the nine prisoners came on board. Two
days later, in the morning, they were brought on
deck. Four of them were pardoned, including John
Lawson, the drunken American who had broken into
the magazine, and William Handy, who had patrolled
the decks with a burgoo stirrer.
Five men were hanged. Robert McLawrin was the
man who slapped Parker in the face outside the
magazine. William Morrison and Michael Cox had
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tried to force the magazine open. Martin Ealey was
the man who had refused the half-guinea when he
was working with Bearby in the head. John Sullivan
was the man who had tried to disappear into the
rigging as Bligh approached. (1)
Next day the captain had all hands turned up
and made a speech to them. But the Admiralty was
still worried about the Defiance, and they took
Pringle's advice and dispersed the crew. One
hundred men went to the Director, now commanded by
William Bligh. Within a month almost all the rest
of the seamen had been dispersed to other ships,
(2) although many petty officers remained on the
Defiance. This dispersal, however, did not
completely solve the problem. One year later
Bligh's Director was the first ship to mutiny at
the Nore and the last to surrender.
Two Witnesses
The mutiny on the Defiance was defeated
because the men were disorganized. The crucial
moment was when Bligh came alongside. They lacked
the collective organization to turn their shouts
(1) Ship's log, 8 March, Adm. 51:1101.
(2) Ship's log, 9 March, and muster books in Adm.
36:11910.
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into actions. Their fate shows clearly why almost
all other mutinies were carefully planned
beforehand.
But the Defiances were not broken. Even after
the mutiny the Admiralty did not dare to let them
remain together. And at the court martial some of
the witnesses showed a spirit of decency and
resistance.
'Big Job' Else testified over and over again
against his shipmates. Jacob Hill, a foremast man,
told the court what he thought of men like Else:
On Monday morning after the prisoners were in
irons, I was warming some water on the galley
fire on the larboard side and Job Else came
in to warm some water in a pot the same. I
was standing just close by the prop by the
bar, and some other people were there, I
don't know who. I said to Job Else, 'What,
have you got Martin Ealey in irons? I
understand he's in irons. ' And he made answer
and said yes. Then I said, 'Job, what did he
do to you? Did he knock you down?' He said he
did not knock him down but he pulled him and
lugged him about a great deal and used him
very ill. And I answered, 'What's that all he
had done to you. And the poor man had got in
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chains, and I saw him quietly at different
times.
He then made answer that he should not
have thought so much of it. But Martin Ealey
was the man who went and made a complaint to
the doctor when he (Else) was in the doctor's
list. Then he went and told the doctor he was
fighting in the galley with one of the
maintop men. And I said to him, 'Why, that's
a very hard thing that a man should lose his
life through such a thing as that.'
Joseph Nicholson was a witness for the
defense of John Lawson, the Prian. {is
	 cv
gives a vivid picture of life below decks at the
start of the mutiny. Nicholson and Lawson were
probably lovers, and Nicholson is clearly trying
to save his mate's life. He is establishing that
Lawson was so drunk at the start of the mutiny
that he could not have been a ringleader and was
not responsible for his actions. Lawson was
pardoned, and Nicholson's evidence probably saved
his life. Notice that at the end of the testimony
Nicholson gets so angry that he takes the risk of
using sarcasm to the judges.
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Lawson: On the evening of 17th October last
did I turn into your hammock and ask what
time was it?
Nicholson: The prisoner Lawson did turn
into my hammock about seven o'clock that
evening.
Lawson: What was the time and occasion of
my turning out of it again?
Nicholson: The occasion was that they were
cutting the hammocks down, when the prisoner
said to me, we had better turn out. This
might be about ten o-clock...
The court asked: Did the prisoner and you
always sleep together or had you separate
hammocks?
Nicholson: No. We had separate hammocks,
but he laid alongside of mine.
The court: How came he to sleep in your
hammock with you that night?
Nicholson: I supposed he was a little
intoxicated with liquor when he turned in.
The court: How did you so particularly
notice the time of his turning out again?
Nicholson: One of my messmates had a watch
and looked at it when we were turned out and
there was a light in the berth.
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The court: Who turned first into the
hammock?
Nicholson: The prisoner turned in just
before me.
The court: How came you then not to turn
into his hammock?
Nicholson: It was not hung up.
The court: How came you to have a candle in
your berth at ten o-clock at night?
Nicholson: There was a woman and a child
laying there at the time and it happened that
the child was frightened at the noise and she
was looking at it.
The court: Did you wake your messmate to
look at his watch?
Nicholson: No. He was awake in the berth.
The court: What could be your reason for
wishing to know the time so exactly?
Nicholson: My reason was that I supposed I
should be called on as a witness for John
Lawson.
The court: What reason had you to suppose
you should be called on as a witness for John
Lawson?
Nicholson: In case he should be detected
afterwards, that I might know the time.
305
Coriclus ion
At the end of chapter nine we paused to
consider what light the mutiny on the Culloden
threw on the themes of Part Three. This section
will repeat the process for the mutiny on the
Defiance.
How does this mutiny conform to Rodger's
unwritten rules? It happened in port. It did not
happen in the face of the enemy. One of the two
demands, that over grog, was certainly an
assertion of a traditional right.
Nor was this a demonstration by the dregs of
the shore, unused to the conventions of shipboard
life. We have quoted Nicol's memory that 'she was
manned principally by fishermen, stout resolute
dogs. ' Of the five men executed, Norrison and Cox
were ordinary seamen, Ealey and Sullivan were able
seamen, and NcL.awrin was an able seaman and
captain of the afterguard. We have evidence of
organization or leadership by four men. NcLawrin
was captain of the afterguard, Parker was captain
of the maintop, Handy was rated landsman but
served as captain of the mast, and Graham was a
landsman. Graham is the only one who can plausibly
be seen as an agitator from shore. This was a
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sailor's mutiny over very traditional sailors'
demands.
Yet it was not simply a safety valve, a rowdy
demonstration that exasperated officers accepted
as part of shipboard give and take. Much does not
fit; the men who pursued Lieutenant Dunbar with
cutlasses and tomahawks, the men who aimed the gun
at their officers and jammed a crowbar down the
gun mouth, the men who stormed the quarterdeck and
the men who called for firing the guns. Like the
Culloden, this was an armed strike. The great
difference, and the great weakness, was that the
Defiance was not organized.
One is reminded of the sailors' strikes in
Aberdeen and Tyneside in 1792, the sheer rowdiness
and exuberance of the crowds of sailors. It seems
that the traditions of the sea had changed. What
happened on the Defiance was, from the sailors'
point of view, 'collective bargaining by riot'.
After all, they attempted to bargain with the
captain and seemed to have got his agreement to
free the men. At the same time, the sailors' idea
of riot had reached a point which the officers
felt they could not tolerate. What we see here is
a tradition of protest in the process of change.
These are tradtional men, 'stout dogs', fighting
for traditional goals, in a way that is neither
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new nor old, in a way that is changing year by
year.
The second theme of this part is looking at
mutiny as 'class struggle'. As with the Culloden,
this is not a mutiny caused by sadism or anarchy.
It is a protest over conditions of ship board
life. The men were avoiding the press and
deserting the fleet in large numbers. It was this
that caused a defensive captain to refuse liberty,
and this also that deprived him of the support of
marines or soldiers. We cannot understand the
causes or course of the mutiny without
understanding the pressures of the war on
recruitment and the resistance of the men by
voting with their feet.
Again, Admiral Pringle's actions make sense
in terms of the more general struggle for control
by the officers. He was under pressure from the
admiralty not to cede the men's demands and to
punish the ringleaders. After the Windsor Castle
and the Culloden, anything less would have opened
great holes in the officers' control. If men could
chase officers with cutlasses and have shore leave
when they wanted it, naval discipline would be
severely threatened. But Pringle had to be
careful: there was always the threat of other
ships backing the Defiances.
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Again, we see a captain caught between the
power of the lower deck and the demands of the
Admiralt y . Again, the solution is duplicity. But
there is a major difference between the two
mutinies: organization. The moment at which this
told was the moment Bligh's boats came alongside.
The shouts went up to open fire. But the men had
not organized their own chain of command. Without
that, and without organized discussion beforehand,
they were never likely to go into battle.
In the aftermath, we again see the operation
of the court martial as social control. But it is
incomplete control. The ship still had to be
disbanded, and the one hundred men who went to the
Director remained a future nucleus of mutineers.
Our third theme was the importance of
detailed studies. It is hoped that these two case
studies have illustrated some of what can be done
with the extensive court martial records. Such
studies could fill a thesis many times over. But
in the next part, attention will shift from the
wood to the trees. We will look at the whole
course of mutinies between 1793 and 1814.
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PART THREE:
Mutin y and Protest, 1793-1814
310
Chapter Twelve: The Explosion: 1797-98
Part Four will be a chronological histor y
 of
the mutinies and protests from 1793 to 1814. It
will touch on almost all of the conflicts that
ended in court martials in those years. In some
ways the aims of this part are different from the
aims of Part Three. Then the intention was to
describe the workings of two mutinies in detail.
Here the intention is rather to give the reader a
feel for the range of shipbarod protest in these
years. There has also been a running dialogue with
Rodger's work on mutiny in an earlier period. In
this section that dialogue will fade into the
background, but the conclusion will return to the
topic in the light of the evidence presented in
this part.
The main theme of this part will be a
continuation of the attempt to understand mutiny
and protest in terms of the struggle between
officers and men. Over time, the balance of power
between quarterdeck and lower deck shifted back
and forth. This affected how officers responded to
protest, and also the form8 that protest took. At
the same time, the particular struggles themselves
311
affected the balance of power in turn. The rest of
this thesis is, then, an attempt to situate
particualr disputes in terms of this changing
balance of forces. The matter is complex. But as a
signpost for the reader, it will be helpful here
to crudely summarise the shifting tides of
struggle in this period.
Broadly, the first years of the war saw
several ma,jor mutinies on line of battle ships,
met by an increasingly firm line from the
Admiralty. This firm line was decisively defeated
by the great mutinies of 1797. The victory at
Spithead provided the men with a confidence that
continued into 1798. But the defeat at the Nore
had drawn a limit to what the men could achieve,
and in 1798 the bloody purges of United Irish
cells in the Navy began a process by which the
Admiralty regained most of their control of
shipboard life. In the early 1800s mutiny and
protest continued on a lower level, sometimes
successful, sometimes defeated. Then in 1809, for
reasons we shall explore, there was a visible
change in the approach of the Admiralty and the
captains to protest. From that time until the end
of the war there was far more willingness to
redress the grievances of individual ships against
individual commanders. But this did not mean an
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end to protest or mutiny, and it did not mean an
end to the repression of some protesters.
The most important events of these years were
the mutinies of 1797-98. For reasons given in the
Introduction, these events are treated quite
briefly in the rest of this chapter. (1) The
intention is not to provide a narrative history.
It is rather to touch on some disputed questions
of analysis and situate the mutinies in terms of
the events that preceded and followed them.
The Roots of 1797
To understand what happened in 1797, it is
helpful to review the major mutinies from '93 to
'96 in the order in which they happened. At the
beginning of the war in 1793, the Winchelseas
wrote a letter and held a demonstration. They had
two men flogged around the fleet and the Admiralty
(1) This chapter is based upon James Dugan, The
Great Mutiny, the best history of the naval
mutinies; Conrad Gill, The. Naval Mutinies of 1797;
and Roger Wells, Insurrection: the British
Experience, 1795-1803, which is particularly
helpful analytically. Dobree and Manwaring, The
Floating Republic, is not so helpful, and nor is
W. J. Neale, An Account of the Mutiny at Spithead
and the Nore.
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agreed to remove their captain. (1) Next year, in
1794, the Windsor Castles took over their ship in
the Mediterranean. They ran out the guns and made
it clear that they would fight unless their
captain and first lieutenant were replaced. The
admiral conceded their demand. (2)
Within weeks the Cullodens at Spithead
refused to put to sea. The admiral on the spot was
reluctant to take them on. The Admiralty, while
prepared to promise a refit, feared that another
amnesty might lead to a rash of mutinies. So
Pakenham promised forgiveness and the Admiralty
prosecuted.
Next year, 1795, the same thing happened on
the Defiance: Lieutenant Hewitt promised
forgiveness and a trial followed. The Admiralty
was angry with Captain Home for releasing the men
from irons on the Saturday night, and pleased with
Admiral Pringle's resolute action in putting down
the mutiny.
In September 1795 there was a mutiny on the
Terrible in the Mediterranean. The Terribles were
angry with the ship's discipline in general and
with the bad bread their captain forced them to
eat in particular. The Windsor Castle was also
(1) See above, pages 7-11.
(2) See above, pages 211-217.
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part of the Mediterranean fleet, and like them the
Terribles seized the lower decks and barricaded
themselves in. Captain Campbell shouted 'We'll
have no Windsor Castles here. ' He also,
interestingly, said that he was not prepared to
tolerate Peep-o-day Boys. He had the marines take
a crowbar to the planks of the deck and begin
firing down into the men. Several were badly
wounded and the people surrendered. A few were
flogged on the spot until they broke down and
talked. After the court martial the leaders were
hanged. The whole fleet, including the Windsor
Castle, watched the execution. (1)
From the Winchelsea to the Terrible it is
possible to see a stiffening of the attitude of
the Admiralty, and to some extent of the captains
too. Demands might be met, but it was essential to
prosecute the leaders afterward to restore
discipline and control. It is in this context that
(1) The main sources on this mutiny are the trial
of the mutineers in Adm. 1:5333; Solicitors to
Admiralty, 14 March 1796 in Adm. 1:3684; Admiral
Hotham to Admiralty, 12 September 1795, 21
September 1795 and 10 October 1795, all in Adm.
1:393, Letters 225, 228 and 242. The Peep-o-day
boys were Protestant peasant organizations in
Ulster that pursued an underground war against
their Catholic equivalent, the Defenders, and
eometimes against landlords as well.
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we must understand the official response to the
petitions for a pay increase that began to come
from the Channel Fleet in 1796.
Spithead
1795 had been a year of dearth and subsequent
inflation. Because of this pay increases had been
granted to soldiers, marines, naval captains and
naval lieutenants. It is not surprising that the
sailors in the Channel Fleet began to petition for
rises too. These petitions were ignored. The
official explanation afterwards was that they had
been sent to Admiral Howe. Thinking them the work
of a lone crank, he had simply pocketed them. This
explanation, given by Howe to a gullible House of
Lords, will not do. Captain Pakenham had written a
detailed letter to Spencer, the First Lord of the
Admrialty, setting out the men's grievances and
the probability of serious protest. (1) And while
the precise details of the sailors' organization
were secret, every officer in the fleet knew that
the men were publicly discussing action over wages
for days before they finally moved.
l4P; W44
	 P1-Ifl4 .1.
(1) See Julian Corbett, editor, Private Papers of
George, Second Earl Spencer, Navy Records Society
number 48, 1914, volume two, pages 105-109.
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difficult to meet pay increases, as Spencer
informed Pakenham. But when they finally had to
find the money, they did. And one must recognize
that their recent instinct had been to break
militancy in the fleet by confrontation. So they
responded to reports of general unrest in the
Channel Fleet by ordering Admiral Bridport to send
the fleet to sea.
The sailors refused. 'Flying pickets' rowed
from ship to ship, and each ship's company crowded
the rail to exchange cheers with the ships
anchored closest to them, just as ships did before
they went into battle. Each ship elected two
delegates to a committee of the fleet, which met
in the admiral's cabin on the Queen Charlotte. The
officers had lost control of the fleet.
This was no small matter. The Channel Fleet
was charged with keeping the French fleet bottled
up in Brest. For the moment the wind kept the
French in port, but should they break out to
Ireland or the West Indies the course of the war
could change. This put the sailors in a very
strong position, and the Admiralty had to move
quickly. Their Lordships raced down to Portsmouth.
They offered pay rises of about twenty per cent,
and met some of the men's lesser demands as well.
Admiral Gardner was sent to meet the
317
committee of delegates on the Queen Charlotte.
They liked the offer. Gardner was an admiral's
admiral: bluff, tempestuous, .joking, brave, open
and foul-mouthed. He heartily congratulated the
delegates on agreeing to the offer. The committee
explained that they had to wait for the return of
the four delegates from shore. Gardner accepted
this, and sat down in the cabin among the
delegates to write out a letter of thanks for the
delegates to sing and send to the Admiralty.
Valentine Joyce was one of the four delegates
still on shore. He was a twenty-nine year old
quarter master's mate on the Royal Sovereign. The
quarter master's mate was the man who took the
wheel. Joyce was a skilled seaman, born on the
seafaring island of Jersey. (1) But Valentine
Joyce is not a Jersey name. In 1793 Joyce had been
running a tobacconists's shop in Belfast. That
year he was arrested for sedition and sent into
the Navy as punishment. He was an active United
Irishman, and the informal leader of the delegates
of the fleet.
It is not known what Joyce and the other
delegates were doing on shore at this point. It is
(1) Nuster books of the Royal George for 1793 in
Adm. 36:11699, and for 1797 in Adin. 36:11704.
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possible that they were consulting with democrats
on shore. They returned to the Queen Charlotte to
find the other delegates gathered around Gardner.
Joyce must have known at once that if they signed
the letter of thanks they were dead men. He began
arguing with the other delegates that they must
have a signed pardon from the king before they
returned to duty.
Many delegates did not agree. Joyce walked
out of the cabin onto the quarterdeck. He and his
three mates started talking to the Charlottes on
the forecastle and in the waist. 'Remember the
Culloden', they said, 'remember the Culloden.'
The Charlottes remembered. The Culloden was
now in the Mediterranean, but two years before it
had been part of the Channel Fleet with the
Charlotte. Every ship in the fleet had heard the
execution gun, every ship in the fleet knew the
story of Pakenham's promise of an amnesty, and
Pakenham was still a captain in the fleet.
The Charlottes surged aft on the quarterdeck.
Admiral Gardner was which way the wind was
blowing. He lost his temper and accused them all
of being a damned mutinous set of blackguards that
deserved hanging. He grabbed one man by the collar
and said, 'I'll hang you, and I'll hang every
fifth man in the fleet.'
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The Charlottes bustled Admiral Gardner
roughly off the ship. That afternoon the red flag
flew from Joyce's ship, the Royal George. The
delegates met there and sent the Admiralty a
message. They would return to duty when they had a
pardon signed by the king for every ship in the
fleet. All around Spithead the sailors opened the
ports and ran out the great guns.
Earl Spencer, the First Lord, left Portsmouth
that night and was in London by nine in the
morning. At five in the afternoon he left London
for Windsor with Pitt. Four hours later they
persuaded George III to sign a royal proclamation
decreeing a total pardon. A hundred copies were
printed and rushed south. By next morning every
captain in the Channel Fleet read out the
proclamation. The men returned to duty. The five
Cullodens had been executed, but not forgotten.
The Second Mutiny
The men of the Channel Fleet returned to
their duty on 23 April in a confident mood. But
apparently they still did not trust the Admiralty
to fulfill their side of the bargain. The promised
increase in wages was not actually paid
immediately. The reason given was that it took
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time for the neccessary business to work its way
through Parliament. This may have been true. But
when a Whig peer, Bedford, attempted to get the
matter discussed in the Lords, the government
refused.
At the same time the Admiralty wrote a
general letter to captains instructing them to
take a firm line and immediately suppress any
further disturbances with forceful measures. Then,
before the increase in wages was approved, they
ordered several ships to put to sea. They were
clearly reasserting control.
And so the mutiny broke out at Spithead
again. Most captains wisely obeyed the mutineers,
but on the London Admiral Colpoys attempted to
follow the Admiralty's new orders. The marines
were drawn up and ordered to fire on the sailors.
They began to do so but then threw away their
weapons, after wounding several seamen, two
fatally. The enraged Londons wanted to hang both
Colpoys and one of his officers on the spot. But
Valentine Joyce was present at this crucial
juncture as well, and this time he intervened to
save the lives of the two officers. Had the
sailors executed an Admiral, of course ., the line
would have been truly drawn arid there would have
been no settlement likely short of insurrection.
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In saving himself Colpoys revealed his Admiralty
orders, and the delegates realized the Admiralty
meant to have a decisive test of strength.
So they stripped the ports, ran out the guns
and raised the red flag. They also put one hundred
and fourteen unpopular officers ashore and refused
to have them back. To claim the right to dismiss
officers was a challenge to the heart of naval
discipline and the naval heirarchy. Moreover, most
disputes between officers and men centered around
the control of work, and most disputes over work
took the form of objections to the style and
punishments of particular officers. The wholesale
sacking of officers in the Channel Fleet resolved
many such disputes in the favour of the men. The
Terribles, for instance, who had mutinied against
Captain Campbell the year before, now put him and
every one of his officers save one midshipman
ashore.
The Nore
The victory at Spithead encouraged a wave of
mutinies in other fleets in the Caribbean, the
th	 T- w"	 rnny
4th1.' t. ri-i;1-	 Pip m14r l3	 1h	 irn
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Fleet in 1797 and 1798. (1) There appears to have
been a general relaxation of discipline in the
Channel Fleet during this period, and on La Nymphe
John Pollard appears to have been able to strike
his captain on two different occasions without
punishment. (2)
But in the aftermath of the Spithead mutiny
the Admiralty was looking to reasert its control.
And with the crisis past, some in the cabinet
began to argue that Pitt had been too soft. The
Admiralty's need to reassert itself met the
sailors' increased confidence in the mutiny at the
Nore.
During the course of the Spithead mutiny the
delegates had written letters and sent delegates
to the ships at Plymouth, the Nore and in the
North Sea Fleet, appealing for joint action.
Pymouth had joined the mutiny but had returned to
duty with the fleet at Spithead.
The mutiny at the Nore, in the Thames
estuary, had begun just before the Spithead mutiny
was settled. It was at first regarded as a smaller
sideshow, which it was. The mutiny at Spithead was
the work of line of battle ships, but at the Nore
(1) Dugan, pages 397-435.
(2) Wells 1
 page 108.
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there were only two line of battle ships until
late in the mutiny.
When Spithead settled the Nore mutineers also
demanded a firm promise of amnesty for the
ringleaders. They also demanded that the officers
they had recently sent ashore be not returned.
These demands the Admiralty refused.
The mutineers at the Nore were in a weaker
position than those at Spithead for several
reasons. Firstly, the fleet at the Nore was a
chance agglomeration of ships in the Thames
estuary, coming or going out for supplies or
repairs or remanning. Like the Channel Fleet, they
elected delgates to a committee of the fleet, and
unlike them they also had a committee of twelve
men on each ship to coordinate the strike. But at
Spithead the core of this committee appears to
have been the men who had already planned and
organized the mutiny. At the Nore it was the men
of the moment. The committee had no experience of
working with each other, and fell out almost from
the start. Nothing illustrates this better than
the election as President of the committee of
Richard Parker, a man who had only been on his
ship for a few weeks.
Secondly, the Channel Fleet had already
settled. Now the Admiralty, rather than facing a
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potential rising of the whole Navy, was able to
take on the fleets one by one.
Thirdly, the strategic position was much
worse. The Admiralty had to negotiate with the
Channel Fleet in haste lest they leave the Channel
open. But the ships at the Nore had no strategic
role. And with the Channel Fleet now at sea and at
least some of the North Sea Fleet standing off
Holland throughout, the Admiralty could afford to
wait out the Nore.
By refusing to negotiate on the central
issues, the Admiralty ensured that the leaders of
the mutiny would do all in their power to prevent
a surrender and their own hanging. They had four
possible courses of action. They could try to
raise London in solidarity and strike for peace.
This was tried and failed. They could blockade the
river and cut off London's supplies. This they
did, but very quickly hundreds of vessels anchored
by the blockading fleet. The sailors realized they
could be overwhelmed and called off the blockade.
Or they could take the ships and run for France or
the Americas. Many argued for this, particularly
the United Men. It is difficult to tell if the
crews would have followed them in this, for in the
event the Admiralty had the navigation buoys and
lights removed down the Thames and it became
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effectively impossible to sail the great ships
into the Channel.
The fourth course of action was to wait and
hope the Admiralty would break. This they did.
Pushed into a corner, the more militant leaders of
the mutiny reacted with enraged words and symbols.
They wrote angry letters, behaved rudely to
admirals and hanged Pitt and Dundas in effigy. As
the Admiralty waited them out, the more
fainthearted sections of the crew began to argue
for surrender. The committee threatened to fire on
any ship that tried to leave the mutiny. Several
did leave, and while there were no pitched battles
and nobody was injured, several symbolic shots
were fired. But the fleet gradually dropped away.
On the fifteenth of June the last ship on strike
took down the red flag: the Director, with her
Captain William Bligh and her hundred old
Defiances.
The Admiralty proceeded to an exemplary
blood-letting. Well over a hundred men were put in
irons. Richard Parker was soon killed, and
followed by at least thirty-five other men. (1)
William Bligh, alone of all the captains at the
(1) Estimates vary, as it is difficult to
establish how many of the men sentenced to death
were actually executed.
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Nore, intervened personally to make sure that not
one of the men under his command was executed, no
matter what their guilt.
Consequences
The admiralty clearly intended to make an
example of the men at the Nore, and clearly did
so. The hangings at the end, it was hoped, would
leave an impression of a defeated movement. Later
historians have sometimes followed them in this
impression, or in the more sophisticated line that
the Spithead mutineers were moderate and
responsible en and therefore had their 3ust
demands met, while the wild men of the Nore could
only expect what they got. If anything, the
reverse was true. The Spithead mutineers won
because the action they were prepared to take
threatened the heart of the British state. The
language of the leaders at the Nore sometimes
appears more militant because they were pushed
into a corner by the Admiralty.
Nor did the defeat at the Nore mark the
defeat of the sailors as a whole. Mutinies
cont inued for the ret eihteei-1 months. with t
I rnl'ci Fcr	 U' iu'xI.	 '	 ht.v'ti uufl(.fl , w tn r
secial relix.at ion of discitljrje in the ihann
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Fleet. After all, the mutiny at the Nore had been
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a smaller affair than that at Spithead, the
leaders at Spithead were still serving in their
ships, and the rise in wages won at Spithead was
being paid to every ship in the Navy. And even at
the Nore the Admiralty realized the could not go
too far or have exectuions 'too frequent', lest
they provoke further mutiny. (1)
The Wider Context
But the Nore did reveal the limits faced by
the movement in the fleet. The mutineers at
Spithead had the support of the Whig local
administration in Portsmouth and the active
backing of the Portsmouth crowd. They demonstrated
with the sailors, and they did not allow 'God Save
the King' to be played in Portsmouth theatres
during the mutiny.
The workers and militia in Sheerness had also
made their active sympathy for the mutineers at
the Nore clear at the beginning. But here the
decisive arena was London. The London bourgoisie
were against the mutineers. While many workers
felt a passive support, the activists of the
hRnn	 n4th	 w- nc 1n'
(1) Wells, page 106.
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remotely able to organize demonstrations in
support. In short, the largest strike of the 1780s
was taking place at a time when the radical
movement in England as a whole was in retreat.
The sailors were connected to this movement
in many ways. Roger Wells has mustered a great
deal of convincing evidence for the influence of
the revolutionary movement in general, and the
United Irishmen in particular, in the fleet. (1)
Valentine Joyce was a United Nan, as was John
Blake, the leader of the intransigent faction at
the Nore. There were thousands of Irish political
prisoners sent into the fleet as punishment.
Pelham, the Home Secretary, estimated in 1796 that
15,000 Defenders and United Men had been sent to
the Navy as punishment. Even if he exaggerated,
and even if many were gut Defenders rather than
cerebral United Men, and even if many of them
deserted or lost their politics, there must still
have been a significant number of active political
prisoners below decks. And by 1798 there were
clearly branches of the United Men on at least a
dozen ships. The influence of democrats and trade
unionists ashore is also evident in the structure
of 'delegates', 'committees' and a 'President'.
U)
329
And the leadership of Joyce at Spithead was of
crucial importance,
But equally, if not more, important was the
influence of democratic ideas in general. At the
time captains and admirals blamed the mutinies on
the influence of the quota men. They argued that
the simple British seaman, long accustomed to a
harsh discipline, lacking in the finer feelings
and none too intelligent, had been joined by
educated landsmen and artisans who were unused to
such subordination. These educated men, fired by
French ideas, agitated relentlessly among the more
traditional sailors and brought them to a new
realization of the indignity of their position.
This view served the needs of officers who
wished to disassociate the naval tradition from
the shame at Spithead. The real sailors did not
mean it, and anyway they were misled. It had
become the general view among naval historians,
and unfortunately even Roger Wells accepts it. No
evidence whatsoever has ever been advanced for it,
and upon inspection the argument collapses.
For one thing, the leaders of the mutiny were
quite simply not educated landsmen. Richard Parker
was an educated sailor, a former officer who had
spent most of his working life at sea. Valentine
Joyce at Spithead and John Blake at the Nore were
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both Irish able seamen. And there is the case of
Matthew Hollister of the Director. He was the
yeoman who barred the three drunks on the Defiance
from the magazine, and took no part in the mutiny.
The muster book of the Defiance gives his age as
forty-two. In the books of the Director he is
fifty-six and Bristol born. (1) But it is the same
man with the same rank on both ships. Men were not
too particular what they told the ship's clerk.
Hollister was clearly at least an old salt from
southern England. He was also one of the four
delegates sent from the Nore to talk to the
mutineers at Spithead, and he was subsequently
sent to Yarmouth to persuade the fleet there to
come out.
Hollister's case illustrates an important
point. There were landsmen on the committees, but
they were a minority. And there was no such thing
as a group of simple sailors accustomed to naval
discipline. Rather, there was a trade called
sailor, and most of these tradesmen served on
merchanL vcsels in peace time. In times of war
they were impressed into the Navy, and resented
the discipline. These sailors had been in the van
(1) Defiance muster books, Adm. 36:11909-11910;
Director muster books, Adm. 36:12781.
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of the strikes and demonstrations of 1792. There
is no reason to assume that the men who planted
the Libert y
 Tree in Aberdeen in 1792 and then
organized the sailors' strike there could not
organize a mutiny in the fleet.
Nor, of course, was the democratic movment
the sole preserve of educated men. A few lawyers
and poets may have been prominent. But the mass of
the members of the London Corresponding Societies,
the Defenders and probably the United Scotsmen
were workers or peasants, resolutely plebian. Eben
Thomas Hardy and Francis Place were not of the
same class as Danton and Robespierre.
Noreover, the London Corresponding Society
was a mass movement and the United Irishmen became
one. At any one time in these years there were a
quarter of a million sailors in the Navy and the
merchant fleet combined. This was a very
significant proportion of the young men working in
the major ports. It is not surprising that the
politics of the fleet should have reflected the
politics of workers in the ports. The captains, in
short, were right that the fleet had changed its
politics, but wrong not to notice that Jolly Jack
himself had turned on them.
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1798
Throughout 1798 there were mutinies on
individual ships. But sailors were part of a wider
movement. On land the central event of '98 was the
defeat of the Irish insurrection. At sea it was
the purge of the organization of the United
Irishmen in the fleet. (1)
The United Men had been important in 1797,
and they had organized with the English and Scots
on board. After the mutinies the Dublin leadership
realized the importance of the fleet and began the
serious organization of branches on ships. By '98
they had branches on at least a dozen ships, and
probably many more. But as the rising developed in
Ireland, it became more and more a rising of
Catholic against Protestant.
Moreover, the majorit y
 of the rebels sent to
the fleet had been Defenders rather than United
Men. They were part of an organization of wage
labourers and mall tenants for the defense of
Catholic lives and liberty. They were not a
bourgoisie and heavily Protestant organization for
(1) The following is based on Wells, pages 145-51,
and Dugan, pages 420-434.
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the Rights of Man. So on ship after ship there
developed a split between Catholics and
Protestants, Irish and English. The instructions
of the United Men were to take their ships over to
the enemy one by one. This made sense if one sided
with the French and Irish against the English. But
it divided the English off, and they were the
majority of the crews.
The split was not automatic, and the English
sailors wrestled with their consciences. On the
Haughty, for instance, the Irish sailors struggled
in silence with the English sailors for control of
the guns off the coast of Ireland. It was only
several days later that a deputation of English
seamen brought themselves to tell the officers of
the plot to take the ship.
On many ships the English sailors spent weeks
in fear of being murdered in their beds before one
of them talked. Even when the captain began to
arrest large numbers of Irishmen, they had great
difficulty finding witnesses among the English
sailors. Nor, of course ) were any English sailors
actually hurt.
But the Irish on the Prince Royal, the St.
George and the Marlborough did try to run thier
ships into Cadiz in May. Plots to do the same were
discovered in June and July on the Haughty, the
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Pluto, the Adamant, the Mars, and on the Caesar,
where sixty-eight men were put in irons. In August
there was a mutiny on the Ramilles, an aborted one
on the Defiance and arrests on the Neptune.
Further arrests followed on the Nemesis, the
Zealand, the Druid and the Queen Charlotte. There
are suggestions that United organization extended
to many more ships.
These arrests split the fleet. The year
before the Irish hotheads had been in the van with
the English hotheads. Now they were being
arrested, and even if there were few witnesses
from among the English, there were some. Moreover,
these arrests provided the Admiralty with the
occassion for a show of repression they had not
felt confident enough to mount after the Nore.
On most ships good witnesses were hard to
come by, and so only a few men could be proved
guilty enought to hang. But on the Defiance
(almost completely remanned since the mutiny in
1795) one witness was prepared to testify to the
presence of twenty-five other men at an oathing
ceremony in the galley. Twenty of them were hanged
at once.
This level of killing on one ship is unique
in this period. Part of the explanation, of
course, is that they had been plotting treason and
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that the uprising in Ireland was no sideshow. But
one of the effects of this wave of repression,
probably intended by some officers, was to bring
to an end the period of lower deck confidence that
had followed the mutinies of 1797. This confidence
had been highest in the Channel Fleet, and it was
the Channel Fleet that stood and watched twenty
men at the rope's end. This was to have its
effect.
The next chapter will trace the decline of
confidence among the men after 1798. From 1799 the
officers slowly reasserted their authority. This
did not mean an end to protests and mutinies.
Indeed, as the prospects of a successful mutiny
became less, there seems to have been a rise in
attempts to take the ship and run for a foreign
port after 1800. The years 1800 and 1801 seem to
have been a period of particular bitterness,
though not of particular conflict. Then there was
a year of peace and partial demobilization. With
the resumption or war there were continued
mutinies. But their incidence was a bit less and
the bitterness surrounding them was also reduced.
The chapter ends in 1809, just before the mutiny
on the Nereide and the important changes of 1809.
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Chapter Thirteen: The Tide Recedes, 1799-1808
In 1799 many officers were still clearly
running scared. Captains sent men for trial on
grounds they might previously have ignored.
Several marines on the Royal George, for instance,
were drinking in their hammocks. One of them
proposed a toast: 'Success to the United Irishmen
and may the Tree of Liberty be planted before us.1
One witness also heard him wish victory to the
enemy. Four marines were tried for either joining
in the oath or not preventing it, and each was
sentenced to 300 lashes. (1)
William Davis of the Lowestofte was tried for
disrespect to the officers and for having said
while in irons that 'he hoped he should see the
Tree of Liberty planted in the centre of the
Lowestofte and extended all through the British
Navy.' In his defense he protested fervent loyalty
to the British Constitution, but he was sentenced
to 500 lashes and two years solitary confinement.
(2)
(1) Trial of Patrick Townsend and others, 15
January 1799 in Adm. 1:5348.
(2) Trial of Davis, 24 January 1799 in Adm.
1 : 5348.
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In March two seamen of the Ramilles were
tried for circulating a letter asking for the
removal of their captain and several other
officers. In their defence they said that they had
never meant to provoke a mutiny, they were only
agitating over the right to have bum boat women
admitted to the ship. The court took the
possibility of mutiny seriously. They sentenced
one man to death and recommended the other to
mercy. (1) This may have had something to do with
the fact that the Ramilles had been off Work when
the letter was circulated, and Ireland was still a
sore point. But it may also indicate that in 1800
the officers felt that industrial relations were
so tense that it was unwise to allow the people
their traditional custom of sending petitions to
the Admiralt y . Probably any collective action was
a threat, and the officers were aware how quickly
it might escalate.
That same month in the North Sea fleet,
Bouzelia Forbes was sentenced to 300 lashes and
Alexander Kerr to 200 for writing a letter. They
had met with other shipmates by candlelight in the
manger to write to the Lords of the Admiralty
complaining of their captain's usage. They had
(1) Trial of Green and Layton, 4 March 1799 in
Adm. 1:5348.
338
torn up the first draft as not painting the
picture black enough. (1)
Sometimes it is clear why a captain would
react angrily to a letter. John Ferris, master at
arms of the Stag in the Channel fleet, wrote a
letter to Earl Spencer at the Admiralt y on behalf
of the ship's company, 'one and all'. The letter
effectively accused Captain Yorke and the purser
of embezzling the crew's share of the prize money.
Ferris sent the letter to his friend, Corporal
Joseph Peters of the marines, so that Peters could
improve the handwriting. Captain Yorke sent both
Ferris and Peters to trial for attempting to stir
up a mutiny. The court found them not guilty of
stirring up mutiny, but guilty of writing an
unfounded letter. They were both broken in rank
and sentenced to eighteen months solitary
confinement. (2)
But in several cases the court martial
officers seem to have taken a much less serious
view of an offense than did the captain reporting
who sent the man for trial. On the Caesar Thomas
Mahoney had terrified William Oliver by coming to
(1) Trial of Forbes and Kerr, 22 March 1799 in
Adm. 1:5348.
(2) Trial of Ferris and Peters, 28 March 1799 in
Adm. 1:5348.
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his berth and asking how it felt to hang a man?
He accused Oliver of being the man who had
reported 'the Romans intending to take the lives
of the Protestants' , and so had as good as hanged
six innocent men. Mahoney heaped a good deal more
abuse on the informer and then took off his own
neckerchief and undid his shirt collar. Baring his
neck, he said 'Here is a white neck! I defy both
you and them.
Oliver was clearly frightened by Mahoney's
moral contempt. He turned Mahoney in to the
captain, who sent him for trial. The court awarded
50 lashes. This was a punishment the captain could
have awarded without going through all the trouble
and formality of a trial. Of course 50 lashes were
not insignificant to the man who took the beating.
But it was still a derisory sentence for a full
court martial. This may reflect a a private
contempt for informers on the part of the officers
of the court. (1)
Again, in August Thomas Perkins of the Mars
was sentenced to a hundred lashes. A number of
boats had been alongside the ship. The women in
them could not be persuaded to come on board.
Perkins had called out, 'Come, men, what do you
(1) Trial of Mahoney , 23 July 1799 in Adm. 1:5350.
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say, let's all go ashore after the women. I will
be the first to make a break.' The surgeon told
Perkins to mind what he said. Perkins replied, 'I
don't care if the admiral heard me.' (1)
In Torbay Thomas Lewis of the Russell was
sent for court martial because while scrubbing
the decks he remarked to the men around him, 'By
the Holy Ghost, if every man in this ship was of
my mind we would not scrub the decks. There is not
a ship in the fleet that does it but us and the
bloody Ramillies. ' He was sentenced to 50 lashes.
Again the captains seem to have felt that their
brother officer was being unduly jumpy. (2)
One night in April Robert Powell of the
Repulse was well in liquor. The ship was tense.
That evening an anonymous letter had been dropped
for the officers to read. Powell was heard to say
'I am a United Irishman and I hope I shall gain my
ends or die in the attempt'. Staggering towards
his hammock he shouted 'Vive le Republique
toujours'. His shipmates urged him to go to his
hammock, shut up and go.to sleep. But when one of
them informed on Powell, the captain decided that
(1) Trial of Perkins, 6 September 1799 in Adm.
1 5350.
(2) Trial of Lewis, 27 September 1799 in Adm.
1 :5350.
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he had found the ringleader of the letter writers.
This may in fact have been the case, or it may
not. The court awarded 100 lashes. (1)
These prosecutions reveal captains nervous
about odd remarks and any scent of sedition. We
should not leap to the conclusion that these were
silly fears. On the Volae in the West Indies,
three men were tried for organizing a conspiracy
to seize the ship and run her into an enemy port,
and for administering oaths to their shipmates not
to reveal the plan. It seems clear from the
evidence tht this was a serious plot and that many
of the ship's company knew about it. The court
took a relatively lenient view. The defendants
were sentenced to 500, 300 and 200 lashes
respectively. (2)
In May the captain of the sloop Hope
discovered that at least twenty-four of his able
seamen and petty officers were plotting to take
the ship and sail her into an enemy port in
Madagascar. The plot was revealed while they were
still swearing men in oe by one. This time four
(1) Trial of Powell and McAllister, 30 September
1799 in Adm. 1:5350.
(2) Trial of Dunavon and others, 12-15 August 1799
in Adm. 1:5350.
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men were sentenced to death. (1)
On La Sophie even the first lieutenant was
moved to urge the men to petition the Admiralty.
After punishment one day he leapt up on the
carronade slides and addressed the ten or fifteen
men nearby, saying that he wondered that they did
not write to complain of the captain, and that 'I
have a list of the people's names who have been
flogged since I have been in the Ship, and if I am
called upon I shall know what to say. He was
dismissed the service and rendered incapable of
ever serving in the Navy again. (2)
The Navy was clearly tense throughout 1799,
with the possibility of mutiny still lingering in
the air. But we need to realize that despite the
fear and the aboritve plots, only one actual
demonstration made it into the court martial
record: the 'mutiny' on the sloop Dart.
One day in June the carpenter's crew on the
Dart were rigging up the gratings for a flogging.
The ship's company moved aft in a disorderly
manner, whispering among themselves. When the
prisoner was seized up they refused an order to
(1) Trial of the mutineers of the Hope, 3 January
1800 in Adm. 1:5351.
(2) Trial of Thomas Vanthuysen, 3 January 1800 in
Adm. 1:5351.
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move back. When he was ordered to strip they tall
ran forward crying out he shall not be flogged'
The officers dived for the arms chest and shared
out the weapons. The people moved back and the man
was flogged. At the subsequent trial one man was
sentenced to death and four others to between 100
and 500 lashes. (1)
The fact that this is the only demonstration
in the court martial record does not mean that
other ships did not demonstrate and escape with a
whipping. Probably some did. But it must be
remembered that 1799 was only two years after the
great wave of mutinies in 1797. What is striking
is the absence of mutiny and the severity of
repression. The punishment of the Darts was severe
for what was only a demonstration. Men found
themselves on trial for sedition after the odd
remark below decks. The officers were reaserting
their authority. The United Irishmen had been
defeated on land in 1798, and broken in the fleet
as well. Reaction now ruled afloat and ashore.
(1) Trial of John Miller and others, 4-6 July 1799
in Adm. 1:5350.
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1800
This pattern continued into 1800. On Narch
5th of that year Florence McCart y , a seaman of the
Phoebe, was lashing up his hammock. He was working
next to Thomas Holloway, the captain of the
forecastle and presumably a trusted and
experienced sailor. The Phoebe had recently
captured a French privateer with eleven English
speaking men among her crew. Holloway told McCarty
that he was happy to think that 'we had found out
these men, Americans as they deemed themselves,
and I said that they deserved hanging if they were
subjects of the Crown of Great Britain.'
There is reason to believe that the captain
of the forecastle already knew something of
McCart y 's politics and was trying to wind him up.
It' so, it worked. McCarty replied that he would do
the same as the eleven men. Holloway and McCarty
began quarrelling. Holloway told McCart y that he
deserved punishment as bad as the eleven. McCarty
said that 'if he went into any service and took
the bounty of any nation he would fight as long as
he could, and he gloried in them young fellows for
doing1
HoLLoway threatened to report MoCarty to the
quarterdeck and McCarty told him to go bugger
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himself. Holloway reported him instead and the
captain sent him for court martial. He was
sentenced to 500 lashes and two years solitary
confinement. The court took treason seriously,
even when it was only treasonous words. They
commended Holloway, who was promoted to gunner and
removed to another ship. This was, of course, a
reward, but it also got him out of the way of the
other Phoebes. (1)
Many officers were touchy. The majority of
trials for the offense called 'mutin y ' were in
fact raving drunks shouting at their officers.
Usually such a man would be flogged the next day.
If sent for court martial he usually received 100
to 200 lashes. But when William Gillfirtnan of the
Monarch was drunk one night he said to some of his
shipmates, 'Ye buggers, if ye were of my mind, the
ship would not be here.' He was reported and taken
to the lieutenant of the watch, who told the
sailor he would have him hanged. The court martial
concurred. It is clear that Gilifinnan was in no
position to launch a mutiny. After all, he was
complaining about the other buggers who would not
do anything. But it is equally clear that in 1800
the captains on this court were sensitive enough
(1) Trial of McCart y , 7 April 1800 in Adm. 1:5352.
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to the threat of mutiny to kill a man for
mentioning it. (1)
And while in 1800 sailors certainly still had
the right to petition for redress of grievances,
they could be seriously punished for exercising
that right. The marines of the Diadem at Spithead
had previously written to their Major General on
shore and reeived some satisfaction. It is unclear
what they had complained about, but clear that he
did not object in principle to them writing
letters. But then in April 22 marines wrote to him
asking for relief from the oppressions of their
ship's officers and their marine lieutenant.
Sixteen of them signed their names and six made
their mark. This suggests that they were confident
of the Major General's response and felt that
their protest was legitimate. But this time a line
was drawn. John Briscoe, the writer and organizer
of the letter, was tried and sentenced to 200
lashes and six months in the Marshalsea prison.
(2)
Writing letters might be dangerous that year,
but people still clearly felt it was their right.
In May seaman Thomas Lawrence and marine David
(1) Trial of Gillfinnan, 7 July 1800 in Adm.
1 : 5353.
(2) Trial of Briscoe, 18 April 1800 in Adm.
1 : 5352.
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James of the sloop El Corso were tried for
organizing a letter to their admiral, Lord Keith.
They had wanted to complain of their captain's
style of punishment, particularly the way men were
treated in the brig. In trying to persuade one of
his shipmates to sign the letter, Lawrence had
made it clear that 'it was neither mutiny nor
sedition, but the legal complaints that the ship's
company laboured under.
The prisoners stuck to this line at their
trial and defended their legal right to petition.
James was sentenced to 500 lashes and Lawrence to
200. But the court did not specifically deny their
right to petition. Instead they sentenced them for
'stirring up the ship's company to write against
the officers without any just ground.' (1) They
thus preserved the doctrine of an Englishman's
rights while denying its practice.
But even in 1800 some court inartials do still
suggest that the captains felt some respect for
the moral economy of the forecastle. The abusive
Gladiators provide an example.
John Jones had been the captain's steward on
the Hermione (2) and had testified at the trial
(1) Trial of Lawrence and James, 10 June 1800 in
Adm. 1:5353.
(2) See chap. one above and Pope, The Black Ship.
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of at least one of the captured mutineers. One day
he was in a ship's boat passing near the
Gladiator. A woman on the forecastle called out:
There goes bloody Jack Ketch, belonging to
the Hermione, you bloody bugger, you hung the
man the other day, if ever I catch you on
shore I will have your bloody life taken from
you.
As the boat drew away she kept calling after
him. This must have shamed him deeply in front of
the Gladiators on the forecsatle.
Jones had the men put the boat about and went
back and boarded the Gladiator to complain about
the woman. The officers blandly told him that the
woman could not be found, an unlikelihood. It is
unclear whether they respected her sentiments or
simply did not relish punishing women. Jones
clearly thought the officers were being
obstructive, and the Gladiators felt free to abuse
him. As he pulled away, Thomas Nelson called to
him from the head:
You bugger, who are you going to hang now?
That is the bloody bugger belonging to the
Hermione who hangs all the men. You bugger,
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if I had my will I'd hang you, 1 1 d make a
swab of you upon the beach.
Jones saw no use in returning to the
Gladiator to protest:
He still kept abusing me as far as I could
hear him. As I was passing along to go on
shore I could not understand what he was then
saying, but he kept his eyes on me all the
time. I then went on shore and made my
complaint to my captain. He gave me a letter
to carry on board the Gladiator to the
commanding officer.
And there Jones identified Nelson, who was
brought to trial. He escaped flogging and received
the relatively mild sentence of two years solitary
confinement. It seems likely that at least some of
the officers of the court sympathised with the
sailors' code on informers. Clearly the officers
of the Gladiator had not wished to challenge their
people on this. After all, they must have heard
Nelson shouting if his voice followed Jones all
the way to the land. And his eyes, which Jones
could not forget. (1)
(1) Trial of Nelson, 30 July 1800, Adm. 1:5353.
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The court also made allowances for the
seamen's moral economy in the case of the
Overyssel. There some new beer had been hauled on
board and the people refused to touch it. They
wanted their grog. When they refused the noon
ration, the captain compromised and gave them half
rations of grog. But when they refused their beer
again that evening the captain snapped and
arrested three ringleaders.
The court sentenced them to 150, 80 and 50
lashes respectively. The court had to back up the
captain. But their refusal of the beer was a
traditional tactic, and relatively legitimate.
Their captain implicitly acknowledged this. 'tie did
not charge them with refusing the beer or with
organizing the refusal, but with 'making use of
language tending to create a disturbance or riot
in the ship. ' (1) Said riot of course never
happened. If it had the court inartail sentences
would have been much more severe. The relatively
light sentences on the three men indicate that the
court saw some merit in their behaviour.
Of course, these are relative matters. Fifty
lashes was a mild sentence for a court martial but
a serious sentence for the man who had to
(1) Trial of Bendal, Turner and Laverty, 13
October 1800 in Adm. 1:5354.
withstand it. Any sentence of more than a hundred
lashes was really a statement about the severity
with which the court viewed the offense, rather
than a serious intention to adminster that many
strokes. The surgeon was present at floggings
round the fleet, and it was his duty to step in at
the point where in his opinion further beating was
likely to kill the man. He almost always had to
step in before the boatswains' mates reached 2D0
strokes. The prisoner would then spend a period in
the sick list. After his release from the sick
list, he was sometimes flogged round the fleet
again to make up the required Lashes. But ir the
majority of cases, as far as I can tell, the
prisoner appealed for mercy after the first
beating and received it.
If the Overyssels did not riot, the Daphnes
did. In the early evening of 19 September 1800
their sloop was working her way with some trouble
into English Harbour in Antigua. Some of her crew
seem to have blamed the trouble on the
incompetence of her commanding officer, Mr.
McKenzie. He must have been acutely embarrassed.
English Harbour was the home port for the fleet,
the entrance is not that difficult, and the other
ships in harbour must have been watching what
appeared to be sloppy seamanship.
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McKenzie blamed the men for being drunk. The
ration had just been switched from wine to grog.
Witnesses later differed as to whether the men
started out riotous, but as one seaman admitted,
the Daphne was 'in a bad state for all the men
being groggy' . So NcKenzie ordered the boatswain's
mate, Gillespie, to start two men for drunkenness.
Gillespie went about his duty very
reluctantly. Then McKenzie ordered him to seize up
one of the men for more vigorous punishment.
Gillespie refused. He said he didn't know how. He
was clearly being economical with the truth.
For some time the people had been angry with
NcKenzie for his general treatment of them. Now
they began to protest noisily against the starting
of the two men. One of the people said that if
they were all of the same mind as him, they could
sweep forward and have a clean sweep of the deck.
While the drunks were debating, McKenzie armed
himself and his officers and called out the
marines. They forced the men below, but not before
Peter Hook had cut off a piece of the painter
(bow-rope) of the ship's boat. He threw it at
McKenzie and scored a direct hit in the face. The
next morning the men were quieter. But during the
night persons unknown had cut a lot of the running
rigging, and McKenzie therefore still had great
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difficulty working the ship into English Harbour.
(1)
Gillespie, Hook and one other seaman were
court martialled. Their defense and the court's
judgement is missing from the record. We can
assume that at least Hook and Gillespie would have
been sentenced to death. But this was the only
'riotous' demonstration in 1800. The contrast with
1797 and 1798 could not be clearer. And this one
clearly was not organized.
Taking the Ship
If 1800 saw few demonstrations and a firm
line taken with letters and grumbling, it was also
the high point for organized seizures of the ship.
It seems likely the two were connected. Men who
were too frightened of repression to demonstrate
might turn to mutiny instead.
There were many occasions between 1793 and
1814 on which small groups of men took control of
press tenders, prize crews and the ship's boats.
There were several occasions when the people tried
to take control of a ship and return to a friendly
port where they could seek redress from
(1) Trial of Gillespie and others, 25 November
1800 in Adm. 1:5354.
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an admiral or the Admiralty itself. There were
also many occasions on which at least some of the
people planned to take the ship but were betrayed.
But I have only been able to find five
mutinies in which the crew successfully took the
ship into an enemy port. One of these was the
Hermione. 1797 was an exceptional year, Pigot was
an exceptionally brutal captain, and it is the
only mutiny where the people killed their
officers.
Of the four remaining mutinies three were in
1800-01 and one was in 1806. All were on small
ships like sloops and ketches. This may reflect
the very real difficulty in organizing and keeping
such a secret on a larger ship.
It is not easy to find out what happened in
these mutinies. The captain and officers were
usually courtmartialled for the loss of the ship.
But the court was not interested in the reasons
for the mutiny. In their eyes nothing could
justify an offense which combined mutiny, armed
revolt, desertion and treason. Their only question
was whether the officers had done their utmost to
prevent the mutiny.
The Navy usually caught a few mutineers in
ones and twos over the years. But the prosecution
in these trials was only concerned with whether
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the men had participated in the mutiny, and if so,
what they had done. Any defendant who tried to
introduce evidence justifying the mutiny would
have ensured his already highly probable hanging.
But some times the odd remark in the
transcript provides a clue.. There are some
indications that Lord Proby of the Diana in 1800
was a flogging captain, but the evidence is
unclear. (1) Certainly all of the leaders of the
mutiny were topmen, and it was topmen who were
most likely to come into conflict with a flogger.
William Jackson, the captain of the foretop, was
one of the two leaders of the mutiny.
The other leader was 'John Brown' . He was one
of several English speaking sailors captured on
board the French privateer Bordelais. All of them
said they were Americans, and some may have been.
In any case, one did not join a French privateer
by accident. One volunteered. 'Brown' was almost
certainly a purser's name, for he told his
shipmates that he had been one of the mutineers on
the Hermione. There is no reason to doubt this. He
may not have been a Virginian, as he claimed, but
it is likely he had been a slave. Several other
(1) The following is based on Dudley Pope, The
Devil Himself: The Mutiny of 1800, London, Secker
& Warburg, 1987.
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old Bordelaises were forward in the mutiny as
well.
A minority of the people seized the ship one
night off Brest and ran her into the port. On
shore the majority of the crew of 120 joined the
mutineers. Many of them wore the revolutionary
cockade in their hats. It would appear that in
this case, a few hardened enemies of the British
state combined with a majority of natives who had
come to detest Lord Proby, the Royal Navy, or
both. (1)
Much the same seems to have happened on the
schooner Goza in the Mediterranean in 1801. The
people seem to have planned the mutiny carefully
for midnight on July 23rd, when the small ship was
off the coast of Naples. As on the Diana, they had
already sworn oaths to stand true to each other.
Precisely on the hour they surged on deck and went
straight to the cabin of their commander, Lieut.
Mime. They planned to kill him. Mime awoke to
find a boy cutting his head with a cutlass. He was
hurt, but they did not kill him.
Several men hustled Mime on deck, where he
confronted the leader of the mutiny, John
Cochrane. He persuaded the other mutineers not to
(1) I should emphasize that this is my
interpretation of Pope's evidence, and not his.
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kill Mime, who was put in chains. The mutineers
were the large majority of the people , and they
were armed with cutlasses and pikes. They forced
the officers below and ran for the shore. The
French took them in. (1)
It is clear that they hated Mime. The plan
to kill him was very unusual. Cochrane's remarks
suggest that Mime had been responsible for the
death of at least one seaman. But there are also
strong suggestions of political motives. Several
of the Gozas wore French revolutionary cockades on
shore, and at least one of them defiantly told a
loyalist that he was a 'True Republican' . The
prosecutor at the inutineers' trial (2) was
certainly looking for evidence that men had said
they did not give a damn for king and country.
That prosecutor was probably Milne himself. Of
course he would have had good reason to emphasize
a revolutionary plot and thus implicit y belittle
his responsibility. But this does not mean that
the Gozas could not have encouraged towards
(1) Trial of Milne and others for the loss of the
Goza, 26 November 1801 in Adm. 1:5359; Trial of
Jones, White and King, 14-15 Decmeber 1801 in Adm.
153S9. The minutes of the trial of Drummond and
Bardelle, 23 February 1802, in Adrn. 1:5360 are
missing.
(2) Trial of Jones, White and King.
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republicanism by the tyranny of the ro yalist they
knew best. The evidence either way is thin, and we
shall never know.
It is remarkable how reluctant mutineers were
to kill their officers. The bomb ketch Albanaise
had a crew of of forty-two in 1800. (1) On
Novemvber 23rd they decided to take the ship and
run her into Malaga. Her commander, Francis
Newcombe, later testified:
I was awoke by a whispering in my cabin. I
called my servant by name but no answer was
made. I again repeated it and immediately a
clashing with cutlasses and other weapons was
made and Casalino said, 'Captain, if you do
not lay still and behave like a gentleman we
will have life for life. Laying hold of my
cot at the same time, I immediately turned
out without saying a word, got at my pistols
and shot one man dead in the cabin. I
immediately ran on deck to alarm the officers
and was received by three or four men with
cutlasses, at the same time pursued by those
who were in the cabin. Godfrey immediately
laid hold of me and swore if I spoke another
word I should be put to death, that all was
(1) Ship's muster book in Adm. 36:14126
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secured and nobody would help me. I put the
muzzle of the other pistol to his breast
which unfortunately snapped (misfired). I
received some blows with cutlasses from some
other men and several blows with a tomahawk
were made at me by Godfrey which I fended
off. . . (1)
But once they had disarmed Newcombe, Jacob
Godfrey intervened to save the captain's life.
Remember that Newcombe had just killed one man. He
had Just tried to kill Godfre y , the ship's
carpenter (2) and leader of the mutiny. But when
Godfrey said 'For God's sake, men, don't put the
captain to death; don't take the captain's life,
arid I will stand by him', the people listened. '3)
They sailed the ketch into Malaga and gave
themselves up to the Spanish. Fourteen months
later Captain Newcombe's testimony hung Godfrey.
It is clear that some people may have
disliked serving under Newcombe, but there is no
(1) Trial of Thomas Parsons and others, 19 June
1802 in Adm. 1:5361.
(2) Ship's muster book in Adm. 36:14126.
(3) Trial of Jacob Godfrey, 11 June 1801 in Adm.
1:5360. See also trial of John Ferrel, 19 June
1802, in Adm. 1:5361.
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clear evidence why they took the ship. And it is
also difficult to find out why the men of the
sloop Dominica mutinied. They seized the sloop in
harbour (Dominica, the place) one night in 1806,
and slipped quietly out of port, bound for
Guadeloupe. The acting master did testify that as
the mutineers overpowered him, George Farrington
of the carpenter's crew told him 'e are all
resolved on death or liberty.' But again, he told
Osborne not to be afraid, for there would be no
blood shed. His words echo Patrick Henr y 's 'Give
me liberty or give me death', but liberty may have
been used in its more restricted meaning of
getting ashore and leaving the Navy. (1)
In fact, simple desertion may have been a
motive in all of these ship seizures. Small groups
of men commonly took over prize crews or tenders
or ran away with one of the ship's boats. Usually
they went to the English shore, but sometimes to
an enemy port. The Goza, the Albanaise and the
Dominica were all small, and even the Diana
carried only 120 men. Their crews may have been
not so much treasonable as just totally lacking in
(1) Trial of Proctor and Mancon, 30 June 1806, and
trial of Dean, officers and men for her loss, 21
July 1806, both in Adm. 1:5376; and trial of Loach
and others, 3 November 1806 in Adm. 1:5376.
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patriotism.
However, a ship seizure had to be planned and
carefully organized. This probably required a
combination of quite political leadership with an
unhappy crew. It is not surprising that such
mutinies should have reached their peak in 1800
and 1801. The Admiralty were taking a firm line,
murmuring and sedition were firmly dealt with, and
few crews seem to have had the confidence that, if
they demonstrated, their grievances would then be
redressed. In such circumstances, collective
desertion would have seemed a reasonable solution
to an unbearable ship.
1801-1802
1801 was a bitter year. In the normal course
of events, when a captain took exception to his
men writing a letter, one or two men were tried
and sentenced to to fifty or a hundred lashes each
and perhaps a year or two in prison. But that year
the people of the Active wrote a letter asking for
a change of commander. About one hundred men
signed their names in a circle, so that all knew
they stood together. This time there were two
separate trials and seven defendants. One man was
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sentenced to 500 lashes and one to 300. (1)
The Glenmores tried to strike, On 5 June 1801
two men were tied up to await punishment for
insulting the boatswain's mate. The people
gathered to watch punishment and began to murmer.
One of them, Charles Turner, called out that
broomsticks were not fit things to punish men
with. He too was seized. The people surged aft.
The marines were called out and the first
lieutenant went aft and threatened to run through
any man who held back from watching punishment.
The people then assembled in their proper places.
The punishment began presumably with a
broomstick. The first lieutenant later testified
that Turner, when first beaten, looked steadily at
the ship's company and seemed to be hoping that
they would rescue him. But part way through the
beating he began to beg Captain Talbot for mercy.
Once order was restored, Captain Talbot chose
(1) Trial of Charles Coleman and others, 25 March
1801 in Adm. 1:5355; and trial of John Betham and
others, 9 April 1801 in Adm. 1:5356. Round robins
were an old tradition among merchant seamen. See
Rediker, pages 234-236, where he points out that
the round robin was an organizing tactic to
persuade the men that they stood together, by
demonstrating to each other their united
signatures.
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not to treat the demonstration as a mutinous
assembl y : he did not send anybody for trial. That
night the Glenmores began oathing below decks.
They wrote a letter to the admiral, but when
Talbot found out he assured them no attention
would be paid. They determined that they would not
raise anchor until Talbot was replaced. Two days
after the punishment Admiral Gardner was in a
schooner that passed very close to the Glenmore.
The people may have thought that he was coming to
give redress, and as he passed they 'assembled
very thick on the forecastle'. He had other
business and passed by. This time Talbot chose to
construe the demonstration as mutiny. After all,
the admiral knew of their complaints and had seen
for himself that Talbot had lost control. The
prisoners, however, were not tried for their
behaviour in massing on the forecastle, but for
their protest at the punishment two days before.
Two men were sentenced to death. (1)
Discipline in these years was fiercest in the
West Indies. The people of the Castor clearly had
to put up with a brutal regime. As so often in
other ships, the topmen were the flashpoint. About
(1) Trial of Joseph Williamson and others, 1
October 1801 in Adm. 1:5358.
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half an hour after dark on 13 December 1801 they
were coming down the rigging after taking a reef
in the topsails. The captain decided that several
of them had been too slow in doing their duty. He
had the boatswain pipe all hands up for immediate
punishment.
The people must have discussed their reaction
beforehand. Those below refused to come up and
began cheering . Many of those coming down from the
yards raced down through the hatches to join their
fellows. The captain armed his officers, and the
marines swept through below decks and restored
control of the ship. (1)
Four men were tried for mutiny on Christmas
Eve and Christmas Day. Three were sentenced to be
flogged round the fleet. William Linfield was one
of the topmen who had been awaiting punishment. He
was sentenced to death and hanged.
Holding the trial on Christmas Eve was deeply
offensive to the fleet. William Richardson was a
gunner on one of the ships, and he never forgot
his indignation. (2) Christmas was a special
festival in the Navy: by tradition a happy
(1) Trial of William Linfield and other, 24-25
December 1801 in Adm. 1:5359.
(2) Richardson, page
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drunken party. Part of that tradition was a marked
relaxation in discipline. But the people could
hardly party happily after seeing their captains
off to the flagship for the trial. The admiral was
singalling his contempt for the morality of the
forecastle, and thus making clear to them his
willingness to take a firm line.
This influenced what happened on the Syren of
the same fleet two months later. The Syrens were
unhappy with Captain Gosselin. First they tried a
traditional form of protest. When the hands were
turned up for punishment, one man began hooting
and the rest answered him. The officers tried to
find out who had started the hooting and could
not. The protest, however, does not seem to have
worked.
The Syrens had been together a long time and
knew each other well. Sailmaker's mate Henry Ross
and several of the other Syrens began to organize
a mutiny . They did not plan to take the ship to
the enemy. But after the experience of the Castors
they must have known the probable consequences of
a demonstration or a strike. So they hit upon a
bold plan: they would go over the admiral's head
and seek redress. They planned to seize the ship
and turn over the command to the first lieutenant,
Mr. Wailer. They felt he was a 'true gentleman'
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He and they would sail the ship to England. There
they would turn Captain L,oring over to the
flagship as a prisoner and demand a court martial.
Ross and the others wrote out a paper and
invited their shipmates to sign it. The paper said
they agreed with the plan. When a man signed it he
also kissed the book (preumably the Bible) and
took an oath. Men who refused to sign were also
asked to swear that they would not inform.
But one man did. Twelve were sent for trial.
Nine were able seamen or petty officers, one was
an ordinary seaman, and two were marines. Seven
were hanged, four sentenced to 300 lashes each and
one was acquitted.
There were three trials in all. One of the
odd things about them was that the prosecutor,
Captain Loring, asked most witnesses what the men
alleged against him. Most answered vaguel y , but
Quarter Master Atkinson Williams told him:
What is alleged against you is, that you used
the ship's company very severely who were
used like men before when Captain Gosselin
had the ship, and we are now thrashed like
dogs and mustering the hammocks every
morning on the quarter deck and mustering the
people by divisions who was never used so
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before, and a short allowance of liquor which
was due to the ship's company when Captain
Gosselin had the command, was measured out
and put into a cask in the after hold and
they could not get it, at which they murmured
very much. The ship's company said if Captain
Gosseling had the ship, there would be no
mutiny in it. (1)
The whole moral world of the forecastle is in
Atkinson's words. There is the idea of rights to
their liquor, their due. There is the suggestion
that the reason they are not getting their due is
that the captain is stealing it. There is the
insistence that the captain is departing from the
customary standard; unlike Gosselin and the first
lieutenant, he is not a true gentleman.
All of this is tradional in form. But there
are also echoes of the Rights of Man. They would
not be beaten, the Syrens muttered to each other,
like animals; they would be treated like men. They
echo the leaflet produced by the mutineers of the
(1) Trial of Henry Ross and others, 23-25 February
1802 in Adm. 1:5360. See also trial of Seton Ross,
27 February - I March 1802, and trial of Richard
Croft, 4-5 March 1802, both also in Adm. 1:5360.
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Nore: 'We have long laboured to find ourselves
men. We now find ourselves so. We will be treated
as such.'
The Syrens were not treated as such. Nothing
illustrates the relative severity of discipline in
the West Indian fleet in 1801-02 better than the
different responses to unrest in the Excellent and
the Gibraltar.
The mutiny on the Excellent has been
described in detail earlier. (1) The war was over,
and on Christmas Day 1802 the Excellents wanted to
go home with the rest of the fleet. At their
dinner below decks they shouted 'Home, Home' . The
marines were sent in and four petty officers were
hanged.
The people of the Gibraltar in the
Mediterranean also wanted to go home at the end of
the war. On 6 October 1802 they surged aft onto
the quarterdeck and demanded to go home. They
stayed there about fifteen minutes, chanting
'Home, Home', and complaining that it was over
twelve months since peace had been signed. When
the Dragon sailed by they cheered her people, for
they knew the Dragons were also organizing
demonstrations to go home.
(1) See pages
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Captain Kelly decided not to punish his men
at all. He seems to have come under considerable
pressure from his superiors, and several days
later he did agree to send two men for
court-martial. One was sentenced to death. The
court reproved him for not sending more men to be
tried and for doing nothing to suppress the
demonstration. Five months later he was court
martialled for this and dismissed the service. (1)
Of course, the difference between the two
cases is not that great. The Admiralty did
eventually make it clear that they expected
dmeonstrations to be suppressed. But the
Gibraltars had gone much further than the
Excellents in the West Indies. They had cheered
from the quarterdeck, not below decks, and they
had cheered the men of another ship. That was how
the mutinies had started at Spithead and the Nore.
Why were the captains in the West Indies more
brutal? There are two probable reasons. One is
that the other fleets were now at peace, and this
(1) Trial of Bream and Silk, 1-3 November 1802 in
Adm. 1:362; Trial of Captain Kelly, 3-5 March 1803
in Adm. 1:5363. See also trial of Beard and Morgan
First Lieutenant and Boatswain) for not
suppressing the mutiny, 15-16 March 1803 in Adm.
1 : 5363.
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involved an inevitable relaxation of discipline.
In the West Indies they were still at war with the
slaves of Haiti. They had recently faced or were
now facing slave insurrections on many islands.
Discipline was required.
The second reason is the nature of the war
they fought. Mortality from disease was higher in
the West Indies. The repression of slave risings
was, perforce, a brutalizing business. I have
found little evidence that many sailors approved
of slavery. Several of those who left their
memoirs clearly did not. The captains of the West
Indian fleet had to persuade their men to do
loathsome work in great danger. It is not
surprising that they felt they had to keep a firm
grip.
1803-1808
After 1803 the temperature of the class
struggle seems to fall. Of course, it is possible
that there are fewer records because fewer
captains were sending demonstrators for court
martial. But the most serious mutinies would still
have ended up in court, and there are very few of
them.
The people were still writing letters, and
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some captains took exception. Men were tried for
writing letters on the Trident and Princess Royal
in 1803 (1), the Tartar, the Locust and the Dryad
in 1805 (2), and the Phoenix in 1806. (3) Other
men were still tried for subversion. Patrick
Nurphy of the Prince was tried in 1803 for saying
that he was a United Irishman and a pikeman. (4)
Walter Fenton, the ship's clerk of the Magicienne
was tried for saying that he was a United Irishman
and he had buried pikes and would do so again. (5)
And Fagan of the Hindostan was tried for
subversion in 1806. He had become very angry and
abusive at his shipmates who were gathered around
the grog tub singing 'Rule Britannia'. He wanted
to know why they were going on about Britons never
being slaves, and yet allowed themselves to be
treated as such. His defense at the court martial
was that his remarks had not been treasonable to
(1) Trials of 15-16 October 1803 in Adm. 1:5364
and of 3 September 1804 in Adm. 1:5366.
(2) Trials of 4 April 1805 in Adm. 1:5369, of 22
June 1805 in Adm. 1:5370, and of 11 December 1805
in Adm. 1:5371.
(3) Trial of Johnson and others, 19 April 1806 in
Adm. 1:5373.
(4) Trial of Murphy on 15 October 1803 in Adm.
1 : 5364.
(5) Trial of Fenton on 29 November 1805 in Adm.
1 : 5370.
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his country , because he was in fact an American
and owed no loyalty to King George. The court
accepted this defense. (1)
There were also mutinies between 1803 and
1808. In 1805 the people of the sloop Favorite
demonstrated their support for the a first
lieutenant who had, among other things, tried to
get them off working in port on a Sunday. Upon his
discharge from the ship, they cheered him as he
/
was rowed away from the ship. (2) The people of
the Tormant held a series of demonstrations in the
same year. During one of them a crowd assauJted
the boatswain. (3)
There were also several attempts to seize
ships. In 1804 some men of the Montagu began to
plot to take the ship, kill the officers and run
for Brest. They were betrayed and three were
hanged. (4) That same year off Bordeaux three
drunken sailors on the prize Eliza talked of
(1) Trial of Fagan, 13 March 1806 in Adm. 1:5372.
(2) Trial of Charles Perkins on 25 March 1805 and
of John Froade on 3 April 1805, both in Adm.
1:5369. Favorite was spelled that way.
(3) Trial of twelve seamen of the Tormant, 15-16
February 1805, in Adm. 1:5368.
(4) Trial of Dunn and others on 19 June 1804 in
Adm. 1:5366.
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taking her, and one paid with his life. (1) On the
Dominica in 1806, of course, the men did succeed
in taking the ship to Gaudeloupe. (2) In 1808 nine
men of the schooner Bream were tried for
attempting to cut the ship's anchor cables so she
would run aground and they could desert. (3) And
the Ferrets very nearly made it.
Just after twelve one night in OctoOber 1806
the men of the Ferret gave three cheers and ran
aft to the quarterdeck. They were planning to take
her and run for a Spanish port in the West Indies.
Captain Cadogan yelled 'Guard the hatches' and
sprang from his cabin onto the deck with a pistol
in one hand and a cutlass in the other. The
mutineers were carrying pikes and cutlasses. The
captain asked one them the cause of their
'mutinous and dastardly conduct'.
'Ill usage', replied John Armstrong, a
cutlass in his hand.
Captain Cadogan advanced on Armstong saying
'I have but one life to lose, and I will have one
of yours' . He disarmed Armstrong. The other
Ferrets lost their nerve and dropped their
(1) Trial of Blacking and others on 20 June 1804
in Adm. 1:5366.
(2) See above.
(3) Trial of 3 March 1808 in Adm. 1:5386.
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weapons on the deck. They received West Indian
justice. Eleven were sent for court martial. One
was acquitted and ten were sentenced to death. The
court also rulcd that the bodies of four of them
should be hung in chains in the most conspicuous
place the Commander-in-Chief 'shall think proper
to direct'. (1)
1807 was a quiet year, with no court martials
for mutiny at all. In 1808 five men of the Edgar
were prosecuted after the ship's company mustered
at night and shouted 'A change of ship'. One was
sentenced to 700 lashes, but none were hanged. (2)
But all in all, one's impression of the years
from 1803 to 1808 is that they mark the low point
of active shipboard unrest.Why?
A partial reason is the peace. Before the
peace the ships often held crews who had years of
service together. They were likely to be very fed
up, and also to have a web of complex solidarities
with their shipmates. After 1802 we are largely
dealing with new crews. Many of them had served in
the Navy before, but not with these particular
shipmates. And in the first two or three years
(1) Trial of Thomas Simpson and others, 8 October
1806 in Adm. 1:5375.
(2) Trial of 2-4 April 1808 in Adm. 1:5386.
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they may not have been so desperately fed up with
the Navy.
The other reason is the marked lowering of
the class struggle ashore between 1801 and 1810.
To some extent the sailors must have responded to
the more general mood ashore. But I suspect that
it was the mood ashore at the time they were
pressed that was often their benchmark. After 1802
the working class, democratic and Irish
organizations were in general on the retreat.
This may have depressed radicalism afloat. It
may also have led the captains to feel less
threatened by militancy. In 1799 and 1800 the
records seem to show many captains on edge, and
the Admiralty clearly wanted to stamp on
resistance. From 1803 on the captains may have
been more confident.
And, of course, the revolutionary wave in
Europe was weaker than before. In Britain it was
almost completely silenced. This meant fewer
revolutionaries in the fleet, and it meant less
fear of revolution for the captains. It is quite
possible that there are fewer records of
demonstrations because more captains were simply
dealing with disturbances themselves rather than
invoking a court martial. It may also be that some
admirals were dealing with complaints informally
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by having a word with the captain.
Of course, all this is informed speculation.
All we know for sure is that there is a drop in
recorded mutinies. But as we shall see in the next
two chapters, there is reason to believe that a
gradual change was taking place in officers'
attiutdes after 1802. But to understand that
change, we must now turn to the mutiny on the
Nereide in 1809.
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Chapter Fourteen: The Nereide Mutin
We now come to a significant turning point in
Admiralty policy and in the relations between
officers and men: the mutiny on the Nereide. But
the story really begins with the case of Captain
Nesbit Willoughby of the small sloop Otter. (1)
On 17 August the ship's company of the Otter
wrote a letter to Admiral Beattie in Cape Town:
Honured Sir,
Your honor being the only person we can apply
to this side of the Board of Admiralty, to
redress our grievances, humbly implore your
protection; ever since Captain Davis left the
ship our treatment is cruel & severe,
especially the last cruize were out, getting
continually starting, and flogging, altho' we
were superior in any kind to the Nereide, or
Charwell, or in short we were not beat by any
ship in the Navy since the Otter has been in
(1) Unless otherwise specified, all evidence on
the Otters comes from the trial of Nesbjt
Willoughby on 9-14 February 1809 in Adm. 1:5992.
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Commission: if a Court martial, or any trial
has been passd on these men that have been
punished they would not receive a lash but,
Captain Willoughby, after he has a man seized
up, declares that seeing a man get three,
four or six dozen is more satisfaction to him
than going to a good dinner: he has at
various times asked the officer of the
morning watch how many were started: when
told, that there were none deserved it, his
reply has been, that he was sorry for it, as
by not having ten, or twelve started every
morning watch, the officer had not done his
duty: since we are in port he decLared to
use his own expression! that he has flogged
like Hell, & would flog like hell, on the
least occasion;! for flogging a man is only
amusement to him, we one and all thought it
proper to acquaint your honour of this,
before we should go on another Cruize, for if
he goes out with us again, our treatment will
be worse than convicts. We remain, your
honors Petitioners, the Ships Otters Company,
one and all. (1)
(1) Otters to Bertie, 17 August 1808, enclosed in
Adm. 1:60, Letter 80.
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Nesbit Willoughby was a lieutenant with
seventeen years service. He had twice before been
in trouble with his commanding officer. On the
second occasion he had been broken in rank, only
to regain it as a reward for personal heroism. The
Otter was his first independent command. This was
his chance and he wanted to do it properl y . Part
of doing that was running a ship that looked taut
and performed manouvers at least as well as the
other ships that sailed with her. In this case,
those ships were the Nereide and the Charwell.
Willoughby felt that the Otters were a slack lot
and it was his task to whip them into shape:
literally. In their letter the Otters complained
that this was unfair because in fact they
performed better than the other ships. This was to
be a recurrent bone of contention between them and
Willoughby at his court martial.
The final reference to another cruise with
Willoughby could be read as an implied threat to
take action on the next voyage. Admiral Bertie
certainly seems to haveread it as such, as we
shall see.
His first action was to send two captains to
enquire on the Otter. This was the traditional
form, the correct response to an acceptable
petition. The report by the two captains implied
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that there was some substance to the Otters'
complaints. Bertie removed Willoughby from his
command, and placed him under arrest on the
Grampus until he could face a court martial. (1)
He explained the Admiralty that:
I did not consider it prudent that Captain
Willoughby remain on board of her till his
trial could take place, fearing least in the
face of an Enemy's Port, some ill-disposed
person should so far influence the rest, as
to induce them to depart from that mode of
conduct, they had in the first instance
adopted, and by which measures most
disastrous to the service might be affected.
(2)
Bertie, it should be remembered, was
commanding a fleet that was rather more at war
than the rest of the Royal Navy in 1808. The
French still held Madagascar. Both privateers and
French men of war were.a constant threat.
(1) Johnstone and Tait to Bertie, 24 August 1808,
and Bertie to Willoughby, 27 August 1808, both
enclosures in Adm. 1:60, Letter 80.
(2) Willoughby to Admiralty, 30 September 1808,
Adm. 1:60, Letter 80.
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Bertie was chronically short of men, and a sloop
like the Otter was often on detatched service. He
could not afford to risk losing her or her men.
So he effectively deprived Willoughby of his
command for an indefinite period. A court martial
requires at least five post captains, and it was
no common event for five captains to be in Cape
Town at the same time. Moreover, Willoughby wanted
to call in his defense every officer and petty
officer on the Otter, some forty men. Bertie could
not spare so many from duty, so they would have to
wait until five post captains and the Otter
coincided in port. That might be a very long wait
indeed. (1)
One detects in the increasingly formal
correspondence between Willoughby and Bertie a
rising level of personal animosit y . This may have
contributed to Bertie's decision to hold
Willoughby. Be that as it may, what was important
was how the matter must have appeared to the
Otters themselves. They had appealed to Admiral
Bertie for redress, and. redress had been
(1) Bertie to Willoughby of 27 August 1808 and 3
September 1808, and Willoughby to Bertie of 2
September and 5 September 1808, all enclosed in
Adm. 1:60, letter 80; Willoughby to Admiralty, 4
October 1808 in Adm. 1:2704, Letter 223.
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forthcoming. They had said they did not want to
sail under Willoughby, and now they did not have
to.
The Nereides
The Otter departed on a cruise to Madagascar
under the command of Lieutenant Benge. There her
crew will have passed on the news of their victory
to other ships, among them the lereiie. 'she 'as ar
unhappy ship. Captain Corbet was a vicious
flogger, and his men found the starting on board
unusually cruel. They had twice written letters to
their Admiral on the Bombay station, Pellew, but
had had no redress. (1)
When they heard the news from the Otter, they
must have decided that Bertie was a different
class of admiral. There is no evidence for this in
the documentary record, but it is a fair inference
and it explains what happened next.
At 7 am on 8 January 1809 the Nereide was
anchored off St. Mary's., Madagascar. The boatswain
piped all hands on deck and ordered them to weigh
(1) hristoper Lloyd, 'The Mutiny of the Neriede',
Mariners Mirror, volume 54, 1968, page 247. In
general this chapter is not based on Lloyd's
account.
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the anchor. They gathered forward and announced
they would only raise the anchor if the ship was
bound for the Cape. Corbet and his officers rushed
onto the quarterdeck. We will let Lieut. Blight's
testimony at the court martial take up the story:
Orders were given by Captain Corbet to turn
the hands up, 'Up Anchor', and there was a
general answer from forward; 'No, Not . The
marines were drawn across the quarterdeck.
with as I then supposed the immediate
determination of forcing compliance. Captain
Corbet remarked that there would be fair play
for it, or something to that effect, and
called for the ship's books. (1)
Blight was then ordered to take William
Wilkinson prisoner and put him into double irons.
Wilkinson was a topman and one of the leaders of
the demonstration.
I found him forward in the crowd but
immediately carried him down, under the half
deck. On perceiving him to look anxiously
(1) Ny account of the mutiny is based on the trial
of the rnutineers, Wilkinson and others, 18 January
to 1 February 1809 in Adm. 1:5391.
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about him and supposing he was going to
speak, I remarked it was a very awful time
and warned him to hold his tongue. He
instantly answered in a very independent sort
of way, 'No Sir, but we have written for
redress and we will have it'...
Blight was warning Wilkinson that he might he
hanged if he called upon the other sailors for
support. Blight returned on deck, where Captain
Corbet already had the purser calling out the
names of the men from the ship's muster books. As
each name was called Corbet invited the man to
report himself present and loyal or go forward
with the crowd and be considered a mutineer. The
great majorit y
 of the people went forward. Blight
again:
Captain Corbet took the trumpet and loudly
called out that he gave them five minutes to
consider before he turned the hands up, 'Up
Anchor', which said he: 'If not obeyed I will
fire on you' , ordering me at the same time to
note five minutes by my watch. Some of the
people requested to be heard. Captain Corbet
said, 'Come one or two but no more.
Recollect, we are now enemies'.
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A few men came forward along the narrow
gangway that ran from the forecastle to the
quarterdeck. Corbet came forward to meet them.
They said they wished to go to the Cape and Corbet
said they could riot. He himself wanted to go home,
he told them, and he could not have his wish
either.
So the deputation returned to the forecastle
and reported. 'The tenor of all that I (Blight)
heard was, "You hear we can't go to the Cape, what
do you say? Why don't some of you speak? Say what
you want".
The men, and their leaders, were clearly at a
loss exactly what to do. It seems that they had
not planned for this moment. Or, as is possible
that they had not allowed for the marines arming
themselves so quickly. In any case, they now faced
organized armed force and a captain who was very
sure what he was doing. As the delegation were
begging men to speak up, Captain Corbet
Loudly called I'll. have but two words, obey
or not obey, and warned them to recollect
seriously what they were about, saying also,
'What the Devil do you take me for, a coward
or what?', remarking that they ought to know
him by this time. John Robinson then returned
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to the gangway and told Captain Corbet that
the ship's company were very ready to obey or
go to the cruise, provided they went with any
other captain. By this time upwards of four
minutes had expired. What Robinson had stated
as their request to the Captain was
immediately told to them was impossible.
There was then a general call forward of
Obey. When the hands were turned up, 'Up
Anchor' , there was a partial answer, 'But to
the Cape' . The marines were then ordered to
ready and I immediately remarked that many
men were coming to their stations. Captain
Corbet called aloud, 'Those who choose to
obey and go to their stations, go, and those
who do not, remain on the forecastle as
mutineers and be shot.'
I believe every person went to his station
and the anchor was immediately hove up.
It seems clear that the Nereides had planned
on a peaceful demonstration, not on taking the
ship by force. In refusing to raise the anchor
they had followed the tradition of the Spithead
mutineers twelve years before. But the Spithead
mutineera had never forgotten that such a strike
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had to be backed by the implicit threat of
organized force. Corbet did not forget it either,
and he called the Nereides' bluff.
He had nine men arrested and put into irons
with Wilkinson. Then he headed for the Cape. It is
not clear if this had been his destination all
along. But in any case he could not court martial
his ten mutineers anywhere else. Neither Bombay
nor Madagascar could provide five post captains.
When he arrived at the Cape the ten men were
immediately court martialled. Their defense was
that they had been non-violent at all times. The
verdict was unique. All ten men were found guilty,
and all ten were sentenced to death. But nine of
them were recommended to the Admiralty for mercy.
The court thus effectively singled out one man,
William Wilkinson, for an exemplary death.
They hanged him the next morning. (1) This
too was unusual. There was usually a wait while
the verdict was referred to the Admiralty. Of
course, immediate executions were not unheard of,
particularly on distant stations. St. Vincent in
the Mediterranean had ordered the exemplary
executions of two agitators and two gay men on a
(1) Bertie to Admiralty, 18 February 1809, Adm.
1:61, Letter 39.
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Sunday because he could not wait. But that had
been right after the mutiny at Spithead, and St.
Vincent clearly expected a mutiny of his fleet if
swift action were not taken. The speed of
Wilkinson's execution does suggest some worry on
Admiral Bertie's part.
So does the destination of the other nine
defendants. Bertie was desperately short of men.
The usual procedure would have been to pardon the
nine men upon the occasion of the execution and
return them to the ship's company. Instead Bertie
put them all on another ship and sent them back to
England for disposal by the Admiralty, presumably
to other ships. (1) It was clearly important to
Bertie not to return the leadership of the
Nereides to the forecastle.
Wilkinson was hanged on board the Nereide on
the second, a Thursday. This was not the end of
the story. On Saturday the Nereides sent a letter
to Admiral Bertie. They complained of cruelty and
asked for a court martial on Corbet. Seaman John
Slade signed the letter with his own name on
(1) Bertie to Admiralty, 18 February 1809, Adm.
1:61, Letter 39.
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behalf of the ship's company. (1) Bertie responded
by ordering a court martial to begin on the
Monday, the first possible day after he received
the letter. It is possible that he had encouraged
the men to write the letter: we will return to
this question later.
The prosecutor in the trial was one of the
topmen, probably Slade. This was in no way
contrary to the laws that governed court martials.
But it was very unusual indeed: I have been unable
to find another case where a seaman prosecuted a
court martial, It was common, of course, for
.iunior officers to prosecute their seniors. This
right was not being extended to the lower deck.
This in itself was a major victory for the
Nereides and a public humiliation for Corbet. A
stream of witnesses came forward to testify
against him. They had not been broken by
Wilkinson's execution.
They produced considerable evidence
concerning cruel floggings. But what they really
objected to were the endless startings. The only
way to convey the flavour of life under Corbet is
(1) There is a copy of the letter in the
proceedings of the trial of Corbet on 6-8 February
1809 in Adm. 1:5392. The following section is
based on this trial.
390
to quote one witness at some length. This is
because it was the repetitive nature of the
punishment that really outraged the Nereides. John
Smith, topman:
The first time he ordered me to beat was... I
was stowing the hamnmocks, when the hands
were turned up to loose sails. I went to my
station on the yard. While I was up somebody
threw two hammocks into the fore part of the
netting (the place for stowing hammocks).
Captain Corbet called me off the yard, and
when I came down on deck he enquired, 'Who
stowed the hammocks?' I said it was me. He
asked rue if I called them hammocks stowed? I
told him they were two hammocks the people
had hove into the netting whilst I was aloft.
He then called for a Boatswain's Nate and
told him to give me a good licking which he
did with a rope's end. Captain Corbet then
made me take every hammock out of the netting
again and stow them afresh and then sent for
the Master's Mate and stopped my grog and
wine for a week. .
When setting the foretopmast studding
sail I was pulling the jack block on the main
rigging and happened to take the hitch above
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the sail instead of under. The captain asked
who did it. I said it was me. He then sent
for John Allen Boatswain's Mate and told him
to go beat me, which he did. The weight of
the stick was so heavy that I could not
stand. Captain Corbet said if you don't
stand, I'll make you and then sent the
Boatswain's Mate for seizings to seize me up
to the Jacob's Ladder, which he did and then
beat me as long as Captain Corbet thought
proper. I was then cast off. My flesh was
terribly bruised, but I was not incapable of
doing my duty.
Another time, I was setting the
Maintopmast Studding sail and was on the Main
Yard. I cast off the head stop of the sail
and the weight of the sail had jammed the
other stop so that I could not cast the knot
off, it being a new stop. Captain Corbet
asked me what had jammed it. I told him the
weight of the sail. He then called me down
off the Yard. He asked me what held the stop.
I told him it was tied in a reefknot and
being fresh blacked I could not get it off.
He then sent for Moses Veale the Boatwain's
Mate to beat me. He gave me six or eight
strokes. I could not stand. Captain Corbet
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then told me if I did not stand he would
seize me up to the Jacobs Ladders. I was then
seized up and beat as long as he thought
proper. Another time we were reefing topsails
off the Isle of France, after we taken in the
reef a little of the sail showed underneath
the yard. Captain Corbet asked who was these?
Somebody told him it was Smith, meaning me.
He called me to him and asked if I saw that.
I said Yes. He asked my why I had not hauled
the sail up. I told him I thought that I had
hauled it up. Said he, 'I'll make you'. He
sent for a Boatswain's Mate. Moses Veale came
aft.
After he had beat me, Captain Corbet
sent the topsail yard men up on the yard
again to shake the reef out. He then called
us down on deck and as soon as we were down
he told to aloft to take the reef in again.
(Smith means this was just make-work.)
My armd being so sore that I could not
tie my points so tight as any other man he
asked me whose point was that. They told him
it was mine. I was then in the top. He called
me down on deck and asked my why I did not
tie the points taut. I told him my arm was so
sore from the beating I had got I could not.
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He sent for a Boatswain's Mate. Moses Veale
came aft. He told him to give me a damned
good licking, which he did. Then he sent the
yardmen aloft to shake out the reef again and
after the reef was out called us all down
again. And then he sent the topsail yardmen
up to take the reef in again.
Smith is implying here that Corhet was
playing with them. It would take considerable time
and effort to get aloft, reef the sails, and come
down again. Each time they would hope to have
finished their task, only to be ordered aloft
again. But let Smith continue:
He sent the Boatswain on the starboard side
to see if the points were all taut. And my
arm being so sore (from the beating) I could
not tie my points so tight as any other man
he asked me who tied them slack points? The
Boatswain told him it was me. He then called
all the topmen down upon the deck. When I
came down he called me to him and asked me
the reason I did not tie the points tauter. I
told him my flesh was so sore I could not
bear fly frock to touch it. (Smith means he
could not bear the pain when his clothing
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touched his skin.) He said he would make sore
and called for a Boatswain's Nate and told
him to lick me which he did according to his
orders. We went up and shook the reefs out
and took them in afresh several times after
that. And after we had done my flesh being so
sore I was forced to go to the doctor and he
put me on the list...
It is not hard to see why Smith joined the
protest on the forecastle. His evidence shows a
cruel captain, but not a pointlessly cruel one.
There punishments were not arbitrary. They were
part of a conflict over work. And as on many other
ships, a conflict over work meant primarily a
conflict with the topmen. They were at the heart
of the protest. The prosecutor was a topman and
Corbet himself felt that his problem was 'a cabal
of topmen'
One of the reasons for this, of course, was
that the speed and precision of the men in reefing
sails or changing tack was one of the things that
other captains could notice easily. But few of
them would notice how tightly Smith tied his reef
points. Not even Corbet could see. He had to send
the boatswain up to look.
Note that none of the punishments Smith
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recounts was a flogging. They were all startings.
These constant beatings during the course of work
were the main complaint of the witnesses at the
trial. Of course many captains did the same, if
not most. But the Nereides felt that Corbet was
doing it more than others they had served under.
And he clearly had some wrinkles all his own.
For instance, William Wiggins, the gunroom
cook, was beaten on the loins in front and as a
result pissed blood for four months afterwards.
George Scargill, a topman, testified that he had
been flogged for not being the first man off the
yard. At this point one of the judges intervened
to check what Scargill had just said. Many
captains, after all, flogged men for being last
off the yard. Scargill repeated his meaning: he
had been flogged for not being the first down.
Augustus Dundas, another topman, was warned
by Corbet that he had a cat in pickle for Dundas
because he was not the first man off the yard.
Corbet meant that the cat was waiting for him,
marinating in vinegar. This would make the wounds
produced by the cat more painful. In the event
Dundas himself was not flogged, but other men did
have pickle juice rubbed into their backs after a
flogging.
Corbet also told Dundas that he could desert
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to the Spaniards as the rest had done. Once Dundas
had been in the maintop when a clue line was let
go. No one man confessed to it, so all were
flogged 'most unmercifull y '. This perhaps explains
why his fellows identified the injured Smith to
Corbet when he made mistakes.
Corbet injured their dignity as well as their
bodies. Seaman Thomas Cumberledge found some
'dirt' (faeces) on the anchor cables. He 'went for
a swab to wipe the nuisance off, when Captain
Corbet said he would not allow anything of the
kind. ' Corbet forced Cumberledge to wipe the cable
clean with his nearly new blue waistcoat.
Cumberledge was proud of that waistcoat. Then
Corbet had Cumberledge put on the waistcoat and
then he had him started with it on. He told
Cumberledge that 'if he caught the cable in that
state again he would make me lick it off with my
tongue. I then went up to the head and threw my
waistcoat overboard.
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Judgements
The prosecutor, probably Slade, faced a
problem in bringing his case against Corbet. What
the people really hated was the starting. But this
was the most difficult grounds for conviction,
because many captains might feel sympathetic.
Corbet may have been fierce, but it was only an
extreme version of something they did regularly
themselves.
So 'Slade' also brought forth a potentially
more serious charge. He claimed that Corbet had
sold captured slaves to French merchants. This wsa
three serious offenses in one. Firstl y , the slave
trade had recently been forbidden and the Royal.
Navy was supposed to enforce the ban. Secondly
they implied that Corbet had pocketed the prize
money for the slaves without sharing it with them.
Or the admiral. Thirdly, he had been trading with
the enemy. And in addition to selling the slaves
he had sold the ships they came in.
Corbet managed a defense acceptable to the
court. He proved that at the time he sold the
slaves the order forbidding the slave trade had
not yet been officially conveyed to his fleet. He
produced witnesses to show he had kept the books
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in order. And he demonstrated that the slave ships
were not seaworthy enough to send on to the Cape.
So he had been faced with a choice. The French
merchants came out from Madagascar to offer to buy
the slaves. Either he had to sell them or forgo
the money. The court saw the force of this
practical approach.
But what did count against Corbet was the
sticks for starting. tSladet had Boatswain's Mate
Moses Veale produce them in court. They were much
larger than those normally in use in the Navy for
starting, and some of them had been sharpened.
Veale admitted that he had also made sticks of
sharpened whale bone, but said he had now lost
them.
The court acquitted Corbet of everything but
the sticks. They found:
The charge of cruelty and oppression has been
partly proved by punishment having been
inflicted on board the ship with sticks of an
improper size and such as are not usual in
H.M. service. The court do therefore adjudge
the said captain to be reprimanded.
And reprimanded he was. He remained in
command of the Nereide, of John Slade and John
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Smith and Moses Veale. The court immediately moved
on to the trial of Nesbit Willoughby, the captain
of the Otter whose arrest had inspired the
Nereides to seek redress in Cape Town.
Corbet now moved over to be a judge in
Willoughby's court martial. A succession of Otters
came forward to prove that Willoughby was not much
better than Corbet. Many times he had told his men
what a pleasure it was to him to see them
punished, and they believed him. William Lot, the
carpenter's boy, had been flogged with thirteen
dozen (156) strokes for stealing liquor. Another
boy , Connoll y , had been mericlessly flogged for
giving his grog away because he did not want it.
But here again most of the violence had been
against the topmen. (1)
Willoughby too had found his men slack in the
topes. As the Otter sailed together with the
Cherwell and the Nereide, Willoughby had been
timing his men up and down the yards, starting and
flogging them if they were not faster than the
other ships. The Otters were particularly bitter
because they knew they were never bested by other
ships. (So did the Nereides, of course.)
(1) Trial of Willoughb y , 9-14 February 1809 in
Adm. 1:5392.
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There must have been several times when the
Otter and the Nereide ran on the same tack, their
captains racing each other, their eyes on the set
of their sails and the other ship, both beating,
beating, beating.
Willoughby wsa acquitted of all charges but
advised by the court not to use such bad langauge
in future. The fleet seems to have returned to a
sort of normality. Admiral Bertie reported to the
Admiralty that he had court martialled the
mutineers, hung one man and tried two officers:
I trust the example that has taken place, and
the fair investigation by which these
Officers have been acquitted, will operate to
the perfect satisfaction of order and
subordination. (1)
There, in a nutshell, is an explanation of
the social function of law in this period. The
'example T is William Wilkinson's body. And yet. of
course the merciful pardoning of his nine
shipmates is also part of the example. This is no
simple policy of repression. The goal is the same:
(1) Bertie to Admiralt y , 1 February 1809, Adm.
1:61, Letter 38.
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perfect order and subordination. But the men will
now be given a fair chance to state their
grievances. They too will have access to the Law.
Of course it is a jury of the defendant's
peers, and justice the sailors will not have. As
Blake put it, 'One Law for the Lion and the Ox is
Oppression'. (1) But Bertie feels that justice has
been seen to have been done, and that this
matters. It is because the trials of Willoughby
and Corbet fitted so well into Bertie's strategy
that I suggested above he may have encouraged the
Nereides to bring their case. This would fit with
Bertie allowing a topman to prosecute, and with
Slade's confidence in signing the letter. But it
may have been that Bertie only took advantage of
an unexpected letter.
Aftermath
Corbet retained his command. But the real
significance of the mutiny on the Nereide was in
what happened afterwards. On It August 1809 the
Admiralty wrote to express their public
disapproval of 'the manifest want of management,
good order and discipline' in the ship. They added
(1) In the Proverbs of Hell.
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a general prohibition of starting, because it was
'unjustifiable' and 'extremely disgusting to the
feelings of the British seaman. (1)
This did not mean that starting ceased. It of
course continued on almost all ships. But the
Admiralty's letter was a public statement of an
ideal. And it was part of a larger change of line
that will be explored in the next chapter. The
letter also helped to create the Naval legend of
Corbet the monster. For the murmuring was to
follow Corbet to his death and after.
In the spring of the next year, 1810, Corbet
was appointed captain of the Africaine. Her crew
wrote a round-robin to the Admiralty refusing to
have him aboard. The Admiralty had the Menalaus
drop alongside with her guns ready to fire into
the Africaine, and the crew grudgingly accepted
their new captain. This suggests some limits to
the Admiralty's moral indignation over Corbet's
disciplinary habits.
On September 13th the Africaine went into
battle off Madagascar with the support of three
smaller ships against two French frigates. Corbet
(1) This letter is quoted in the entry on Corbet
in the Dictionary of National Biography, 1887
edition, volume 12, page 205.
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was wounded in the foot and thigh and taken below.
He died a few hours later.
The Africaine carried 295 men. She lost 163
killed or wounded, including every officer,
before, dismasted, she surrendered. Legend later
held that her men had refused to fight and stood
to be slaughtered rather than follow such a man.
Naval legend also held, variousl y , that Corbet had
been killed by his own men, or that, unable to
bear the shame of defeat, he had torn the bandage
from his foot and thus bled to death. (1)
It is impossible to tell how much credence to
give these legends. For our purposes the important
thing is the existence of these legends in the
fleet. The court martial may have left Corbet in
his command. The legend testifies to the sailors'
conviction that the mutiny on the Nereide had
been, in the largest sense, a victory, and that
they would no longer stand for men like Corbet.
In the end, they were right. The mutiny on
the Nereide was the occasion for a change in the
Admiralty's public and private response to
(1) For Corbet's later career and death, see DNB,
volume 12, pages 204-6; Lloyd, pages 250-51;
William James, Naval History of Great Britain,
London, 1859, volume 5, page 183.
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petitions. The next chapter will explore this
change in some detail.
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Chapter Fifteen: Prosecuting Officers: 1809
The court martials of Corbet and Willoughby
marked an important change in naval discipline.
Both men had been acquitted, but their trials had
become very public matters. The admiralty's
reaction signalled to other officers that
complaints from a ship's company would now be
taken much more seriousl y . There had certainly
been some court martials before when officers were
accused of murder. But now there was a sudden
increase in the number of officers tried for
cruelty. The Admiralty was responding to
petitions, and at least some admirals were
following their lead. In this chapter we will
first look at several trials from 1809 in some
detail, and then turn to a consideration o t'rie
possible causes of the changes they refelct.
The Euryalus
Fifteen days after Captain Corbet's
acquittal, the people of the Euryalus wrote to
Admiralty to complain of the cruelty of their
captain, George Dundas. It is unlikely that they
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had heard about events at the Cape, for they were
part of the North Sea fleet. But the Admiralty
sent Dundas for court martial, and it is a sign of
their changing line that they did so. (1)
The trial lasted eight days because a very
large number of sailors came forward to testify
against Dundas. The great majority were topmen.
The root of their grievance was Dundas t
 attempt to
harry his topmeri into working quickly without
mistakes.
It was a tightly run ship. Men were not
allowed to speak to each other on deck. In theory
they were forbidden to talk in the tops as well.
But the evidence shows they did: the rule was
unenforceable. Below decks there was a marine
sentry in each berth to prevent the men from
making much noise or conversing in large groups.
Dundas seems to have been of the school that held
talking was inimical to hard work. It also seems
he was frightened that the men might organize some
form of resistance below decks. And of course they
did: they wrote the petition that brought about
his court martial.
There were regular floggings. The topmen were
(1) Trial of Dundas, 9-18 March in Adm. 1:5393.
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started a good deal to punish them for making
mistakes or for denying to Dundas that they had
made a mistake. The people found these startings
unneccessaril y
 cruel. But what they most resented
was being sent aloft without proper clothes.
The Euryalus was part of the North Sea fleet,
and it was winter. It was the usual practice on
board for the first lieutenant, when giving the
order to go aloft, also to order the topmen to
take off their jackets and hats. This was done in
all weathers. Sometimes it was snowing or
sleeting, and often it was blowing hard. The men
were often on the yards for two or three hours.
They regarded it as punishment, and would go down
to their dinner afterwards 'much hurt' by the
insult. It seems that Dundas intended this
practice to emphasize his general lack of
satisfaction with their work.
On January 27th the men were upwards of two
hours on the yards in intense cold. Richard Coombe
said to the man next to him on the yard that 'he
was certain it would be the last time for him as
he had received his death by being as he termed so
long upon the yard half-naked. ' After he came down
he told another maintopman that his 'breast was so
bad he would not be able to go any more aloft. ' To
quote a paper submitted to the court martial by
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several of his shipmates, 'this unfortunate man
lingered until the 5th and then expired.'
The captains of the court faced a problem.
Clearly the behaviour of Dundas offended against
the morality and dignity of the men. At the same
time, it was not notably worse than the behaviour
of many other captains. Many of them would have
understood the necessity ot starting and flogging
men for neglect of duty. So they cleared him of
all charges of 'having inflicted severe floggings,
cruel startings and other improper treatments.'
Implicitly, they decided the startings had been
not cruel and the punishments proper. They also,
crucially, decided that Coombe had died as the
result of a long standing lung complaint. But they
did say that Dundas should not have struck William
Stephenson with a spyglass, though they recognized
that Stephenson had provoked him.
The morality of the forecstle had confronted
the morality of the captain's cabin and lost. This
was to be the common, but not invariable, pattern
in such cruelty trials. And an acquittal by the
court martial did not leave an officer's career in
shreds. Dundas continued to serve, as did Corbet
and Willoughby. The Admiralty respected their own
legal system in a way that would be most unusual
in a modern bureaucracy. If the court said a man
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was innocent, he was innocent, and the Admiralty
did not punish him. In every case I have followed
up, if the court said a man should be dismissed,
he was. If the court acquitted him, he kept his
job and it did not count against him afterwards.
Thus even Corbet, of whom the Admiralty clearly
disapproved, obtained further commands after he
left the Nereide.
Does this mean that such court martials were
a sham because captains were judging capt rs? Tc3
a certain extent, yes. But we should not
underestimate the importance of theatre in the
class struggle in this period. The Euralyuses were
able to organize prosecution publicly and many of
them had the courage to come forward and testify.
This meant something: they were now able to make a
public statement of their morality. They could
stand like men and challenge their captain. And no
captain was likely to relish such a ritual and
public challenge.
Other Cases in 1809
Moreover, sometimes the officer was
convicted. It is likely that Lieut. William
Richards of the sloop Dart would have escaped
trouble if it had not been for the Admiralty's
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change of line. His offense occurred on 26
November 1808, but he was not tried until eight
months later, six months after Corbet's trial.
He was accused of causing the death of
William Robinson, a supernumerary (probably a
seaman), on the Pompee. Robinson had been drunk
one morning and Richards ordered him put into
irons. Robinson later asked loudly to be allowed
to go to the head and relieve himself. Richards
refused and had the drunken man gagged. Then he
walked away, leaving the man without a sentry.
Robinson choked to death on his own.
The other Pompess insisted that the body be
taken to hospital for a post mortem, but the
corpse was spirited away by boat.
And there the matter rested for eight months,
until Richards was finally brought to trial. As in
many cruelty cases, the court split the
difference. They found him innocent of causing the
man's death. But they ruled that he should be
dismised the service because he had not provided a
sentry over Robinson and had dumped the body at
sea without even the formality of a prayer. (1)
It is clear that the new policy was having an
(1) Trial of Richards on 18 July 1809 in Adm.
I : 5397.
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effect on the seamen. The people of the Doterel
sioop, for instance, seriousl y considered refusing
to take down their hammocks in protest at Captain
Thomas Muston's brutalit y . But some of them argued
that a letter would bring redress. Forty six of
them jned a letter to the Admiralty. This
indicates a level of confidence in not being
victimized not ceen since 1798. They did in fact
obtain a trial. A long string of witnesses
testified to 6o lashes on the bare breech for
talking in church, 60 lashes for having a dirty
shirt, and much more. Such punishments were
unusual, and the court found the charges proved in
part. Muston was dismissed from command of the
sloop, but not from the service. (1)
Officers also began charging each other with
offenses against the men in cases which were
essentially arguments between the officers
themselves. Lieut. Fredrick Parker of the Bombay,
for instance, court martialled his captain on
series of charges in 1809. One of them was
Scandalous, infamous and unofficerlike
conduct in ordering a quantity of the
(1) Trial of Muaton on 21=23 September 1809 in
Adm. 1:5399.
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composition made from oatmeal and water,
commonly called Skillagolee or Burgoo, to be
taken every morning from the Ship's Company's
Breakfast, for his pigs, before the Ships
Company had theirs served, thereby causing a
murmuring and discontent among the ship's
company, by feeding the very Brutes before
the Crew entrusted to his care and protection
by the Lords of the Admiralty. (1)
And there is the case of the Honourable
Captain Lake of the Ulysses. He was court
martialled by his first lieutenant in September
1809. Lieut. Young alleged that Lake did not
support his officers and allowed them to be
'treated with greatest disrespect, insolence and
contempt by the inferior officers and men. ' He
often refused to punish men after his officers had
taken their names or put them in irons. When the
crew of the gig complained about Young, Lake had
the lieutenant put under arrest and gave the gig's
crew the night off duty, presumably to en.ioy the
lieutenant's humiliation. Finally he sent Young
(1) Parker to Collingwood, 20 May 1809, enclosed
in trial of Captain Cuming, 7 June 1809, in Adm.
1 5397.
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to work in the flat boats instead of doing duty as
first lieutenant. This lead the petty officers in
the cockpit, always a riotous place under Lake, to
say they were glad of it and hoped never to see
Young again.
The court acquitted Lake of not supporting
his officers, but did note a a want of correctness
'in not sticking to the established rules of the
service.' They also found in part that he had
lowered Young in the eyes of the men. For this
they admonished Lake. (1)
But soon afterwards Lake was on trial for
cruelty. The disgruntled purser who turned him in
insisted to the Admiralty that he had never met
Lake but was only passing on a rumour that was
commonly known throughout the West Indies.
However, it is not beyond possibility that Young
and the other officers had a hand in encouraging
the purser.
The purser accused Lake of marooning. On 13
December 1807 Lake had been in command of the
Recruit off Sombrero Island in the West Indies,
about five or six leagues from Dog and Prickly
Pear Island. Standing on the deck and looking at
(1) Trial of Lake, 28-29 September 1809 in Adm.
1 5399.
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Sombrero Island, Lake remarked to the master that
they had some thieves on board. The master agreed.
Lake ordered one of them, Robert Jeffrey, be rowed
ashore and left on the island. Sombrero was a
'desert island' nobody lived there.
This punishment was not provided for in the
Articles of War, and the news spread around the
West Indies. It was over a year and half, though,
before anybody told the Admiralty. When they found
out, they wrote to his mother. She replied that
she was very worried, the boy had always been good
during his apprenticeship as a blacksmith, and he
was two days short of his eighteenth birthday on
the day he was marooned. The Admiralty launched a
search, and Jeffrey came forward to say that he
had been rescued by an American merchant ship
after some weeks alone. The court martial
dismissed Lake from the service. (1)
The Admiralty was also taking complaints
seriously even in cases where there was no
suggestion that somebody had been killed. John
South wrote to the Admiralty from his bed in
Greenwich Hospital, where he was not a pensioner.
(1) Trial of Lake on 45-6 February 1810 in Adm.
1:5402, and the large number of letters attatched.
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He accused Lieut. Westropp of the Surveillante of
cruelty. Westropp had had South beaten on the
quarterdeck with a rope's end for misunderstanding
an order. Then he was sent forward for work. But
when Westropp's back was turned South tried to
sneak below to get a pair of shoes. So Jestropp
had him rope's ended on the forecastle.
At the trial the captain said that on both
occasions the smalles t available rope was used.
After the beating South could not use his left
arm. The surgeon testified that he had advised
South to exercise his arm lightly, and South had
ignored his advice. The captain, in his evidence,
was not prepared to say whether or not South had
willed his arm to stop working like 'certain
devotees of the East', but he had no doubt that
South had gone to no trouble to preserve the use
of his arm. South had eventually been invalided
out to Greenwich Hospital.
The court acquitted Westropp. (1) The
surgeon's evidence was important in these cases,
and the surgeon supported the accused officer in
the great majority of cses. After all, he was an
officer himself. He had to live in the wardroom,
not the forecastle. On the Cambrian in 1809, both
(1) Trial of Westropp, 23 August 1809 in Adm.
1 5399.
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the surgeon and his assistant appear to have lied
to save a lieutenant's career.
Lieut. Connolly had ordered the rope's ending
of George Hollingsworth for not getting his
hammock down from the riggging in time. He also
had a record of bad conduct and drunkenness,
Connolly said, which he had previously tried to
overlook. Witness disagreed about the severity of
the beating. The best witness was Robert Wise, the
boatswain's mate who gave Hollingsworth the
beating. He was clearly troubled afterwards. He
said thet he beat the man first with the Top
Gallant Clueline and then with the 'lard Tackle
Tricing Line, both about two inches thick. The
beating lasted about eight or nine minutes. He was
asked if the punishment was 'such as to cause his
death.' He replied, 'I do not know, but it was as
severe a starting as I ever gave a man in my
life. ' He left Hollingsworth on the quarterdeck
leaning against a carronade.
A friend helped Hollingsworth to his hammock.
He stayed there until his death eleven days later.
At the trial the assistant surgeon stated that he
had examined Hollingsworth after the beating but
that he had never looked at his back. Both he and
the surgeon said that the man had died of a long
standing 'internal complaint' exacerbated by
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drinking. The man's messmates were very clear in
their evidence that they had never heard of this
complaint. They had heard the assistant surgeon
say, right after Hollirigsworth died, that there
were suspicious marks on the body.
The court acquitted Lieut. Connolly. But
afterwards Admiral Collingwood did write a letter
to Captain Fane pointing out that under
regulations the first lieutenant was not supposed
to have regular authority to punish in the
captain's absence, and that in future Connolly
should not have such authorization. (1)
Changing Rules
It is clear that from 1809 onwards the
Admiralty was changing the rules of the game. This
left many serving officers unsrure where they
stood. It also left the court martial captains
unsure. Take the case of Thomas Simmonds,
midshipman of the Orion in 1810.
Simmonds had a servant named Edward Cooper.
Carried on the books as a boy, Cooper was in fact
It) Tri1.	 ConnolLy on tO April 1809 in Adra.
1:5395. I have lost the reference for
Collingwood's letter.
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a young man with a beard. One night when the ship
was at anchor Simmonds went looking for his
servant. He found Cooper on the deck and ordered
him below. As Cooper was going down the stairway
Simmonds hit him several times with a rope's end.
Cooper turned to say something, perhaps to
protest. Simmonds slugged him onto all fours.
Several minutes later Cooper's friend Patrick
Murphy saw him coming out of his berth. Cooper
said goodbye to Murphy, who assumed he was going
to his beer. Cooper passed Hugh King crying and
said, 'He'll never thrash me again, for I will
jump overboard.
Thomas Molloy was in the head when Cooper
came in. Something in Cooper's manner alerted him,
for he leapt to stop the boy but Cooper managed to
swing out and jump. He may have been trying to
swim ashore, but nobody had ever seen him swim and
the ship's boat found no trace.
Simmonds was tried for causing Cooper's
death. His defense was interesting. He submitted
it in writing. He began:
With all possible duty and respect I beg
leave to express that my feelings are
distressed and awakened beyond measure, at
the nature of the charge exhibited against
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me- that I should be pointed at as the young
sea officer who was tried for beating a man,
till he jumped overboard is of itself
punishment, before judgement... (1)
This is an important point, and it is echoed
in the defense statement of many officers in this
period. Even when an officer was acquitted in the
face of strong evidence, the trial was not simply
a sham. The defendant did not escape scot-free. In
addition to the ritual humiliation of arrest,
there was the finger of public suspicion. For
years afterwards the older hands could point out
an acquitted officer: 'There goes the man who. .
And as he trod the deck of each new ship, he would
be followed by a murmuring so low no one man could
be accused. This was the fate of Bligh and Corbet,
and in a smaller way it could be Sirnnionds' fate
too.
Of course, this does not mean we are dealing
here with a fair legal system. Disgrace and death
are not equivalent penalties. Officers were almost
never tried for murder, even when they delivered
the blow that led to a man's death. The charge was
usually something like 'causing death'. Even in
(1) Trials of Simmonds on 12 March 1810 and 28
March 1810, both in Adm. 1:5403.
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the one exceptional case, where Lieut. Griffon of
the Griffon was convicted of murder after running
through Sgt. John Lake of the marines for
disobeying an order, the court still recommended
him for mercy because of his previous good
character. (1) But if Cooper had returned the
midshipman's blow even once, he would have hanged
for it.
Of course, the evidence did not not show that
Simmonds had used unusual force on Cooper. He also
tried to prove that Cooper had been drunk when he
jumped from the head. All his shipmates would
admit was that the young man had been 'a little
hearty'. Simmonds' problem was that the written
rules of the service did not allow a midshipman to
punish a man. He should call a boatswain's mate to
do it. But as Simmonds wrote in his defense:
If I have erred, I am truly sorry for it, and
humbly submit to the wisdom, experience and
penetration of the Court, whether anything
premeditated took place on my part, and
whether from your youth, it has not been a
very general rule, or custom, in the Service
for a midshipman to start his servant, with
-------------------------------------
(1) Trial of Griffon on 27 October 1812 in Adm.
1 : 5430.
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a rope's end, when he has considered him
disobedient or neglectful; and if complaining
to a Captain in such a case would not be
construed into teazing, or importuning him.
Simmonds was right, of course. The five
captains sitting in judgement on him would all
have beaten boys in their time. As captains, if
they did not laugh at a midshipman who complained
of his servant, they would at the least judge him
not to be a future leader of men.
So the officers faced a problem. The official
rules were changing. Or rather, the Admiralty were
insisting on observance of the written rules. But
the custom of the service and the necessities of
discipline were not changing. What they had done
as boys and now tolerated in their own midshipmen,
they were now required to judge harshly when its
worst consequences appeared.
They must also have reflected that even an
emotional boy is unlikely to throw himself
overboard after one beating. All the evidence
suggest that violence was a customary part of the
relationship between the two boys and that one
night Cooper cracked.
So the court delivered a compromise verdict.
They said that Cooper threw himself overboard
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because he was drunk and it was not Simrnonds'
fault. But they convicted him on the technicality
of beating Cooper himself 'contrary to the rules
of the service', and they dismissed him from the
service.
Lieut. John Root of the Peruvian provides
another case of confusion about rules for
discipline. He was court martialled in December
1809 upon the complaint of Charles Saltrnarsh, a
young landsman scarcely older than a boy.
Saltinarsh had been the captain's servant, but was
convicted of stealing his master's rum and moved
to be galley cook. Lieut. Root frequently had
cause to complain of Saltmarsh's uncleanliness,
both in the galley and about his person. One day
he finally told Saltmarsh the galley was 'not half
cleaned' and called him a 'damned dirty son of a
bitch'. He had Saltmarsh tied over a gun and
flogged 'as a boy': that is, with a cat of six
tails. The boatswain's mate delivered a dozen
strokes and ten boys six each: a total of six
dozen.
Saltmarsh wrote Lord Mulgrave. At the trial
the evidence of Captain Douglas was crucial. He
said that he had not given Root permission to
punish during his absence on shore, and that Root
had not informed him or entered the punishment in
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the log. This was important, for this was not just
a starting, it was a flogging. Nor had Root asked
the surgeon to be present.
In his written defense Root began by fully
acknowledging the 'impropriety' of the punishment.
But: ' I beg leave to call the attention of the
court to the task of the executive officer
endeavouring to do his duty. . . ' Saltmarsh had been
dirty and had not listened at all. And:
it is now for me to appeal to the feelings of
members, now arrived at a distinguished rank
who no doubt have served in the same capacity
as I do, whether or not it was frequently
necessary to inflict temporary punishment and
tho I am now fully convinced of the
irregularity, might say, I have frequently
seen put into practice since I have been in
His Majesty's Service. (1)
The court took the point. Again they
delivered a compromise verdict. They found the
charge proved and sentenced him to be dismissed
the service. But in view of the very good
oharater given by his aaptain and of his fifteen
(1) Trial of Root on 30 December 1809 in Adrn.
1 : 5400.
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years of zealous service, they begged the mercy of
the Admiralty for his. This would have been
forthcoming.
Analys is
After 1809 there were many more trials of
officers for cruelty. (1) In the next chapter we
(1) Among others, the trials of Lieut. Fynmore of
the marines on 16-19 July 1810 in Adm. 1:5407; of
Captain Scobell of the Verniera on 7 July 1810 and
Surgeon Hamilton of the same on 12 July 1810, both
in Adin. 1:5407; of William Murray, Master's Mate
of the Ardent on 8 August 1810 in Adm. 1:5408; of
Lieut. Cart' on 6 December 1810 in Adm. 1:5408; of
Captain Watts on 3 january 1811 in Adm. 1:5412; of
Lieut. Keiley on 30 April 1811 in Adrn. 1:5415; of
Thomas Bourne, Master's Mate on 29 July 1811, and
of Hornsby, a Master's Mate on 2 August 1811, both
in Adm. 1:5417; of Lieut. Grove on 6 June 1811 and
Lieut. Harvey on 17 June 1811, both in Adm.
1:5416; of the Lieutenant and Surgeon of the
Hearty on 12 December 1811 in Adm. 1:5421; of
Nahor Edward Nicholls of the marines on 6 April
1812 in Adin. 1:5425; of the Boatswain of the Fawn
on 19 May 1812 in Adm. 1:5426; of Lieut. Pritchard
of the Dersent on 20 October 1812 in Adm. 1:5430;
of Lieut. Scott of the Gladiator on 20 December
1812 in Adm. 1:5433; and of Lieut. Burgess of the
Pincher on 7 June 1813 in Adm. 1:5346.
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will deal with four cases that illustrate
particular points. But first we must pause to ask
what were the causes of all these cruelty trials.
True, there had been such trials before. But there
were nothing like as many of them, they were
almost all caused by the actual death of a seaman,
and even those trials were rare.
The cruelty trials in these years usually,
but not always, acquitted the defendant. Does this
mean that reformers at the Admiratly were forcing
unwilling captains to change their ways? I think
not, for several reasons.
Firstly, there is no significant change of
personnel at the Admniralty in this period. Nor
was there a change in the Ministry in 1809. There
was a political attack on punishment in the Army
led by Cobbet and Burdett, but it came after the
Admiralty t s change of line, not before.
Most important of all, serving captains
formed an essential link in the process of
charging an officer. When an Admiral received a
petition from a ship's company, he could choose to
ignore it. If he chose to respond, he did not
inquire into the matter himself. When a court
martial was a possibility, the correct procedure
was to send two or more captains from other ships
to investigate the charges.
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From 1809 onwards some of these visiting
captains began recommending a court martial. They
usually said that they had taken evidence from
several of the people and that there appeared to
be a case to answer. The crucial thing, though,
must have been how they behaved towards the people
when they came on board. They could begin by being
extremely friendly with the captain. Of they could
call the people together and address them, asking
for evidence to back up the charges.
In the latter case, everything would depend
upon their manner. Sailors were not fools, and the
judgement of officers' true intentions was one of
the skills of the trade. In some cases the man who
spoke out would find himself prosecuted to writing
the letter. In others the visiting captains would
listen carefully, take notes and report back
honestly. In 1800 many crews were willing to write
letters, but individuals were not willing to step
forward. In 1810 many were, and this must have
been because the visiting captains wanted them to
do so. Of course, it is probably than many
visiting captains still discouraged witnesses. It
is in the nature of the records that we only
encounter the cases where captains said there was
a case to answer. So the most we can be sure of is
that some captains now wanted their peers tried
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for cruelty.
Moreover, it was the captains who actually
composed the court martial. On some level they
themselves had to consent to the changes in
discipline. Of course, their consent was only
partial, and some may not have consented at all.
For in addition to whatever solidarity they felt
with other officers, there was a real structural
problem. Officers called it 'the necessities of
the service'. This was not simply a cant phrase. I
have already argued that naval discipline grew out
of the process of work on board. Labour that was
press ganged, underpaid and denied shore liberty
was unwilling and hostile labour. Unlike an
employer on shore, the officers could not threaten
a man with the sack. Unlike army officers on
shore, they could not call for other troops to put
down revolt. Often there was no other ship in
sight, and the men heavily outnumbered the
officers. Men would not work as hard if they were
not beaten. After all, why should they? And the
whole panoply of punishment and theatre was
neccessary to make the control of the officers
seem natural and invulnerable. Remember, we are
not dealing with some invariant feature of a
brutal age. Merchantmen during the wars had
lighter discipline. There men were paid more and
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unhappy crews could leave at the end of the
voyage. It is significant that when captains
debated the question of discipline in print in
this period, they did so almost wholly in terms of
schemes for the abolition of impressment.
After 1808 we see the courts wrestling with
the same problem again and again. How do we
satisfy the complaints of the people and yet
maintain the customary discipline and control in
the fleet? This was not an easy problem to solve,
because the contradiction was structural.
But why were the captains themselves
wrestling with this problem in 1809, when they had
not in 1798? There is no way of knowing for sure.
It is clear that the problem of controlling the
work force was a key concern for all captains at
most times. Yet it was not a problem that was
openly debated. They did not argue about it in
print directly, nor does it surface often in their
letters. Individual captains who got into serious
trouble might be labelled as weakling3 or sadists,
but even this was largely a matter of gossip
rather than print. The question of control was
taboo. This taboo was part of the ideological
control of the officers as a class. Radicals read
book and newspapers. So did seamen. If officers
began discussing the matter where seamen could
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overhear them, their control was threatened. There
was no place on a ship where officers would not be
overheard by at least one servant. Perhaps the
only truly private forum was the discussion among
the judges at a court martial. Of this, of course,
we have no record.
So there is remarkably little direct evidence
outside of the court martial records themselves.
There one can see the change in line, both in the
frequency of cruelty trials and in the way courts
asked questions and rendered verdicts. But to
understand why so many captains seemed to be of a
different mind by 1810, we are thrown back upon
specu 1 at ion.
That said, I think there are three factors
which can account for the change. The first is
that the captains of 1810 were, on the whole, not
the captains of 1797. They were the midshipmen and
lieutenants of 1797. They had lived through the
mutinies of that year as relatively junior
officers, somewhat closer to the men. As far as
one can tell from remarks in later memoirs, their
collective retrospective judgement was that the
men had been justified in many of their grievances
but too forward in their methods. In any case,
they had seen the potential power of the crews.
By 1809 they had also lived through up to
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sixteen years of war. The problems of control in
those years had been more severe than the Navy had
ever faced before. Men were compelled to serve for
longer. They were more influenced by revolutionary
politics, and the trade union movement ashore was
stronger. Moreover, mutiny had been a sporadic but
continuous reality throughout these years. And
there must have been many more demonstrations that
never surfaced in court martial records. All these
factors must have slowly combined to change the
general climate of opinion among the officer
class. In a sense, there had been enough unrest
for long enough for commanders to begin to decided
that grievances ought at least to be seen to be
met, even if they were not always redressed.
And by 1809 there were two political facts of
considerable importance that may have made reform
easier. The first was that the years from 1804
until 1810 were the absolute bottom point for
revolutionaries and working class activists in
Britain and Ireland. The class struggle on shore
was at a low ebb and the remnants of the United
Irishmen had been smashed in 1803. The Luddites
were not yet active. A judicious reform, mostly by
a nod and a wink, did not carry with it any risk
of revolution, or even of encouraging lesser class
conflagration on shore. In 1797 it had been
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necessary to claw back control of the fleet after
the Spithead mutiny in order to control Britain
and Ireland. In 1809 it was not.
The second political fact was Trafalgar. The
Royal Navy now did not have to worry about control
of the sea. A mutiny in the Mediterranean was no
longer a strategic threat: a French invasion of
Ireland wsa no longer a nightmare result of a
mutiny in the Channel Fleet. The reins could be
relaxed.
Of course, neither of these political facts
were part of the conscious motivations of most
captains, if any. Rather, they formed part of the
background facts which set historical limits to
what men in certain positions are likely to think.
Let us summarize. There was a gradual shift
in the attitudes of many officers after 1800.
Because it was gradual, and because it was not
publicly discussed, it was only partly conscious.
After the Nereide mutiny it seemed that new
signals were coming from the Admiralty. This
enabled the gradual shift in attitudes to
crystallize into a rapid shift in behaviour.
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Chapter Sixteen: Reform and Repression:
1810-1816.
There was a real change in 1809. But it
should not be exaggerated. There was no
revolution. Nor was there a public and permanent
break with the old ways. There was a quiet and
partial reform. More ship's companies found their
petitions answered and more officers were
prosecuted for cruelty. But the majority of heavy
floggers never faced a court martial, and most of
those who did were acquitted. In many ways the
Navy continued to observe the customs of the
Service. Most of the accounts of cruel punishment
I have quoted above, such as those of Leech and
Hodgskin, belong to the years after 1808. And if
there had been a pause in mutiny court martials in
1806 and 1807, from 1808 onwrds there seems to
have been a revival in the struggle.
tinies and Demonstrations
tiQ9 bigan with the mutiny on the Nereide.
Then in August there was an attempted mutiny on
the sloop Columbine off the American coast. For
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days the Columbines debated secretly below decks
whether or not to take the ship, run her onto the
American shore and desert. It was not a plan to
desert to the enemy. They were not then at war
with America, and many British seamen did run in
America. But the Columbines were unable to agree
on whether or not to mutiny, and one of them
informed. The court martial took a serious view of
their plans. One French prisoner, two seamen and
one marine were sentenced to be hanged and then to
be hung in chains 'in such conspicuous places as
the Commander in Chief shall direct'. The
boatswain, another French prisoner and a marine
were sentenced to simple hanging. The carpenter
was banished for life and sentenced to fourteen
years in irons. The cook wsa banished for fourteen
years with seven years in irons. Two men 500
lashes and seven years in irons, three got 300
lashes and seven years. One man got away with only
500 lashes, four with 300, two with 200 and one
with 150. There were few reformers sitting on that
court. (1)
On the Bulwark in 1809 the marines were
making a row in their berth in protest about being
reported for punishment. The sergeant told them
(1) Trial of William Coates and others, 6-12
September 1809 in Adm. 1:5399.
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them to stop it and Frederick Becker and William
Hemingway talked back. The sergeant said he would
report them and Becker said they should all go up.
They rushed up together in an unruly fashion. They
fell in before the captain, but protesting noisily
as they did so. Becker was sentenced to death and
Hemingway to 100 lashes. (1)
In 1810 the petty officers of the frigate
Naiad, who had been a long time together,
organized, on behalf of the ship's company, a
letter to the Admiralty. They complained about
Captain Hill: his cruelty, the extra polishing
work, and the five waters grog in winter without
lemon or sugar to make it drinkable. The Admiralty
did not reply so they wrote again, and this time
they threatened not to go to sea under Hill.
They learned that Admiral Buller was to come
aboard in response. They hoped he would redress
their grievances. They wanted to be drafted into
another ship. Two days before Buller was to come,
the organizers met secretly in the Carnatic hulk,
moored next to the Naiad. Almost all the petty
officers were present, and they agreed that if
called into the cabin and asked they would say
(1) Trials of Becker, 26 June 1809, and of
Hemingway, same date, both in Adrn. 1:5397.
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they wanted to be drafted. On the day Buller came
aboard twenty or thirty of them tried to come aft
to speak to him, but the first lieutenant shooed
them away. Eight of them were tried for mutinous
assembly: the meeting in the hulk. Three were
sentenced to death. (1)
On the Latona in 1810 Antonio Miller, an
impressed German landeman, was sentenced to 500
lashes for talking about mutiny over cards with
some French prisoners. (2) There was a riotous
demonstration on the Bellerephon in 1810, (3) on
the Diana in 1811 (4) and on the Ulysses in 1812.
(5) In 1812 Captain Douglas came on board the
Polyphemus and read out his commission to the
ship's company. They cried otu 'No! No!' and went
below. (6) And in 1813 the ship's company of the
(1) Trial of John Campbell and others, 26-27 March
1810, in Adm. 1:5403.
(2) Trial of Miller on 12 October 1810 in Adm.
1:5403. For a similar case see the trial of John
Peter and others from Gun Boat No. 2 on 12
February 1811 in Adm. 1:5413.
(3) Trial of five men on 18 December 1810 in Adm.
1:5411.
(4) Trial of three marines on 16-17 october in
Adm. 1:5419.
() Tvil of 0
	
cember 1812 in Adm. 15423.
() Ti1 of 17
	
b.'uy 1812 in Mm. 15423.
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Resistance invaded the quarterdeck. They attempted
to take control of the ship. They planned to
replace their captain, Fleetwood Pellew, with the
second lieutenant. They would then take ship
peaceably to join the rest of the Mediterranean
fleet. But they failed to take the ship, and four
of them were hanged. (1)
Letters
None of these collective actions were that
different in kind from what had gone before. But
notice how often the 'mutiny' is in fact a case of
men being punished for attempting to redress their
grievances. This was true of the Naiads meeting on
the hulk and the Resistances trying to get back to
their admiral. After 1809 some ships at least were
having their grievances listened to. But some were
also being savagely punished for trying to get
somebody to listen. This indicates both that
people thought redress was possible, and that they
were sometimes mistaken.
During these years some men were also still
being prosecuted for writing letters. On the
(1.)	 c1	 t3Vtfl 1fllfl kfl	 My	 AcIn,
1 :5437.
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Dannemark in 1811 William Coombes was acquitted of
writing a letter. (1) On the Fawn one man was
tried for writing an improper letter in December
1811, but five months later the Fawns did manage
to get the boatswain court martialled for striking
a man contrary to his captain's orders. (2) On the
gun brig Martial five men were tried in 1812 for
writing a letter complaining about provisions, and
one was sentenced to 200 lashes. (3)
Of course, the officers had always implicitly
acknowledged the people's right to send letters,
even if they objected to the actual letters sent
as improper. But it does appear that people were
now becoming more confident of their right. This
can be seen from the case of the cutter Dwarf in
1813.
The Dwarves were angry with their commander,
Lieut. Samuel Gordon, and with the acting master
of the ship. John Denton, a marine, began
organizing the men to send a letter to complain to
to the Lords of the Admiralty about their harsh
(1) Trial of Coonibes on 8 October 1811 in Adm.
1:5419.
(2) Trials of 9 December 1811 in Adm. 1:5421 and
19 My 1812 in Adm. i!5426.
(	 TriaL of 9 July 1812 in Adin. 1:5428. See aleo
trial of Dujaidin on 2 June 1812 in Adm. 1:5427.
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and bad treatment and the 'unwholesomeness of the
provisions'
Denton could not read, so the people
approached Arthur Johnstone, who was known to be
able to write well, to write the letter.
Johnstone's rank was ordinary seaman. He was
probably a landsrnan rather than a man born to the
sea. He was at first most reluctant, but Denton
collected the names of 28 or 29 men who supported
the petition. On a cutter this would have been a
sizeable proportion of the ship's company. Denton
got them all to sign a piece of paper to show
their support. Many petty officers put their names
forward; the quartermaster's signature was first
on the list. Johnstone enquired of the petty
officers if they really supported the letter. They
said they did, and so he wrote it.
Donald McClellan, a seaman, later testified:
I came down the main ladder and was going
forward. There were several people laughing.
I said, 'What is the fun?' (Denton) came to
men and asked if I wished to have my name
down for a new ship.
McClellan said he was not in favour of injuyt to
officers, and Denton reassured him on this point.
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So McClellan agreed that if it was done in a
reasonable manner his name could be put to it. The
ship's company clearly thought they would get a
new ship.
They sent off the letter unsigned. The list
of signatures had been collected not for the
officers but to reveal to the Dwarves themselves
their solidarity and seriousness of purpose. This
was common on other ships. It had been part of the
sailor's tradition for at least sixty years. (1)
Even when men were planning to take the ship they
often collected lists of signatures. In a partly
literate society, of course, signing your name
counted for something. For few sailors was it an
everyday act. But more important, if men planned
mutiny they had to know that they stood together
before they began. Otherwise they would be easily
broken. A man who would not put his name to a list
was a man who could not be counted on at the
crunch. In any such confrontation, the oppressed
only stand together if they believe that their
fellows are resolute enough to stand with them.
Otherwise they break and run. The list of
signatures stiffened the mutineers. And it could
(1) See Rediker, pages 234-36.
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be used by the organizers to demonstrate to the
waverers the support they had.
When the Admiralty received the letter from
the Dwarf they sent a Captain White to enquire
into the allegations. He came on board and asked
who wrote the letter. Johnstone said he did.
Captain Gordon had him court martialled. (1) His
defence was that he did not organize the writing
of the letter: John Denton did.
The notable thing about Johnstone's trial was
that Johnstone was not informing on Denton. The
Dwarves had clearly made a collective decision to
stand by their letter. One witness after another
freely admitted that he had put his name forward
and encouraged Johristone to write the list. All
agreed that John Denton had organized the letter.
Denton freely testified to the same effect.
The first witness, for instance, was John
Jones, the boatswain's mate. The questioning
started:
Q. Do you know anything of a petition from
the crew of the Dwarf which was sent to the
Admiralty?
(1) Trial of Johnstone on 8 March 1813 in Adm.
1: 5435.
fl/Li
A. Yes.
Q. Do you know who wrote it?
A. Yes. Arthur Johnstone.
Q. Did you, or any of the cutter's crew
desire him to write it?
A. Yes. I did.
Q. Did you propose to the Prisoner that he
should write the petition, or did he propose
it to you?
A. I proposed it to the Prisoner.
Q. Why?
A. I thought him more capable of doing it
than any other as he was considered a
Scholar.
Jones and the others were clearly asserting
their right to sent the letter. The court found
the charge proved in part but decided that because
Johnstone had not led the others on, he should
only recieve three dozen lashes.
Captain Gordon could have awarded that
punishment himself. Hemight have let the matter
rest there. He did not. Nineteen days later John
Denton went for trial for organizing the letter.
The testimony was much as before, with the Dwarves
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again clearly asserting their right to write
letters. This time Denton ws sentenced to 150
lashes. (1) By 1813 these sailors were feeling
confident of their right to redress, but this did
not mean they were going to recieve it. The same
court that awarded a minor punishment to Johnstone
could award a severe one to Denton. This
ambivalence in court martial captains was also
found in many of the cruelty trials after 1809. We
turn now to a few examples.
Ganymedes and Sylvias
The changes were partial and limited, but
real. So court martial judgements could be full of
contradictions. Sometimes the court both acquitted
an officer and told him not to do it again. In
1811, for instance, the Ganymedes wrote to
complain about Captain Preston and the officers.
As the men came up on deck for duty, the boatswain
and his mates were always waiting by the hatchways
to beat them with rope's ends and broomsticks as
they passed. Men who cried out while being beaten
were taken aft and flogged with three or four
(1) Trial of Denton on 27 March 1813 in Adm.
1 :5435.
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dozen. They also complained of the captain's
langauge. He abused them as 'you sodoms' and 'you
godamns', while the boatswain's mate was flogging
them. This was literally adding insult to injury.
The court martial ruled that the
Charges of cruelty, tyranny and oppression.
have not been proved. . .and. . .Captain Preston
is hereby acquitted accordingly, but the
Court however cannot help feeling it their
duty to express their sense of the
irregularity of punishment in many instances
on board the Ganymede, and strongly recommend
to Captain Preston a future change of conduct
in that respect. (1)
Such a verdict did not supply the Ganymedes with
the change of officers they had requested, but it
did vindicate their case. Captain Preston probably
heeded the advice.
Officers were sometimes convicted of cruelty
where a man had died, but convictions were simple
brutality were hard to obtain. There were
exceptions.
T.'iL c,f Preston on 17-23 Ootober 1811 in Adm.
1:5419.
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In 1811 the crew of the cutter Sylvia wrote
to the admiral at the Cape about their commander,
Lieut. Crawford. Again it was punishments they
complained of, but Crawford had gone further than
the Admiralty allowed. Starting and flogging by
the boatswain T s mates was one thing. But Crawford
himself was a hitter. He beat a helmsman while the
man was steering the ship. He hit a man so hard he
knocked him over a gun. He also had men taken to
his cabin. There he would kick them and hit them
until they fell down, and then he jumped on them.
The crew also complained of his language. He did
not call them by their individual names, but
instead used general terms of address like 'pig'
and 'animal'.
The ship's company signed their letter in a
round robin, a sign of their confidence in the
admiral. He in fact talked to Crawford privately
and admonished him to behave more gently. At the
same time he allowed the crew to learn the gist of
this private conversation. They all agreed that
from then onwards Crawford was no longer
oppressive. One assumes that such informal
settlements must have been much more common than
full scale court niartials.
But we know of this informal settlement
because the Sylvias were not satisfied. They still
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wanted Crawford removed. The admiral sent ship and
captain back to Spithead for court martial. There
the Admiralty removed Crawford from command. He
later wrote he was
given to understand (although not officially)
that until my character was freed from the
unfavourable effect of the imputations thus
cast upon me by the seamen there could be no
hope of my ever again being honoured with
employment in the service. (1)
The court seems to have taken their cue from
the Admiralty. They found the charges proved in
part, but in view of the fact that he had already
been removed from command, they did not dismiss
him from the service. They did severely reprimand
and admonish him and took away one year's
seniority. The punishment was symbolic, but it
must have meant the end of his career. The
grievances of the Sylvias had been redressed.
Most captains tried for cruelty, however,
were still acquitted. Crawford was unusual in
hi	 t'4I- cr
1.i4 .fl At4rn,	 Hi.0 n4
Curtis, 12 August 1811, enclosed in the
transcript.
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that he punished himself, and this destroyed the
whole theatre of repression. The case of the
Nemesis is more typical. The ship's company wrote
to their admiral to complain 'under the command of
Captain Feris...the usage we are met with is very
severe and more than we can bare' . They also
complained that their first lieutenant had
murdered a boy, and they added a threat:
To prevent any unbecoming behaviour of this
Ship's Company we the old Nemeses have
thought this is the prudentest way to make
our grievance known to your Goodness hoping
you will order us better usage until we get
to England as your Honor's interference may
hinder some mischief if our present usage
continue,- Honord Sir, believe us we are so
disenheartened with our usuge that we cann
not go to our Duty like British Seamen. (1)
The letters writers may indeed may been loyal
old Jack Tars trying to restrain the young
hotheads, or this pose may have been a bit of a
Ct)	 hi.p''	 pny t	 I'(n1y, t9
	 rnb' tU9, in
cf Thm	 Hkir, 7	 b'i-vy ti1U, Adm,
1:5402. See also trial of Ferris, 5-7 February
1810, Adm. 1:5402.
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ploy, or both. In any case, the threat worked.
Admiral Dixon ordered court martials on both
Ferris and First Lieutenant, Thomas Hodgskin. The
latter, of course, is the political economist and
defended or the claims of labour whose work on
naval discipline I have freely quoted above.
The first court martial cleared Ferris. It
was clear that he had been a regular flogger. He
is doubtless the captain Hodgskin later remembered
as flogging twenty-six men for not cleaning their
hammocks properly. At one point he had
twenty-eicht topmen brought to the gangway for
doing their duty in too relaxed a manner. On that
occasion he pardoned them, but there seems to have
been a constant struggle between Ferris and his
topmen. It was probably one of the topmen who
wrote 'Ferris is a Tyrant' on the ship's guriwhale.
It was clear to the court of captains that
while Ferris may have been strict, he was not much
more strict than they would have been themselves.
Hodgskin's testimony did much to support his
captain. He would have been a fool to do
otherwise, for his trial was next.
He was accused of causing the death of John
Bentley, a fifteen year old boy. Bentley was
brought to Hodgskin on the quarterdeck one
morning. They boy had beshitted himself all over
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while doing his business below decks and the smell
made it impossible for other men to go below.
Hodgskin ordered the sergeant at arms to take the
boy forward and scrub him clean. That was the last
Hodgskin had to do with him.
The sergeant kept the boy naked in the head
for more than twenty minutes. Then either he
struck the boy, or according to his own testimony,
the boy slipped and fell. He cut his head badly
and was dead within half an hour. But it was
Hodgskin and not the sergeant who was on trial,
and the court acquitted him.
I think this was a fair verdict. The court
martial transcipt does suggest some tension
between Ferris and Hodgekin. The next year Ferris
had Hodgskin court martialled for allowing a man
to desert so Hodgskin could claim his clothes.
Hodsgkin's defense was furious, but he was
dismissed the ship and lost two year's seniority.
(1) He promptly went ashore and wrote his book.
(1) Trial of Thomas Hosgskin on 25 April 1812 in
Adtn. 1:5425.
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Britomart
The great majority of complaints against
officers were about cruelty: that is, beatings. It
was very hard to get a conviction in these cases,
except when the officer had killed somebody. But
sometimes the men could assert their dignity in
other ways.
On Christmas Day, 1811, Lieut. George Ellerby
was in charge of the watch on the sloop Britomart.
We may presume that all concerned were half seas
over. For some hours Ellerby had been riding
Boatswain t s Mate Elijah Kelly on the subject of
the pigs. They were kept in a sty on deck. Kelly
had gone below, probably to get away from Ellerby,
Ellerby called him back up again. He told the men
around him that the pigs were waiting for Kelly,
that Kelly would rather have connexion with pigs
than with a woman, that he had catched Kelly in
the pigsty not once but five hundred times, and
that in future he would have two men over him in
each watch to look after him by night.
Kelly came up on deck and Ellerby said to
him, 'No call to button up your trousers, for
twc pigs in the sty waiting for you.
EJ1.srby alea.r].y regarded all this as good
cruel fun and expected the seamen to share in the
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drunken humour. They did not.
This was partly a matter of dignity. On
different ships, again and again, the men
complained of the language their officers used
towards them. They regarded being sworn at or
called names as deeply offensive. In this respect
their moral world differed from that of the modern
armed forces. And Ellerby's joking could also end
in Kelly's death.
The year before Patrick Muleraty, a seaman on
the Theban, had been caught in the hen house.
There were terrible squawks from there, as of a
bird in pain. The watch investigated immediately,
to find Muleraty on the deck with his trousers
down and a dead chicken. He had a stupid smile on
his face. They took him down to the surgeon who
found blood and feathers on his penis. The
chicken's posterior was covered in blood. It is
hard to tell what had had been done to Muleraty to
bring his sexuality to this pass. But the Navy
knew what to do. They hanged him by the neck until
he was dead. (1)
This was the common punishment for sex with
animals. The offense was classed as 'buggery' : the
(1) Trial of Muleraty on 17 September 1811 in Adm.
1:5419.
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same as sex between men. In both cases the offense
was clearly seen as against nature. Again and
again the prosecutor and the witnesses at trials
for homosexuality refer to the 'unnatural crime'.
We should not simply assume that this attitude was
the same as late Victorian prudery. What worried
them was not an offense against the family so much
as a transgression of the boundary between nature
and culture. This was a period when people still
shared much of the traditional human obsession
with this boundary. Human culture, after all, was
not then as overwhelmingly dominant over nature as
it is today. And if there was any group who would
be conscious of the fragile grip of culture over
nature, it would be men who made their living
sailing small ships across great oceans.
The danger in sex with animals was mystical
danger. In one case in the 1780s (1) a seaman was
found having sex with a sheep in the manger.
Before anyone touched the man, before anything
else was done, they called for the chaplain to
defuse the situation with a prayer. Before they
hanged the man, they killed the sheep and threw it
overboard.
This was why the Britornarts did not take
(1) I have unfortunately lost the reference to the
court martial record.
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Ellerby's joking lightly. The next day, Boxing
Day, they went to complain to the Captain Hunt. He
called in three captains to investigate. They
recommended a trial. Hunt kept Ellerby confined
for forty-six days before the trial. He was not
allowed to write to his wife or his mother.
There was clearly bad feeling between the two
officers. Hunt was the prosecutor at the trial.
Ellerby said in his defense that he had seen Kelly
coming from the pigs before. If so, Hunt asked,
why had Ellerby not reported Kelly?
Ellerby explained that on a previous occasion
he had had trouble with the captain of the
afterguard. The man had effectively dared Ellerby
to arrest him and said he would take the case to
the quarterdeck. So Ellerby took the man to
Captain Hunt. The captain
Merely said to the man that he must not talk
in that way to the first Lieutenant and sent
him about his business. He went forward, and
I heard him remark to one of his command, 'He
had complained of me but I knew the captain
would laugh at it'.
So when Ellerby had discovered Kelly being
unclean, he had not wanted to go through that
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again. The court did not belive him. They found
the charge proved and dismissed him from the
Britomart, although not from the Navy. They also
severely reprimanded him and took away two years
seniority. (1)
Ne r e us
The Britomarts had taken advantage of a known
animosity between officers to protect their
shipmate. This was not the only ship where a
commander was more liberal than his officers. We
have met many cruel captains in this thesis. They
were not monsters by the standards of their fellow
officers. many of them, however, would have been
seen as severe. Some officers, a minority at the
time, thought Pigot and Corbet deranged. But the
record reveals at least one captain who was a
model of fairness and kindness. We move now to the
last case to be examined in this thesis. The good
captain was the prosecutor.
The story begins with George Packha, the
master of the Nereus in 1810. He was one of the
awkward squad. For some time he had been on
tn wilh Wi1Lim FyrLmore, the
= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = ====== = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =
(1) Trial of Ellerby on 4 February 1812 in Adm.
1 :5423.
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lieutenant of marines. But Fynoinre was also the
caterer of the officers' mess. Packham refused to
pay part of his mess bill on the grounds that he
had been ashore during the relevant period. The
two men quarrelled bitterly.
At much the same time Packham informed on a
brother officer. The captain later testified:
I had given verbal order... that the officers
should never have immodest unmarried women on
board, considering it a bad example. While at
Chatham the ship's company hulked, I received
a letter from Mr. George Packham, informing
me that he had been put to much inconvenience
as a married man, by one of my officers
having disobeyed an order of mine, and he
said that that officer had had a woman of the
town on board the hulk, and therefore he
could not have Mrs. Packham on board with
him. On enquiry I found that that officer had
a woman on baord unmarried to him. I ordered
her out of the ship immediately and as the
officer expressed sorrow at having mistaken
my meaning as to the application of the order
I gv	 t	 bltr, thinking, I only meant
it to pp1y to the ship and not the hulk, I
was induced to look over this fault. He
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requested me to inform him who had told me,
which I did, and it was afterwards intimated
to rae, that the master himself was not
married... (1)
The Captain called Packham in and demanded to
see his marriage licence. Packharn prevaricated for
a while and then was foolish enough to forge a
license in his own handwriting: the same had he
used to fill in the log every day. The Captain
checked the license with the curate of the parish
of Seven Oaks, who could find no record of such a
marriage.
Packham confessed to the forgery, and the
Captain sent Sarah Mayton ashore. He also
recommended privately to Packham that he apply to
leave the ship, and Packham did so. But the
Captain did not bring a court martial or otherwise
disgrace the master. It is worth noting that when
asked by the officer who informed on him, the
Captain named Packharn. It may be that he did not
like informers. It is also noticeable that at the
subsequet trial the Captain was careful not to
name thne repentant officer. One might hazard a
guess that it was Lieut. Fynmore, and perhaps
(1) This whole section is based on the trial of
Lieut. Fynmore, 16-19 July in Adm. 1:5407.
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one might guess that it was Fynmore who informed
on Packham in turn.
So far this was just one more tale of
claustrophobic gun room hatreds, hundreds of which
surface in the court martial records of these
years, in welters of accusation and counter-
accusation. But what happened next made the matter
a bit more serious.
Packham sat down and wrote an anonymous
letter to Colonel Bell, the commandant of the
marines on shore. It read as follows:
If Colonel Bell Commanding the Royal marines
at Chatham was to enquire into the treatment
of Jas. Stephens a private marine who died on
board His Majesty's Ship Nereus, he would
find it to be the most wanton barbarity ever
known.
If the Marine Officer in that Ship ever
beat this said Stephens, or used him cruelly
himself, if he was scrubbed with birchbrooms
& scrubbing brushes till the flesh wsa
scrubb'd off his back sides & posteriors. If
the Marine Officer of the Nereus did not kick
and beat the said Stephens three days
previous to his death.
There are at Head Quarters now a
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Sergeant arid part of men who were in the same
ship, to testify the same as well as Con.
Mellish and Roberts now on board and a number
of other people.
I am Sir
a Friend of the Marine Corps
This time Packham had learned to disguise his
hand. He had a friend on shore copy out the letter
for him. But he forgot something. When a marine
committed an offense on shore, he was tried by the
marines. When he committed an offense on board,
the case fell to naval justice. So Colonel Bell
forwarded the letter to the captain of the Nereus.
He in turn requested a court martial on Lieut.
Fynmore. His letter to the admiral read in part:
I must take leave to observe, Sir that the
facts asserted in the anonymous letter to
have taken place on board the ship I have the
honour to command, never came to my
knowledge, through any channel whatever; I am
the more surprised at them (if they did
really happen) because the following written
order of my own addressed to the officers
expressly forbids every one of them to
inflict punishmen of any degree viz.
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"The improper practice of what is called
starting men with a Boatswain's mate, is
hereby strictly forbidden to be used by any
Officer whatsoever in the Ship: Punishment
corporally shall only be inflicted by the
Captain, or under his sanction and eye; as to
him alone in the Ship the Lords Commissioners
of the Admiralty have thought it proper to
entrust that power": (1) and the master is
also particularly directed by another order
of the same date (July 31. 1809) specially
addressed to himself. 'on every occassion to
report to the commanding officer any disorder
or irregularity he shall discover of from
time to time may be wanting.'
It appears therefore that the Master
neglected his own duty by not immediately at
the time acquainting me with what he must
have known to be entirely subversive of the
system of order and good discipline which I
was desirous of establishing in the Nereus.
(1) The underlining is as in the copy the court
alerk made for the court martial records. I assume
he was also copying the Captain's underlinings.
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This is unusual. The Captain not only forbade
all starting but also ordered the master to report
to him if anybody hit a man. And he meant it. At
Fynmore's trial one witness after another
testified tO the Captain's lenient regime. What
had happened?
Marine James Stephens had presented himself
to the surgeon in later October of 1809. He
complained of weakness and said he was unable to
use his legs properly. The surgeon did not believe
him, for he seemed to have no symptoms of a
disease. He was just a fifty old man who had not
bothered not to defecate in his trousers. He had
developed 'blisters and excoration from laying in
his own excrement and urine, which out utmost
attention was not able to prevent.' So the surgeon
sent Stephens back to his duty.
His corporal, however, discovered that
Stephens was useless for sentry duty because he
could not stand up. His messmates blamed the
surgeon for being unable to cure the blisters. So
the corporal and his messmates sent him back to
the sick list.
At some point in November Surgeon Jackson
decided that Stephens was suffering from 'a
collection on the brain which caused an occasional
derangement.' Stephens' symptoms fit
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well with a progressive disease of the central
nervous system, which may have been what the
surgeon meant. This would explain both his
progressive inability to walk or stand and his
incontinence as he lost muscular control.
Be that as it may, Lieut. Fynmore seems still
to have thought that Stephens was skulking.
Certainly the other men below decks would not have
wanted to lie day after day next to him lying in
his own excreta. And the surgeon had ordered that
he be taken on deck for regular exercise and that
he be washed twice daily so his sores did not get
worse.
That meant he had to be carried on deck, or
that he had to be made to get up himself. The
people began to murmur among themselves. James
Read, the captain of the forecastle:
mentioned it myself at the grog tub, but this
was before I saw him beat; I said it was
murdering him the way in which he lay having
myself picked him Up out of the lee-scuppers
at night: he was wasted to a mere skeleton.
The William Brown, the master at arms, saw
something that upset him:
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William Rugg the Corporal of Marines he had
the morning watch. James Stephens the
deceased then hung (in his hammock) between
two guns on the larboard side of the half
deck. Rugg came to him and ordered him to get
out of his hammock. The man replied he was
not able. Rugg told him he was a damned
skulking rascal, and that he was able, and
likewise laid hold of him and drew him out of
his hammock, and stripped his shirt over his
head and threw a number of buckets of water
over him. He put his shirt over his head
again and ordered him to put on his trousers.
The man replied he was not able to put them
on. With that Rugg lifted one leg at a time
and put them on himself, and ordered him to
go to the gangway, his trousers not being
then buttoned but still about his heels. He
ordered; still the man replied he was not
able to walk... (Rugg) then took a rope's
end, as near as I can judge of an inch and a
half, round his shirt flap and cut him across
the rump. He beat him on the backside, gave
him a number of strokes. Nr. Fynmore, then
standing on the starboard gangway, Mr.
Fynmore said, 'Give it to the damned
rascal. '
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'Oh, sir', says he,
	 Ill cut his shiter
off'. Rugg then beat him up the midships
ladders and Mr.Fynmore then took a rope's end
and beat him in a like manner, telling him at
the same time, that he was a damned skulking
rascal. I looked till I see Mr. Fynmore beat
him to the break of the forecastle, and I
turned up myself and went under the half deck
to prevent my seeing any more of it, and I
prayed at the same time that the captain
might upon the deck that he might see it with
his own eyes. From that day the man was in
his hammock in the afternoon and to my own
knowledge I never saw him out of it again.
The beating may not have hurt Stephens as
much as one might imagine. It is quite possible
that by this time the disease had deprived him of
most of the feeling in his legs. When Brown was
asked, 'Did the deceased when he was so cruelly
beaten as you have described express the sense of
pain that he must have felt by cries?', he
replied:
ti	 that he hd not his natural
legs were very muoh swollen,
for when he went to fetch one leg up with the
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other it was several seconds before he could
get even with the other.
Notice that the master at arms prayed for the
Captain to come on deck, but he did not tell him
what was happening. The master at arms would have
been an appropriate person to tell him. And there
was certainly murmuring among the crew, but none
of them told either. Why not?
We can only speculate, but I think the answer
lies in the solidarity of the officers. They were
clearly agreed among themselves not to tell the
Captain about the repeated beatings. As one
witness put it, they kept it 'altogether. . . a
secret from (the) Captain.' After Stephens finally
died Packham, the master, led the rest of the ward
room in joking with Fynmore about how he had
cleaned the man to death.
This was not the only beating the officers
concealed. Brown, the Master at Arms, testified
that starting wsa forbidden, but 'I have seen it
done.' We have seen that the Admiralty prohibitied
starting in 1809, but the practice continued. It
was not only that it was the custom of the
service. It was difficult for many officers and
boatswains to imagine another way of motivating
such unwilling labour. And, in truth, it is
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difficult for me. Individual officers could gain
the enthusiastic loyalty of their men by being far
more liberal than usual. But if a whole ship or a
whole Navy behaved in that way, the people would
probably work much less hard.
In any case, the officers of the Nereus used
starting, and they stuck together. But why did
none of the petty officers approach the Captain?
One answer might be that Stephens was a marine,
they were seamen, and there was a traditional
rivalry between seamen and marines. But the
seamen were murmering too. The probably answer is
that no one individual wanted to take on the
officers as a whole. After all, captains came and
went. This particular Captain was in fact
transferred the next year. The men would have to
go on living with their officers. The captain was
not on deck all the time, he did stand a night
watch, he did not walk the yards with the
boatswain's mate. Probably they figured that it
was not worth earning the enmity of the officers
as a whole. In fact, the scandal did not break out
until Packham and Fynmore fell out.
Probably the beatings did not kill Stephens,
though repeated beatings on infected sores would
have done him no good. Packham alleged in his
letter that the flesh had been brutally scrubbed
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off Stevens. At the trial Packham was the only
witness to this. The only other people present had
been the marines who did the scrubbing. (What was
Packham doing watching?) The marines said they had
been washing him under the orders of their
corporal. They admitted to using a broom to wash
him: they probably wanted to keep their distance.
They said he had such bad sores that when they
washed him the blood ran down his posterior. But
they insisted this came from the contact between
the water and his sores, not from their scrubbing.
They were adamant that they were scrubbing him for
his health and not as a punishment. This is
probably all true. But reading their testimony,
one is left with a feeling that they resented
their orders and were not overly gentle with their
shipmate.
Packham organized the testimony at Fynmore's
trial. The Captain had realized who must have
written the letter, and Packham had admitted it.
By this time he had quarrelled so bitterly with
the other officers that none of them were speaking
to him. So all the gentlemen testified that they
knew nothing of any cruelty. So did most of the
marines. Many of them had washed Stephens at one
time or another, and they may have felt
implicated. And the marines had to live with
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Fynmore afterwards. Outside the courtroom Packham
privately railed about perjury. Some of the seamen
testified to cruelty and some did not, but all
agreed that there had been murmering.
As so often in cruelty trials, the court
returned a compromise verdict. They judged that:
The charge of having cruelly used.
Stephens, is in part proved by his having
struck him, but that other charges are not
proved; and they do therefore in consequence
thereof, (in consideration of circumstances
and the high testimony bore to his character)
only adjudge the said Lieutenant William
Fynmore of the Royal marine corps to be
severely reprimanded and he is hereby so
sentenced accordingly.
The Court feel it their duty to observe
that the anonymous letter dictated by Mr.
George Packham. . . appears mark'd with a
malignancy which is subversive of discipline
and extremely injurious to the Public
Service.
Pakham'a career was in ruins. Fynmore
remained the marine lieutenant on the Mereus for
two more years, and in 1814 returned to service on
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the Goliath. (1) The court had formally supported
the Captain's regime by reprimanding Fynmore. But
in practice they left him in command of the
marines, and made it clear that to complain of
such behaviour was to subvert discipline. One
imagines that after the Captain left the ship in
1813 the officers went back to starting them when
necessary.
Who was this Captain?
He was Peter Heywood, the only man ever to
have been promoted to captain after being
sentenced to death for mutiny. Devotees of the
naval novel will remember Heywood as the young
narrator of Nordhoff and Hall's Mutiny on the
Bounty. It was a matter of dispute as to whether
Midshipman Heywood was an active mutineer in 1789,
but he certainly did not get into the launch with
Bligh. When HMS Pandora came to Tahiti looking for
the Bounty mutineers, Heywood turned himself in.
He was kept with the other mutineers in a cage on
Pandora's deck. When she foundered and began to
sink, her captain refused permission to unlock the
cage. Several of the prisoners drowned. Heywood
and the others only survived because at the last
minute the master at arms disobeyed orders and
(1) Steels Navy List, 1810-1814.
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threw them the keys to the cage. This experience
may have shaped Heywood's distinctive approach to
naval discipline. (1)
The surviving Bounties were court martialled
for mutiny upon their return to England. Heywood
was one of the six sentenced to death. But he came
of an influential family, and they managed to win
mercy for him. The ostensible ground was his
youth, but in practice they work sytpathy o't 	 i'Ii
by launching an attack upon Bligh's reputation.
Thomas Morrison was also pardoned, later promoted
to gunner, arid died when Thomas Troubridge's
flagship sank in the Indian Ocean. The other four
Bounties were hanged. Heywood returned to the Navy
and was eventually made post.
After the Nereues, he captained the Montagu.
He seems to have continued the same gentle
discipline there. Marshall, in his compendium of
naval biographies, reproduces a poem written by a
seaman of the Montagu and presented by the whole
ship's company to Heywood on the occasion of the
ship's finally being put out of commission. The
men were paid off, and as Marshall says, the poem
(1) The best source on Heywood's life is John
Marshall, Royal Naval Biography, London, Longman,
volume 2, 1824, pages 747-797.
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is the more remarkable for being presented at a
moment when the men were 'freed from the
restraints of naval discipline, and consequently
not liable to the imputation of seeking his favour
by undue adulation.' Marshall had written the
biographies of hundreds of naval officers, and had
'already had occasion to notice the presentation
of numerous swords, snuff-boxes, &c. But we have
never yet met with an instance of a naval
commander recieving a tribute of "respect and
esteem" from his crew, better qualified to gratify
a benevolent and humane mind than "THE SEAMAN'S
FAREWELL TO H.M.S. MONTAGU".':
Farewell to thee, MONTAGW yet ere we quit
thee
Will give thee the blessing so justly thy
due;
For many a seaman will fondly regret thee,
And wish to rejoin thee, thou gem of the
blue.
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For stout were thy timbers, and stoutly
commanded;
In the record of glory untarnished thy name;
Still ready for battle for battle when glory
commanded,
And ready to conquer or die in thy fame.
Farwell to thee, HEYWOOD! a truer one never
Exercis'd rule I'er the sons of the wave;
The seamen who served thee, would serve thee
forever,
Who swaytd, but neter fettered, the hearts of
the brave.
Haste home to thy rest, and may comforts
enshrine it,
Such comforts as shadow the peace of the
bless 'd;
And the wreath thou deserv t st, may Gratitude
twine it,
The band of true seamen thou neter hast
oppress d.
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Farewell to thee, shipmates, now home is our
haven,
Let our hardships all fade as dream that is
past;
And be the true toast to Old Montagu giv'n-
She was our best ship, and she was our last.
(1)
(1) Marshall, volume 2, pages 796-7.
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PART FIVE: Conclusion
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Chapter Seventeen: Conclusion
This chapter will summarise and explore the
relationship between the argument of this thesis
and the work of a few other historians. It will
also summarize the argument.
Rodger
It is time now to summarise the differences
between Rodger's view of mutiny and discipline at
mid-century and our own picture of mutiny and
discipline forty and fifty years later. What
changed?
Quite a lot. We have shown that theft was no
longer taken more seriously than mutiny. Rodger
produces a set of 'unwritten rules' which governed
mutiny in his period. To quote them again:
1. No mutiny shall take place at sea, or in
the presence of the enemy.
2. No personal violence may be employed
(although a degree of tumult and shouting is
permissible)
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3. Mutinies shall be held in pursuit only of
objectives sanctioned by the traditions of
the service.
The only cases in which these rules were
broken were mutinies openly led or covertly
incited by officers; genuine lower deck
mutinies invariably conformed to them, and so
long as it did, authority regarded them with
a weary tolerance, as one of the many
disagreeable but unavoidable vexations of
naval life. It called, not for punishment,
but for immediate action to remedy the
grievances complained of. (1)
In our period many genuine lower-deck
mutinies broke one or more of these rules. The
Hermione in 1797, the Nereide in 1809, the
Resistance in 1813 and several others all mutinied
at sea. There were no mutinies in the actual
presence of the enemy, but at least five ships
were taken by their crews and turned over to the
enemy. The crew of the Africaine were also widely
believed to have refused to fight because of their
hatred of Captain Corbet. This may well not be
(1) Rodger, page 238.
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true, but the fact of its wide belief argues that
the possible norm had changed.
The limits of personal violence had also
changed. On dozens of ships, if one includes 1797,
the men took control by force and put their
officers ashore. They made it clear that they were
prepared to fight. On the Defiance they attacked
an officer physically. At Spithead and the Nore
they ran out the guns. At the Nore they fired
them. Their bluff was called three times.. On the
Defiance and the Terrible they backed down. On the
Queen Charlotte at Spithead the officers and
marines opened fire. The people returned the fire,
and the marines threw away their weapons. Samuel
Triggs of the Culloden, standing by the loaded gun
with a slow match throughout the mutiny, was a
representative of many who had gone beyond
rowdiness.
But there were still limits to lower deck
violence. It is notable that when men seized the
ship, they did not kill their officers, even when
they hated them. On the Goza in 1801 they had even
agreed beforehand to kill Lieutenant Mime. But
when it came to the moment they could not. This
was a moral rule of the lower deck. Men who took
the ship to the enemy would be hanged if caught.
They ran no extra risk in killing an officer. In
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fact, they ran less, for the witnesses who hanged
mutineers were usually officers. Yet in several
cases where we have records of men plotting to
take the ship, the organizers assure the others
that they mean to harm to the officers. These were
clearly men who were prepared to threaten violence
and use armed force, but drew the line at killing
helpless officers. They crossed the line drawn by
the Navy. They observed their own line.
The exception is the Hermione, and nobody has
ever suggested that Pigot did not have it coming
to him. The men must have felt the same way about
the officers who supported him. The other
exception, of course, is the officers. Even in
Rodger's period, the rule that violence was not to
be employed during mutinies applied only to the
lower deck. Violence by officers was a daily fact.
The third rule is that mutinies should be in
pursuance of objectives sanctioned by tradition.
In practice this meant complaints against captains
and demands for unpaid pay. In our period many
mutinies exceeded these limits. The demands of
1797 for a pay rise are the clearest example. So
was the unilateral putting ashore of officers and
the demands for a sixteen ounce pound from the
pursers. Many more mutinies were really about the
control of work, especially the many disturbances
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where the topinen figured prominently.
This does not mean that all disturbances
departed from the unwritten rules of the earlier
period. Many conformed. We shall return to this
point. rt only means that the lower deck often
departed from these customs.
But did the officers still hold to these
unwritten rules? Did they prosecute those who
broke them but redress the grievances of those who
stuck to the old ways? Sometimes yes, sometimes
no. Many mutineers who observed the rules were
hanged, as on Excellent and the Castor. On the
Naiad in 1810 three petty officers were sentenced
to death for organizing the writing of a letter
and a formal protest to the admiral. On the
Bulwark in 1809 Frederick Becker was sentenced to
death for being part of a rowdy demonstration. Men
were often flogged for demonstration. In many
other cases, probably the great rna.jority,
demonstrations were passed over by the officers.
But this was not an invariant rule: the men did
not know what would happen when they began to
demonstrate.
Nor were grievances necessarily redressed. It
is in the nature of the records that
demonstrations without redress or prosecution
seldom appear. But there were demonstrations
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before the mutinies on the Culloden, the Terrible,
and the Excellent, to take three exam p les. nd
there were many more petitions against officers
for cruelty than there were trials of officers.
Even in the relatively responsive period after
1809, less than thirty officers were tried for
cruelty. Most of these were lieutenants and below
in rank, and most were confirmed in their command.
Only one captain of post rank, Lake, was removed
from command, and this was in response to
complaints from his officers rather than his men.
The picture Rodger paints of an earlier period
when cruel captains were removed in repsonse to
the orderly complaints of their crews seems to
apply only to the Winchelsea in 1793.
None of this means that Rodger is wrong about
the 'unwritten rules'. They existed in the minds
of men and sometimes in practice. Those 'mutiniest
that ended in court martials were largely
demonstrations, strikes and armed strikes, not
seizures of the ship. Many more demonstrations,
protests and strikes never entered the records.
There was still a tradition of 'collective
bargaining by protest'. It is not possible to tell
how common such protests were. But they were
certainly much more common than the ones than
ended in the court martial room.
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There was, in other words, a traditional
system. But it was a system in change. When a
demonstration began, nobody knew what would
happen. It might end in a negotiated settlement.
It might end in an armed strike or the rope. Also,
we are not dealing with a system of customary law
in a society without written law. The Navy had
very specific and strict written laws for dealing
with 'mutiny' . In important respects these
contraditicted the 'unwritten law'. And the
officers could choose which set of laws to invoke.
Rodger and Change
By 1797, Rodger and I are agreed, much had
changed. To requote Rodger again in some detail:
It is clear that the Service which suffered
the mutinies of 1797 must have been very
different from that of forty years before...
perhaps it did not change as much as might
appear. Except in being collective movements
in which ships co-operated, these mutinies
followed more or less the 'unwritten rules'
which had long governed such affairs. Like
popular riots throughout the century, they
were essentially conservative, aimed to
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restore the just system which had formerly
obtained, to rescue the Navy from the
deformations recently introduced into it. To
men, both on the lower deck and the quarter
deck, who had seen the excesses of the French
Revolution, the mutinies of 1797 seemed very
dangerous. Certainly they displayed evidence
of class and political sentiments which would
have been unthinkable a generation earlier,
but it is not clear with hindsight that they
were really as novel or as revolutionary as
they then seemed. In forty years material
conditions in the Navy had worsened.
Inflation had ground away at the value of the
naval wage, and the coppering of ships had
removed the chance of frequent leave. The
Service had expanded not only absolutely but
relatively to the population as a whole, to
recruit many men (and officers) unacquainted
with the traditional accomodations of
seafaring. When all these things have been
considered, however, we should still beware
of exaggerating the changes of forty years.
(1)
(1) Page 346.
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There clearly was a change. I differ with
Rodger on the causes and extent of this change.
Let us take the causes first. Rodger points out
that material conditions had changed. He probably
does not mean that rations or berths were worse:
they were not. What he means, I think, is that the
effects of inflation and copper sheathing were
important material changes. Copper sheathing did
make a difference in reducing liberty and
shortening the length of commissions of any one
ship. However, in our period men did not leave the
Navy when their ship was decommissioned. During
the war years they were simply transferred to
another ship. Moreover, mutinies were if anything
more common among the Channel Fleet, which spent
much of its time in port, and in the West Indies,
where there was much leave ashore.
Inflation was important. On shore the
inflation of 1795 was clearly a spur to the rapid
growth of trade unionism in the same period. It
was also the motor of the demand for wage
increases in 1797. This was not a traditional
demand: it was a new sort of demand. But inflation
of itself did not determine the contest between
Admiralty and sailors. Before the mutinies the
government had already given wage rises to
compensate for inflation to the army, the marines
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and the naval officers. It was not inflation of
itself that was the problem. It was the crisis of
the British state, embroiled in a world war which
stretched its economic and social resources to the
utmost.
The expansion of the Navy was part of this
great stretching of the state, and it was one of
the major causes of the change. But this was not
because it brought in men who were unacquainted
with the traditions of the Navy. The greatest
period of unrest was 1794-98. The officers who
mattered in these mutinies were not beginners at
sea. Troubridge, Pringle, Bridport, Gardner,
Campbell of the Terrible, Bligh and the rest were
men with many years at sea in the Navy behind
them. Where the records show the leaders of the
different mutinies, they do not show a group of
agitators and landsmen leading the rest. What they
show is a combination of men which reflects the
combination of experienced seamen and landsmen
among the crew. This was true of the Culloden. The
Defiance was even more clearly a seamen t s mutiny.
And many of the mutinies desribed in these pages
were led by topmen or petty officers. Both were
experienced seamen.
This is not to underestimate the importance
of United Men and other revolutionaries. Agitators
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mattered. It is merely to say that many of them,
like Joyce at Spithead arid Blake of the Inflexible
at the Nore, were both revolutionaries and seamen.
The point is not that the seamen had not changed.
At the time older officers were more or less
unaminous in the conviction that they were dealing
with a new breed of men, and in blaming this on
the landsmen. In part they were right. The sailors
they now had to deal with were different. But the
sailors had changed because working people as a
whole had changed. The officers were correct in
their perception that able seamen now acted and
thought like riotous landsmen. They were wrong in
thinking that this was an infection carried aboard
like landsinen. Sailors had learned these ideas and
habits as part of a larger and changing class
before they ever came aboard.
Nor were their protests 'essentially
conservative'. But before taking up this point, it
is necessary to turn to a problem raised by the
work of Rediker.
Rediker
Th'	 i' two ways of stating this problem.
Ml4cth Cs1 ths bsic rgurnnt of this thesis was
first set out in my The Cutlass and the Lash in
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1985. Two years after, Rediker published The Devil
and the Deep Blue Sea. In my earlier work I had
traced the roots of sailors' militancy back to the
1770s. Rediker has clearly established that they
go back much further, and argues quite
convincingly that the nature of capitalist control
on merchant ships created a counter tradtion of
solidarity and resistance. This tradition, as he
describes it, has much in common with my picture
of the Navy. Violence is a front line measure of
social control. Desertion is the common reply and
protest and mutiny are possible replies. The
seamen's culture is like that desribed by Rediker:
there is the same solidarity, irreligion, and
drunkenness. But, in that case, why was there so
much unrest on Naval ships in our period, when the
merchantmen seem relatively quiet? Why does every
sailor of the period who served on both merchant
and naval ships mention naval discipline as worse?
Why, to quote the very experienced seaman
Bechervaise: 'Of all the places then dreaded by a
seaman in the merchant service, a ship of war is
the worst.' (1)
We can state the problem another way. If one
reads Rodger's book on the Navy and Rediker's book
on the merchant service on successive days, one is
(1) Bechervaise, page 107.
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left with a feeling of puzzlement. Both books are
major pieces of scholarship. They seem to be
describing different worlds. Rodger gives a
picture of social peace in the Navy and Rediker a
picture of class war in the merchant service. Vet
they are dealing with the same period arid the same
sailors. The Navy did not press its men from Mars.
What accounts for this difference?
Partly, of course, it is a matter of
politics. Rodger and Rediker are looking for
different things, and they find different things.
Rediker is an explicit Marxist. Rodger's politics
are best expressed by his choice of the verb
'suffered' in the phrase 'the Service which
suffered the mutinies of 1797'. In looking at any
given mutiny, Rediker and Rodger identify with
different sides. One welcomes mutinies, the other
regrets them.
But this is riot all there is to the matter.
There was a real difference in class relations in
the Navy and the merchant servie in 1750. In many
ways the positions had reversed in 1795. How are
we to explain this? Rediker, I think, provides the
answer:
The first half of the eighteenth century
witnessed a cycle of seamen's struggle in
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which tactics shifted according to larger
social and economic patterns and
circumstances. During wartime and the ensuing
postwar booms, when labor was scarce and
wages high, seamen relied on desertion and
perhaps 'embezzlement' to improve their
situation. The diversity of the maritime work
force, brought about by the lifting of
restrictions on the number of foreign seamen
allowed in the merchant service in wartime,
encouraged the use of such tactics. During
periods of peace, when wages dropped,
shipboard conditions grew harsher, and crews
became more homogenous, conflict tended to
take different forms. Desertion, though less
effective, continued. But mutinies multiplied
and piracy, in many ways the most extreme
form of resistance, erupted after the Treaty
of Ryswick in 1697 and again after the Treaty
of Utrecht in 1713. With the suppression of
piracy in 1726, social conflict at sea did
not abate, but wastransformed into more
personal acts of violence, sometimes murder,
between officers and crew. From the seamen's
perspective, England's "era of political
stability" was thus marked by the most
extreme violence and terror. After the Seven
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Years War (1756-63), seamen incresingly
resorted to the strike. The hands that set
the sail learned to strike it. (1)
To simplify, there was a tendency for class
relations in merchant men to be more hostile
during periods of peace. In wartime the extra
demand for seamen meant that skilled men could win
conditions by deserting to another ship, or even
by choosing their master. It was a seller's market
in labour power. This process must have applied
even more between 1793 and 1814. The war went on
far longer, the demand for men was far greater,
and it was accompanied by an increase in trade.
Wages soared, often to three times their previous
level. Men who did not have to put up with a
master or low wages had less need to be brutal or
to strike for increases. Masters who had to keep
their men would resort to less brutality.
This does not mean that tension between
capital and labour on merchant ships disappeared.
It does mean that it was relatively less, and
relatively less expressed in violence by masters
or mutiny by men. This is part of the explanation
i-i'	 mir&g contradicstion.
(1) Rediker, page 292.
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There is another part. Why was the Navy
relatively quiescent in 1750 yet so militant in
1797? The answer lies in two contradictory
processes. On the one hand, there is the sheer
scale of naval ships. The line of battle ships
were, I have argued, far larger workplaces than
the merchant ships. Hundreds of workers were
gathered together in one place and oppressed
together. This created a unique potential power, a
potentially serious problem of control for the
officers.
On the other hand, there was the level of
repression in the Navy. Mutiny in the armed
services is usually the most dangerous kind of
strike that there is. The Royal Navy was not an
exception. On a merchant ship the master had to
establish his physical superiority with violence.
If he did not, his men could and did hit and
ridicule him. On a naval ship the rating who
struck his captain was killed, unless his madness
could be established. The master had at most his
mate to fall back on. The captain of a 74 had a
score of officers and over a hundred marines.
Rediker emphasizes that merchantseamen faced long
odds when they resisted their masters. Naval
seamen faced longer odds.
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There are two countervailing processes here:
the potential strength of the naval crew and the
threat of naval discipline. Up to a certain point,
the threat of naval discipline could keep unrest
within limits set by the officers. Beyond this
point, the strength of hundreds of workers could
carry them past these limits. But the threat of
the court martial meant that when the men moved
they had to be organized and serious. They were
playing for higher stakes. The appearance of
social peace and the eruption of mutiny were two
sides of the same coin. The question, of course,
is what forces pushed the men past these limits?
Control
In answering this question, we can make use
of John Bohstedt's ideas in Riots and Community
Politics in England and Wales, 1790-1810. (1)
There Bohstedt describes in some detail first the
operation of a tradition of riot and negotiation
in the small industrial, towns of Devon, where the
employers and the workers knew each other, and the
workers themselves were tied together by many
c cQmmunity. He contrasts this to the
(1) Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press,
1983.
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developing
 crisis of control in Manchester after
1790. Here there were too many workers. divided
among themselves in too many ways, without an
organic relationship to their employers. The
consequence was that the traditional way in which
the magistrate dealt with the rebellious crowd no
longer worked in Manchester. Instead the employing
class as a whole had to fall back on a combination
of 'cavalry and soup kitchens.' Naked force
replaced negotiation with the crowd, whose
increased power had to be simply crushed. But at
the same time the grievances had to be redressed,
not by a process of negotiation with the leaders
of the crowd, but by generalized welfare measures
of alleviate distress.
Much of this seems similar to what happened
to the Navy. Here too there was a crisis of
control. The old negotiations no longer work
reliably. So the Admiralty turned to a generalized
reform. In 1797 this meant giving way on pay. In
1809 it meant trying to change the response to
complaints about cruelty. Yet at the same time the
officers resorted to repression far earlier than
they would have previously. This was particularly
the case after 1797, when the dimensions of the
crisis of control were clear to them.
Manchester and the Navy had three things in
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common. They had, in relative terms for their
time, very large workplaces. They had a highly
politicised workforce. And at critical times wage
workers from many different workplaces were able
to act together.
Bohstedt's idea, which I am developing here,
is really an elaboration of Thompson's ideas about
the effects of the development of capitalism. (1)
Thompson makes the important point that the
development of capitalism created a series of
widening holes in the fabric of paternalist
control. London was of course the largest of these
wholes. Rediker's work has alerted us to the fact
that London's major industry, the sea, was the
site of a particularly severe fracture in
paternalist control.
Thompson makes a related point of importance.
The development of capitalism constantly led the
masters to revolutionise the conditions of
production. In Marx's phrase for capitalist
society, 'All that is solid melts into air.' The
pressure of capitalist competition pressured the
employers and the merchants into attacks on the
customary relations of employment and the market.
(1) See particularly 'Patrician Society, Plebian
Culture'.
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The resistance of workers was thus very often
phrased in traditional terms, in terms of
defending what people had already got.
But there is a contradiction in this
resistance. The development of capitalist
production relations opens holes in the fabric of
paternalist control. At the same time it pushes
the workers under attack to fight back in terms of
protecting tradition. Their goals are phrased in
traditional terms while their activity is creating
a new force. Their demands are conservative but
their growing power is the opposite. They wish to
conserve what they have and change the balance of
power in process of production and distribution.
Once this is understood, one can see what was
happening in the Navy more clearly. It was not
simply, in Rodger's words quoted above, that
mutinies 'Like popular riots throughout the
century ... were essentially conservative, aimed
to restore the just system which had formerly
obtained, to rescue the Navy from the deformations
recently introduced into it.' Rather, what was
happening could be understood in different ways.
On the one hand, many of the mutinies
reflected the sturdy moral economy of 'stout
resolute dogs' . As such they could be accomodated
within the traditions of the Navy. But when these
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mutinies reached a certain point, they posed the
problem of control. Mutinies in the tradition of
the service raised the untraditional question of
who controlled the service. We are now in a
position to outline what caused this crisis in
control.
Summary of the Argument
Several factors combined to create a crisis
of control in the Navy. The first was the sailors'
tradition of revolt. As Rediker emphasizes, this
tradition had been a long time in the making. But
it had also developed over time, with the strike
becoming more important.
The second factor was the French Revolution.
This meant that unrest below decks was far more
frightening for officers. For all they knew a
mutiny on one ship might develop into a mutiny of
the whole Channel Fleet led by an Irish
Revolutionary. And indeed that came to pass. This
closed down the room for flexibility.
The French Revolution also opened far greater
possibilities for the men. It did other things: it
gave them an idea of their rights as men, as moral
equals of the officers. It also provided a model
of a people not just defending their rights but
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going on the offensive to create new rights.
But perhaps the most important effect of the
Revolution was indirect. It inspired an explosion
of working class radicalism, strikes and trade
union organization on shore between 1792 and 1795.
The sailors on shore were part of this explosion:
they took politics and tactics on board with them.
On board they were held down by the force of
naval terror. But at the same time they were
gathered together in their hundreds. And they were
gathered together unwillingly. The war against
France strained both the British and French states
to their limit. The Navy's relentless demand for
men had the paradoxical effect of increasing the
attractions of the merchant service. Men arrived
on board in their hundreds, bitter, politicised
and unwilling. On board they were driven to work.
And while they were driven, a state and social
system strained to its limits refused to raise
their pay in the face of inflation, itself caused
in part by the war and in part by capitalist
development. At the same time they were cheated on
p roy is ions.
They sailors resisted in traditional ways,
above all with desertion. The Navy tried to
maintain order in the traditional way at sea:
violence. Beatings 'started' work. But there was a
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spiral at work here. The more men deserted the
more the pressure to recruit. The more men were
beaten to control them the more they resented that
control.
It is not possible to tell whether the level
of violence was far greater in the Navy of the
1790s than before. It certainly seems greater than
Rodger's picture of the occasional necessary
beating. But it may also be that the new
sensibility of equality influenced those who left
their memoirs. The Narrative of William Spavens, a
Chatham Pensioner, by Himself, published in 1793
at the end of Spaven's career below decks,
describes a world in many ways as brutal as Jack
Nastyface's. What is missing is the sense of
outrage. That , for Spavens, is just how it was.
Nastyface has the idea it might be different.
But in any case, the level of violence on board
ship certainly affronted men in a way it had not
before.
So the Navy faced a chronic problem of
control. This was not simply a matter of mutiny.
On a day to day basis, the constant niggling
conflict over work was far more important. There
was constant flogging for 'skulking'. This should
remind us of the extent of repression, but it
should also remind us that men were refusing to
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work. And the court martial records reveal
conflict after conflict between topmen and
boatswain, first lieutenant or captain.
The navy had ways of dealing with this crisis
of control. Rodger points out that 'The Eighteenth
century Navy. . . lacked even a single word for
discipline.' (1) He goes on to assert that this
was because they did not have to worry much about
it. This is mistaken. 'Discipline' is a modern
euphemism, rather like the general change from
'Ministry of War' to 'Ministry of Defense'. The
Navy did have two useful words: 'order' and
'punishment'. The latter word resonated for every
sailor and officer in the wooden world. Its
central meaning was flogging. But it included
everything from an impromptu rope's-ending to a
group hanging.
So at first the Navy reacted in its
traditional ways. The mutiny on the Winchelsea was
the first of the war. The men protested in a
traditional way and the Navy reacted in a
traditional way. It conceded their demand and
flogged two men around the fleet.
But from 1794 onwards a new sort of armed
strike created new problems of control. The
Windsor Castle won. The Culloden, the Defiance and
the Terrible had to be severely punished. In the
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process the tradition of negotiation was severely
damaged, because the Admiralty was no longer
willing to keep its word.
Then in 1797 the tradition of strike in the
merchant ports over pay reached the Navy. This
time the strike was led by radical and
revolutionary sailors. At Spithead they posed an
insoluble problem of control for the Admiralty.
Lying to them did not work, and the Admiralty had
to concede pay rises. Just as important, the
sailors put off those officers they did not like.
They were challenging directly for control.
The Admiralty tried to claw back control at
the Nore. There they faced a force of sailors with
no strategic importance and simply waited them
out. The Admiralty followed this with many
executions. And then in 1798 two connected things
happened. The first was the defeat of the United
Men in Ireland. In 1795 the radical movement in
the British Isles had been largely driven
underground, but it had not been defeated.
Revolution was still a possibility. In 1798 the
defeat was total. That defeat took the form of a
split between Protestants and Catholics. This in
turn rebounded in the fleet, where nervous English
Protestants began to turn in the United Irish
cells on board. The mass executions of Irish
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rebels from the yard arm that followed took the
heart out of the movement of 1797.
But this did not simply mean a return to the
old relations between officers and men. After 1798
the officers allowed very little room for
resistance. The years until about 1802 were bitter
years. Men were hauled up for court martial on the
suspicion of sedition, tried for writing letters
of complaint, and executed for demonstrating. In
these years too there is a spate of 'Cecil B.
DeMille' mutinies. Some crews, despairing of
normal protest, take the ship and run. Others plot
to take it but are betrayed.
In the years after the peace of 1802 the
temperature moderated. Petitions continued,
demonstrations continued, and sometimes even
strikes. The crisis of control moderated. The
radical movement on shore was on the defensive.
The example of the French Revolution was losing
its force. The officers were less frightened and
the men were pressed out of less politicised
ports. But if the crisis of control moderated, it
did not disappear. Nothing illustrates this better
than what happened after 1809 and the Nereide.
In some ways the Admiralty's reaction in 1809
was an attempt to go back to an earlier system.
The Admiralty in Rodger's period had tolerated
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starting while complaining about it, and they had
removed captains upon the complaint of their
crews. But 1809 was not 1750, because 1797 had
intervened. The court martial captains were torn.
They wished to redress some of the grievances of
the men. But they did not wish to replace the
captain. In an earlier period such justice would
have reinforced the Navy's hegemony. In this
period it would increase the power of the men.
And, as defendant officers kept saying, how were
they to maintain control in the Service if they
could not be violent? Torn, the courts admonished
officers and confirmed them in their commands,
while removing the odd lieutenant.
This does not mean that the changes after
1809 were meaningless. From 1809 onwards there are
many cases of cruelty, most of which have been
cited in Chapters Fourteen to Sixteen. Except for
the odd trial of the Captain of the Windsor
Castle, I have not found any such trials in the
years before 1809. It is probable that I have
missed two or three, but unlikely that I have
missed dozens. Before 1809 the traditional system
of redressing grievances simply broke down. The
crisis of control did not allow it. Even after
1809 it could not function as before, even when
the Admiralty wished it to.
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In Conclusion
This brings us almost to the end of this
thesis. But there are still two points to be
tackled. The first is the question of how
representative these mutinies were. Were they not
abnormal events, isolated pathologies, unusual
events which shed little light on the kinder and
more normal tenor of shipboard life?
The first answer to this question is that
these demonstrations, stikes and mutinies were
indeed unrepresentative. As a glance at Appendix
One will show, they were rare. Of course, this
leaves out the mutinies of 1797 and 1798, the
years when mutiny was a common experience. But
still, the mutinies covered in this thesis are
unrepresentative in two ways. They were defeated,
and the defeated were prosecuted. Successful
strikes and demonstrations disappear from the
record. For the Windsor Castle we happen to have
the pro forma trial of her captain, and for the
ship seizures we have the trials of the captain
and officers for the loss of the ship. But where
the captain conceded the point or the admiral had
a word with him, we have no record. Officers did
not discuss these things in print, they did not
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write to the Admiralty about them, and they did
not write to their relatives about them. This
silence is in itself an important social fact, but
very frustrating for the historian.
In short, the records we have grievously
underestimate the force and success of
demonstration and strike. If anything, the tenor
of 'normal' naval life was far stormier than the
records would indicate.
But this does not mean that the mutinies did
not have an effect on daily life. We have argued
above that after 1793 any demonstration was a
chancy thing. Neither officers nor men knew for
certain what would happen next. The great set
piece mutinies set the parameters of the smaller
confrontations. If most men had not mutinied
outside of 1797, most experienced seamen had seen
the results of court martials of mutineers. The
convicted were flogged round the fleet from ship
to ship. When they were hanged, the whole fleet
was mustered to watch. This was not some arcane
custom. The Navy wished to make a point. Nor,
especially after 1797, were captains ignorant of
the possible consequences of pushing their crews
too far.
Moreover, it has been argued above that the
changing course of the mutinies affected the more
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general course of class relations on board. The
crisis of control was manifested in mutinies. The
results of these mutinies in turn affected the
limits of control on board ship. This point will
not be laboured here, as it has been one of themes
of the whole thesis.
There is also a sense in which these
mutinies, although unusual events, provide a
unique window into normal life on board. After
all, if you want to shoot the horizon, you do it
from the crest of the wave. One of the things the
mutinies reveal starkly is the nature of the class
relationship on board ship.
This brings us to our second question, the
question of 'class'. Were these mutinies class
struggles?
The answer is yes. Part of this, of course,
depends on definition. I have argued above that
class conflict is most helpfully understood as
conflict which is patterned by people's position
in the process of production. Relations between
people in the process of work pattern the
conflicts between them. The point was made that
the position of any individual in these conflicts
were not necessarily predetermined. Individuals
might find themselves on the 'wrong side'. The
conflict was a class conflict because people tend
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to be on the 'right side' . And it does not matter
if they understand that they are behaving in that
way because of their class position. It is enough
that the tendency can be observed.
In fact, these qualifications hardly need to
be made for the class struggle in the Navy in this
period. The officers were all, in theory,
gentlemen. If some of them in fact were not, they
were entitled to be outraged if reminded of the
fact. The great majority of the sailors were men
who would work for wages all their lives. Most of
their fathers had worked for wages as well. And
while a gentleman down on his luck could
occasionally volunteer for the bounty, the press
did not take gentleman. A gentleman's dress was
sufficient protection against the gang, and a man
improperly dressed could escape the Navy if he
could prove he was a gentleman. On board one
conscious class faced another.
The ship was divided in class terms. The very
parts of the ship faced each other in binary
opposition: the quarter deck and the lower deck,
the quarterdeck and the forecastle, us and them.
The 'people' thought of themselves as a corporate
group. They signed themselves the 'Ship's Company'
and thought of themselves as the 'Cullodens'. In a
regiment the 'Argylls' include the officer. In the
504
Navy all these terms, the people, the ship's
company, the Terribles, excluded the officers.
In the great moments of class struggle, the
demonstrations and mutinies, the officers and
people moved as compact and united classes. The
mutiny on the Bounty is the exception that proves
the rule. Fletcher Christian was the only officer
in this period to side with mutineers. That was
the enduring source of his fantasy appeal for the
middle classes. But one officer after another,
most of whom detested Bligh, got into the boat
with him to what seemed like almost certain death.
The master and the carpenter were not members of
the ruling class. But they were officers.
After the Bounty, there is no officer who
joins the men in mutiny. Richard Parker at the
Noe was a gentleman, but an officer who had been
dismissed the service and re-enlisted as a seaman.
A few seamen did report for the captain's muster
on the Culloden and the Defiance, but very few. In
comparative perspective, what is impressive about
the strikes in the Royal Navy in these years is
the solidarity of each class against the other.
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Appendix One: Trials
This appendix contains a list, by year, of
all collective actions which ended in court
martials, for the years 1793-1796 and 1799-1814.
The name of the ship and the nature of the action
is given. This list does not include trials of
officers for cruelty, and includes the writing of
letters only when the writer was prosecuted. All
cases mentioned here are referred to at least in
passing in the body of the thesis. This list is as
complete as I can make it, and I am sure it
includes the great majority of such trials. The
year is the year of the protest, not of the trial.
1793
Winchelsea, demonstration.
1794
Windsor Castle, strike.
Culloden, strike.
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1795
Defiance. strike.
Terrible, strike.
Bellerephon, letter.
1796
Eurvdice, letter.
1799
Ramilles, letter.
Forbes and Kerr, letter.
Stag, letter.
Caesar, verbal abuse of informer.
Mars, restive sailor.
Russell, sailor complaining about work.
Repulse, sailor shouting United slogans.
Vola, plot to take ship.
Hope, plot to take ship.
Dart, demonstration.
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1800
Phoebe, seditious talk.
Monarch, loose talk while drunk.
Diadem, letter.
El Corso, letter.
Gladiator, verbal abuse of informer.
Overyssel, collective refusal of beer.
Daphne. riot.
Diana, taking the ship.
Albanaise, taking the ship.
1801
Goza, taking the ship._
Active, letter.
Glenmore, demonstration.
Castor, demonstration.
1802
Syren, plot to replace captain.
Excellent, demonstration.
Gibraltar, demonstration.
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1803
Trident, letter.
Princess Royal, letter.
1804
?lontagu, plot to take ship.
Eliza, plot to take ship.
1805
Tartar, letter.
Locust, letter.
Dryad, letter.
Favorite, demonstration.
Tormant, demonstration.
1806
Dominica, taking the ship.
Ferret, attempt to takeship.
1807
Edgar, demonstration.
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1808
Bream, attempting to cut cables.
1809
Nereide, attempt to replace captain.
Columbine, plot to take ship.
Bulwark, demonstration.
1810
Naiad, letter and petition in person.
Latona, talking about mutiny.
Bellerephon, demonstration.
1811
Diana, demonstration.
Danernark, letter.
Fawn, letter.
1812
Ulysses, demonstration.
Polyphemus, demonstration.
Martial, letter.
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1813
Resistance, attempt to replace captain.
Dwarf, letter.
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Appendix Two: Sources
The most important source for this thesis is
the court martial records. These have been
discussed in Chapter Two. This appendix will
consider the other sources used.
Muster Books and Logs
A range of other admiralty records can be
used to supplement the court martials. The muster
books of most ships have been preserved. (Where
they cannot be found, it is often possible to use
the Treasury pay books, although they are less
detailed.) The whole ship's company was mustered
at frequent intervals. The clerk put a check
against the name of each man present. When a new
man entered the ship, the clerk put down his name,
his age, his place of birth and his rating. When
he changed his rating, the clerk also noted that.
But a man's age never changed, except that when he
was promoted from boy first class to seaman his
age changed from sixteen to eighteen.
So the muster books can give us some idea of
the composition of the ship's company and tell us
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something about their leaders. However, there are
problems. Many men joined the Navy under assumed
names, and they may also have lied about their
homes. The muster book tells whether a man was
pressed or a volunteer, but most pressed men were
offered the bounty and thus 'volunteered' after
baing pressed, and appeared on the books as
volunteers. And the muster books give a man's
place of birth rather than his place of residence.
Sailors moved around a lot. A man bornin Kerry but
living in London for the last twenty years appears
as Irish. A second-generation Irishman in
Liverpool appears as English. This does not
necessarily reflect either man's subjective
identity.
Again, a man's rank on entering the Navy does
not necessarily reflect his experience of the sea.
Men rated themselves upon joining, and able seamen
may well have rated themselves as ordinary seamen.
Writing of the American Navy in 1841, Dana said:
There is a large proportion of oridnary
seinane in the Navy. This is probably because
the power of the officers is so great upon
their long cruises to detect and punish any
deficianecy, arid because, if a man can by any
means be made to appear wanting in capacity
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for the duty he has shipped to perform., it
will justify a great deal of hard usage. Men,
therefore, prefer rather to underrate than to
run any risk of overrating themselves. (1)
The American Navy was modelled bery closely
on the British, but the officers were harsher in
1793 than in 1841. And there is a lot of evidence
that at this period work discipline bore
particularly harshly on the skilled topmen. So we
must assume that many 'ordinary' seamen were in
reality able men bred to the sea.
There are also the ships' logs. The master
made daily entries in the log. Every so often the
captain's clerk copied the master's log word for
word into the captain's log. For most ships one
log or both are preserved. Given a choice, I have
used the captain's log. The clerks were
professionals at hadnwriting and the masters were
professionals at other things.
The logs are not all that useful for our
purposes. They largely record weather, course,
latitude and prizes taken. The master was also
supposed to enter any floggings, but many did not.
So if floggings are recorded in the log, one knows
(1) Richard henry Dana, The Seaman's Manual,
London, Edward Moxon, 1841, page 174.
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they happened. If they are not, one does not know
if they happened or not. There is sometimes a
brief description of a mutiny, but lesser
collective actions are never mentioned.
Letters
The Admiralty's in-letters are, by and large,
the main source after the court martial records.
Unfortunately, the files are by no means complete.
The Admiralty was very punctilious about saving
trial records and musters and log books. But many
letters are missing from the relevant volumes. It
is fair to assume that some were lost and some
were weeded. But many were probably simply taken
home by an interested Lord or clerk who never got
round to returning them.
The admirals' letters are the most important.
The admiral in charge of each fleet or 8tation
reported by letter to the Admiralty almost daily,
and sometimes two or three times in one day. These
letters contain many 'enclosures'. These are
letters the admirals themselves had received,
mostly from their subordinates, but also petitions
in some cases from a ship's company . They include
many reports on mutinies by the captain of the
relevant ship and reports from captains sent to
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enquire into the grievances of various ships, as
well as a host of miscellaneous papers.
The captains' and lieutenants' letters are
less useful. These officers reported regularly to
their admiral, not to the Admiralty. Indeed, to
write directly to London was clearly a departure
from normal procedure. But there are often
interesting letters generated by quarrels between
admirals and commanders, by the necessity for a
captain to explain some major failure, or be
letters from officers on shore.
The Admiralty minutes and out letter books
are almost useless for our purposes. But the
in-letters include many letters besides those from
officers: correspondence with the Navy Board, the
Solicitor's Ofice and many others. These are
occassionally useful. Fortunately, the Admiralty
maintained an index of all letters by both name of
ship and officer, so it is not difficult to trawl
for the relevant letters.
li-i using these letters, one must always bear
in mind that these are men in a bureaucratic
heirarchy justifying their actions to their
superiors. Moreover, they are providing a written
record which their superiors can and will refer
back to. And in most bureaucracies men report many
things verbally to their superiors which they do
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not put into writing. This was the case, for
instance, between admirals and ca p tains, except
when the captain was on prolonged detatched
service. All of this muddies the historical
record.
But with the admirals' letters there is a
countervailing tendancy. Their Lordships might not
see an amdiral from one year to the next. If they
wanted to know what was happening, the only way
they could find out was from detailed written
reports from the man on the spot. When an admiral
reported amutiny , it was his job to explain to his
superior what had actually happened, as well as to
justify whatever actions he had taken. So such
letters often explain clearly the admiral's
strategy in dealing with a mutiny.
Memoirs
There are several lower deck memoirs for this
period, and I have leaned on some of them heavily
in Part Two. Here J will give an outline of their
authors, their biases, strengths and backgrounds.
James Morrison, the gunner on the Bounty,
left a journal which was finally published
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in 1935. (1) It is in the form of a diary, but was
clearly written up in 1792, probably while he
faced trial for the mutiny. Most of the diary is
devoted to life on Tahiti. Because Morrison was an
intelligent and acute observer it is much the best
source on traditional Tahitian society. (2) But
for our purposes the only useful part is pages
17-30. which provide a succinct statement of the
seamen's moral economy and their consequent
contempt for Bligh. It is a pity, though, that the
diary is not more detailed, for it is the only
memoir by a mutineer.
One senses that John Wetherall might have
mutinied if he could. He was a Whitby man, bred to
the sea, one of thirteen children of a whaling
captain. He was pressed at sea in 1803 into the
Hussar, captain Philip Wilkinson. He was soon
	 -
captured and spent eleven years as a prisoner of
war in France. He left a diar y , which has been
edited. by C. S. Forester. (3) It is of limited
(1) The Journal of James Morrison, edited and with
an-introduction by Owen Rutter, London, Golden
Cockrel Press, 1935.
(2) See its use in the standard work, Douglas
er	 Un . ty ci1
P.; HRflU41. 4 	 1.7.4.
(3) The Adventures of John_Wethera)1, London,
Michael Joseph, 1954.
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value, but pages 27-106 provide an interesting
picture of Captain Wilkinson. who had been the
captain of the Hermione before Pigot. Wetherall
hated him.
The diary form in general is of little use.
Robert Wilson also left one. He was pressed into
the Navy in 1806, and one of the aims of his diary
was to keep a record of the severit y of naval
discipline. But by dint of some small influence he
was soon promoted to midshipman. He then dropped
his diary, deciding it 'would be very unpleasant
reading'. He eventually deserted. (1)
John Bechervaise was the son of a Guernsey
sea faring family. (2) He did not join the Navy
until 1820, which is outside of our period. But he
did serve in the merchant marine from 1803 to
1819, and on pages 107 -122 he has an interesting
discussion of the daily routine of a man of war.
This discussion is the more interesting because he
(1) 'Robert Mercer Wilson', pages 121-276 in H.G.
Thursfield, editor, Five Naval Journals,
1789-1819, Navy Records Society, number 91, 1951.
(2) John Bechervaise, Thirty-Six Years of a
Sea-Life, by and Old Quarter-Master, Portsea and
London, Longman, 1839. His later A Farewell to Old
Shipmates and Messmates, by an Old Quarter Master,
Portsea, W. Woodward, 1847, is thin and anecdotal.
It reads more like a hack writer's idea of sea
yarns than like Bechervaise's earlier book.
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himself became a quartermaster who always liked a
clean deck.
Mary Anne Talbot's memoirs are absolutely
fascinating. (1) They were taken down by P.S.
Kirby, a printer who published a sort of monthly
freak show of odd characters: the fattest woman in
the World, the dwarf and the giant best friends..
etc. Talbot made this galler y because she had
served in the Navy in the dress of a boy, and been
wounded at the Glorious First of June. Her memoirs
reveal a brave, determined and snobbish young
woman, but are not as revealing as they might be
about life afloat.
Robert Hay wrote up his memoirs for his
children, and one of his descendants eventually
published them. 1-le was a Paisley wearver, and
during a depression in trade in 1803 he found work
in the Navy, finally deserting in 1811. His
memoirs are entertaining, and he was clearly an
attractive man, but they are not as useful as they
might be. (2)
(1) Mary Anne Talbot, The Life and Surprising
Adventures of Mary Anne Talbot. in the name of
John Tay lor. . .related by herself, London, R.S.
•4:Ui
)	 3.nin ft;y Th
	
bt fty,
1789-1847, edited by M.D. Hay, London, Rupert
Hart-Davis, 1953.
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William Richardson also left a manuscript
memoir. In 1908 this was edited down by Spencer
Childers, the maritime novelist and Irish
Republican. (1) Richardson was from a sea going
family in South Shields: at one point in 1795 all
four of his brothers had been pressed into
different ships in the Navy. He served in coal
ships, merchantmen and a slaver, and was a gunner
in the Royal Navy for 23 years. His account of the
Navy is interesting, particularly for the West
Idruies. His account of his time as a slaver on the
§21 is very useful, and includes a detailed
account of a slave mutiny he helped to
exterminate. (1)
The three most useful memoirs are those by
Nicol, Nastyface and Leech. (2) John Nicol
followed his father in the cooper's trade near
Edinburgh. But his mind was always on the sea,
(1) William Richardson, A Mariner of England,
London, John Murray, 1908.
(2) The Life and Adventures of John Nicol,
Mariner, edited by John Howell, foreword and
afterword by Alexander Laing, Cassell, London,
1937; Samuel Leech, Thirty Years from Home, or a
Voice from the Main Deck, Boston, Tappan, 1843;
Jack Nastyface (William Robinson) Nautical
Economy, or Forecaste Recollections, London,
William Robinson, 1836.
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because 'the first wish I ever formed was to
wander, and many a search I gave my parents in
gratifying my youthful passion.' (1) There was
always work for coopers afloat, and from 1776 to
1800 Nicol served in Naval ships, various
merehantmen, a Greenland whaler and a South Sea
whaler, and on a convict ship. He was pressed at
sea in 1794 and served in the Edgar, the Goliath,
the Ramilies and the Ajax. The striking thing
about Nicol is his human sympathy with everybody:
women, slaves, convicts, Chinese. But if he was an
enemy to slavery and sexism, he was a also loyal
to his kings. In his words, he was 'an old tar'.
His memoirs were recorded in 1822, when he
was 67. He was then a well known character on the
Edinburgh streets, and held a status somewhere
between beggar and racounter. John Howells, an
Edinburgh printer and occasssional writer, met him
when 'he was pointed out to me as a most
interesting character. . . He was walking feebly
along, with an old apron tied around his waist, in
which he carried a few small pieces of coal he had
picked up in his wandering through the streets.
(2) Howells found his story interesting and
published it partly, I think, to help Nicol
(1) Nicol, page 35.
(2) Nicol, pages 215-16.
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financiall y . Alexander Laing in his 1937
postscript says that the style is nothing like
that of Howell's other books, so it must have been
Nicol's own style. (1) Nicol was clearly a
polished storyteller who had spun his yarn many
times before. But his style was not old tar okey,
and there is no reason to believe him less than
completely truthful. Nicol has long been the
favouring inemoirist of naval historians. (2)
'Nastyface' has not. William Robinson was a
printer in Cheapside in 1836, but he had served in
the Navy from 1805 to 1811. He wrote under the
name 'Jack Nast y face' , a common term of address
officers used when they could not remember their
names.
In Robinson's preface, addressed to the
'Brave Tars of Old England', he tells them that he
aims to rell the truth, and more so than any
officer or gentleman's account, for:
(1) Nicol, pages 221-23.
(2) For a rather different evaluation of many of
these memoirs from mine, see Christopher Lloyd,
The British Seaman, 1200-1860, A Social Survey,
pages 199-207.
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A statement, written on a seaman's chest
below, is likely to be as accurate, to what
passes 'tween decks, as the flowery display
coming from the cabin dilletante. .. for all
you know that the men in the foretop can give
a better description of what passes in the
horizon, than the gallant observer, however
gifted by education, whose eyes rise but
little above the drum-head of the capstan.
The order of the present day, on land,
it seems is reform:- then why should the
sea-service have its imperfections unattended
to? To bring about, therefore, a reform in
that all-important department of state, it
is, that without being considered an improper
intruder, I may be suffered to offer for
public consideration my mite of information.
(1)
The rest of the book is in keeping with this
perface: angrily class conscious, frnkly political
and clearly allied with. reform movement on shore.
Robinson hated the officers of the Royal Navy when
he was in it, and twenty-five years later he hated
them still. He was not a radical who brought his
(1) Nastyface, pages iv-v.
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politics to the Navy: the Nav y made him radical.
This frank and manly attitude has not endeared him
to most naval historians, and his book has been
little used.
But for the historian of the lower deck it is
a mine of information. Because Robinson had a
political argument to make, his 124 page book
analysed the Navy, rather than producing a
catalogue of his adventures or a diary of daily
events. Because he hated naval discipline, he
tells us more about it than any lower deck writer.
Samuel Leech was born in Wanstead. His
parents were both servants, but his cousins were
sailors and he volunteered for the Navy at the age
of 12 in 1810. He deserted to the American Navy at
the age of 14, was recaptured and remained a
prisoner of war until 1815, living in daily dread
of discovery.
He finally settled in Connecticut, moving
from trade to trad and then opening a shop. When
he attended his first tent meeting he heard his
first sailor-preacher, the Rev. E. E. Taylor. As
he listened, he felt 'unutterable delight'
Still I feel the tears chasing with each
other down my cheeks, as I grasped the hand
of the 8ailOr preacher so firmly, that it
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seemed I should never let go: while he,
seeing my emotion, observed, "Never mind,
brother, we are on board of Zion's ship now".
(1)
Leech joined the Methodists and married a
Yankee girl, he backslid from time to time: drink
was always a minor problem.
His book is well written and caustic. He is
by now a Yankee through and through. He is
concerned with presenting the facts. He feels a
proletarian anger towards the officers. He is an
American nationalist. He reagrds sailors not as
degraded animals but as suffering fellow sinners.
It is the politics of the Yankee artisan:
agressively egalitarian, proud of America,
contemptuous of rank, hard working, Christian and
abolitionist. Leech was a thoroughly decent man.
He was also the most perceptive of forecastle
writers, because he was the one with the most
analytical mind.
(1) Leech, page 272.
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Other Sources
A variety of other sources have been used.
The most important of thses is Thomas Hodgskin's
An Essay on Naval Discipline, published in 1813.
Hodgskin, of course, went on to become 'one of the
most important of the English economists.' (1) But
he began life as the son of a clerk in a naval
dockyard, and was lucky that his father was able
to find him a place as a midshipman. He eventually
passed his exam for lieutenant and rose by
seniortyto the post of first lieutenant. A man of
(1) Karl Marx, Capital, Volume One, translated by
Ben Fowkes, London, Penguin 1976, page 1000. For
Hodgskin's life see Elie Halevy, Thorns Hodgskin
(1787-1869), Paris, 1903. For his economics see
his Labour Defended Against the Claims of Capital,
London, 1825, and Popular Political Economy,
London, 1827. For comments on his ideas see
William Stafford, Socialism, Radicalism and
Nostalgia: Social Criticism in Britain, 1775-1830,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987, pages
232-249, and Karl Marx, Theories of Surplus Value,
translated by Jack Cohen and S. W. Ryasanskaya,
London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1972, volume 3,
pages 263-319. None of these sources say much
about his naval career. Also interesting is
Hodgekins, 'Aboliton of Impressment', Edingurgh
Review, 1824, pages 154-181.
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his background was unlilel y to go higher. But in
the event he fell out with his captain and was
dismissed the ship after an acrimonious court
martial in 1812. He promptl y wrote his book, which
was clearly the work of a man embittered by his
humble background and personal grievance. An
excellent work, it is the only book of the period
entirely devoted to naval discipline. All previous
writers on naval discipline have ignored it,
presumably for reasons of class and politics. It
does include a few theoretical chapters of a
Benthamite slant which are now entirely useless,
but thankfully by the twenties Hodgskin had found
a more congenial place as the economist and
journalist of the labour movement.
I found it necessary to work through a large
number of contemporary manuals on the various
naval trades, but they have not been used in the
body of the thesis. Special mention, however,
should be made of John MacArthur, A Treatise of
the Principles and Practice of Naval Courts
Martial. (1) The officers memoirs and biographies
of the period proved of little use. The one source
of shich considerable more use could have been
(1) London, 1792 and subsequent editions. For
other manuals see the bibliography in Dudley Pope,
Life in Nelson's Navy, London, Unwin Hyman, 1981.
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made was the naval novels later published by the
vetrans of these years, particularly those who
served on the lower deck. (1)
For documentary records I have relied
exclusively on the Admiralty records in the Public
Record Office. This may seem almost unscholarly,
but nothing useful was found in either the various
Portsmouth record offices or the National Naritime
Museum. I stopped there, because I became
increasingly aware that I was only scratching the
surface of what could be done with the Admiralty
records. With a great deal of work in other record
offices and private collections it might have been
possible to find further useful material. But had
I had four times the time for research, I am sure
I would still be stuck in the Public Record
Office. I feel safer in this strategy after
reading Rodger's The Wooden World. This is a
magisterial, conservative and very scholarly work,
and it based almost entirely on the Admiralty
records.
(1) For an introduction see C Northcote Parkinson,
Portsmouth Point: the Navy in Fact and Fiction,
1793-1815, London, Liverpool University Press,
1948.
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